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PREFACE 
The purpoae of till• paper i• to preMnt Pblllpp G. Frank 
a• epitoml&lna aome of the develop11ent• 'tbat have occurred in the 
philo•opby of acle.nce during th.la century. Frank i• particularly 
well aulted ae a •ubject for thl• •tudy, for aeveral raa•ona. In 
the tlr•t place, b.e baa been an i.nf luential contributor to the 
growth of modern science, tbrough hi• work aa Proteaaor of Theo• 
retical Pbyeica at Prague, fr• 1912 to 1938, aact aa Lecturer on 
Physic• and Mathematica at Banard, fc• 1939 until hi• ret!zwnt 
1n 1954. DUl:lft& thia time be vaa a friead &nd ps:ofeaalonal aaao-
c1ate of audl leadlag aclentlata, .. tl\ematlclana aad logiciafta aa 
Elnatela, Caraap, Schlick, voa Ml••• bicbeDbac:b, Bobr, and 
lridpan, to aame only a f•. Pit Ditfs•tlt,1l•&aye•• deg: 
ll!SIMllrl& up~ DztP.t 'tlbt.cb. be publiabed in 1925 I.A collaboration 
wlth voa Ml•••• waa tile bible for atudenta of .. tbealtlcal phyalca 
during tb.e late Twentie• and Tb1rti••· Be produced a wide range 
of teclullcal papers from 1904 to the early Thirties, dealt..ng with 
variational calculus, Fourier •z:i••• function apacea, convex 
bodies, application• to analytical dynalca and bydrodyllalli.ca, and 
tb.e apec1aL Cb.eory of relativity. la a-. of tbeae efforta, be 
joined f orcea with velL•known colleaguea1 Like the -tb.wtlclaoa 
iii 
iv 
Pick and Lowner.1 
ln the aecond place. and perhaps more important for thia 
diacusalon. Frank waa a philosopher too. criticizing and inter-
preting modern science, and shoving an ever-increasing concern 
with its revolutionary impact on our culture. ln this latter 
role, he demonstrated a unique power of objectivity. Although he 
waa closely allied to the Vienna Circle, and the growing •new 
poaitlviam,• he managed to maintain a degree of detaduaent that 
permitted him to eee this movement in it• context, and to present 
its beat ideas without prejudice to the world at large. T. E. Hill 
has underscored this quality in setting Frank apart from the drift 
of Logical Positlviam, noting that Frank showed an unusual concern 
for philosophy and the aocial lllplicationa of sclence.2 But it is 
not juat Frank•a dual skill• aa scientist and philosopher Which 
mark him as unusual. lt la the role he played of synthesizing the 
two that proves hia leadership in the philoaopb.y of science. In 
this senae, he personifies what he sought to eatabliah throughout 
hie life • a goal summarized in the title of his last book: 
fbilosoptq of Sciyce1 , IU Lt.als Betnen Sg1;1;ce 19d fl)l:L2•0Dl!z. 
let. Laszlo T1aza, "Philipp Frank and fhyaica," in Pl!tl1pe 
[rank.1 l884·f:!6£, a pamphlet giving "Expreaaiona of Appreciat on 
aa arranged tb.e order given at the memorial meeting for Philipp 
Frank," Harvard University Memorial Church. (Pamphlet bears no 
publisher, date of publication, or page numbers.) Oct. 25, 1966. 
2Thos. E. Ht.Ll,_SC!ijRP211£! Iuoriea o( &>a&egg, Ronald 
Preas, N. Y., 1961, 444- • 
v 
As a citizen of Europe and America 1n a period racked by 
two world wars. Frank felt k.eeALy the disintegrating influences on 
our society. Yet he never despaired of the power of reason. and 
of scientific investigation as ita principal tool for guiding 
human conduct. Re would not succumb to the pressures of hysteria 
wblch cast doubt on the efficacy of science. If science ls used 
for evil e.nd•• he maintained• lt ls not the scientist !lY!. scien-
tist who is at fault, but the man who starts from faulty goals, 
and justifies them through false ideologies, and unfounded meta-
physics. Now goals are the province of morality and religion, but 
they are not a world apart from science. Sound education must 
integrate the two realms. Frank liked to cite Einstein in this 
regard: "Religl.on without science is blind; science without 
religion la lame.•3 Frank'• own words, spoken to the same Con-
ference on Science, Pbl1oaopby and Religion that Einstein wae 
addressing, are almilar. Be Said• "It must, then, be the task of 
religion, according to the modern conception of aclence, to do 
what science is unable to do1 that 1a1 set up certain goals for 
both private and social buma.n llfe and influence the dlapoaltlon 
of human beings in favor of these goala.n4 
Frank argued against the thought that scientists can be, 
3A. Einate1n1 "Science and Religion,• in ;&:iense, f:ttt·. 
oso= yd ae1igiqn 1 A sf.'pof~• Conference on Science, 
oso and Religion, N. •t • 211. 
4nscience and Democracy1 " in ii?.• ~·• 228. 
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or should be1 morally neutral. Be deplored th• cloistered view 
of acientiats who tend to accept the 1aetaphya1ca of their child• 
hood,' without crltlcia. Sclentiats bave an obligation, as 
teachers, to poiAt out the metaphysical a.nd moral overto.nes of 
their findinga 1 rather than lgnor:ing auch pr:obl•• in the name of 
objectivity. l.ndeedt aclentlata ahould be particularly well• 
suited, by reason of their train1Ag 1 to present such questions 
fairly 1 and effectively. 
Conalderlng the value of thia man'• ldeaa, thea 1 lt la 
unfortunate, and aot: a·11ttle aurprlst.ag, that so little b.aa been 
written about b.la life and peraoaallty. Perhaps this is becauae 
he lived too recently to admit of hlstorlcal perspective. 
Another factor may be the relative newness of phlloaophy of 
science aa a field of study. lt vaa aot 1 for example, until 1931, 
and then largely due to the prodding of Frank himself, that a 
Chair of Natural Philosophy vaa created at Prague, to be filled 
by R. carnap. And as late aa 1938 1 vb.en Fra.ak came to America, 
there vaa no similar position at Harvard. lt may be only after 
Frank'• contemporarlea, who joined hill in developl.ng thla field, 
have all given over to a new generation, that Frank will be 
recognised widely, and studied as a great philosopher of science. 
lt la hoped that thia paper, if it la of •ll7 permanent value, 
will help to bri.ng publicity to the man whose work it hopes to 
clarify. 
- vii 
I wish to thank four people who have patiently and thoQ&ht• 
fully solved nay probl .. s in thla study. Professor Edvard A. 
MaZiarz haa directed this theala fr• the start, uaillg a subtle 
combination of proddiag a11d encouragement for which I am grateful. 
It ia, however, for the e.nlightening personal experience of work• 
ing with him that l am aoat grateful. Dr. K.eADeth J. Thompson, 
also a faculty r91>resentative, haa posed any critical questions 
and cOllllents • atwaya ill a constructive manner. Bia auggeationa 
have effected cbaagea. Rita lreAll&l'l baa put ray drafts together 
in their final fora. Thia means she has had to decipher my hand• 
writing, aa well as correct the many errors of form and mechanic• 
she discovered iA the proceaa. Finally, 1 cheerfully acknowledge 
a debt to .., wife, Sheila, whe b.aa not only helped with the type• 
script, but haa at the same time continued to care for three cblld• 
ran and a huaband iA the Jd.ad way to 1'hich tbey are accustomed in 
leas hectic daye. 
J. s. 
GleAYiew, lllinoia 
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-PERSONAL HISTORY OF PHILIPP G. FRANK 
Philipp G. Frank was born in Vienna, March. 20, 1884, and 
died 1n Cambridge, Massachusetts, July 3 1 19661 in his eighty• 
second year. One can assume th.at tb.e Fraftk family, which 
included three children younger than Philipp, lived comfortably, 
since Herr Frank was a textile mill owner in a period of rapid 
industrial growth. Also, the fact that Herr Frank was Jewish 
suggests that the cb11dra.n experienced a high degree of academic 
and artistic trainln.g. The aucceaa of the family is attested to 
by the fact that Philipp and his brother, Joseph, got 1ntetnltiona1 
fame 1n their respective fields - the yOW'iger Frank as an architect 
in Sweden. 
Tb.at Herr Frank came from CZechoslovakia may in part 
explain why Philipp chose to live in Prague after the completion 
of his formal education 1n Vienna. He would likely have remained 
there• teaching at the Utd.veraity• had not the Nazi take-over of 
Europe forced him to C01ll9 to America iA 1938. Of course another 
reaaon for choosing Prague was that he bad been recoanended by 
Einstein to succeed the latter, who had accepted another position. 
Frank wae appointed Prof eaaor of 'lhaoretical Physic• at the 
1 
-German University of Prague1 in 1912. At age twenty•eigb.t 1 he 
was the youngest profeaaor in the achoo1 1 &lld must surely bave 
seen a better chance for development there tb.81l he would bave 
expected at Vienna. 
2 
Frank never expressed a personal comad.tment to Judaism, or 
any other re11g1oua creed. 1Adead1 one of his 11f etime acquain-
tances suggested th.at he may have been an athelat.1 The fact that 
thia acquaintance doe• aot know for sure attest• to the silence 
Frank must ba.ve kept on the iasue. Even ao, hia b.~iatic lean• 
inga, and 1 in America, hi• active role in the Conferences on 
Science, ftliloaoph)" and Religion, added to hla Jewish background, 
give cause for wondering. Certainly he must have been more than 
normally aware of Judaism, for he exbt.bited a.n intimate knowledge 
of the life of Jews in Prague, and a peracmal concern for bia 
asaoclatea who experienced the H1t1er1te regime 1.n Europe. Hope• 
fully, more light on this subject remai.na to be abed 1 before all 
of Frank'• peraoaal acquaintances have paaaed away. It is 
information that vlll help to clarify Fra.nk1 a position with 
respect to metapbJrsica and other non-aclentlf ic aapecta of human 
endeavor. 
2. ~qcial and_rolltictl C&!!!f.tt in F:urop9 
Through coamenta 1n his biography of Einstein, Frank 
reveal a many of the cultural and political influences that weighed 
1969. 
lMnte. R. von Mi•••• letter co Juetln Synneatvedt 1 April 10, 
3 
on Einstein and himself • influences which can account in part for 
the depth of character and philosophical interests Frank displayed. 
At the time Frank was completing his doctoral work at Vienna. 1 
under Boltzmann, the Hapsburg emperor Franz Josef controlled the 
large but shaky Austrian Empire including Austria 1 Hungary, 
czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and parts of Poland, Rumania and 
Germany. To the north lay the German Empire, under the Hohen-
zollern ~izer Wilhelm II, extending roughly from Russia to the 
Atlantic, including Prussia as its most powerful state.2 The 
whole of these two empires underwent unceasing turmoil which lastacl 
throughout the nineteenth century, especially after 1848, and into 
the twentieth century, and which led partially to the two world 
wars. Relative stability did not come until after 1948, and then 
only because it was imposed by the rule of Russia in the East 1 and 
the unifying fear of Russia in the West. 
Racial and national prejudices added fuel to the political 
fires. In 19101 for example, when Einstein was asked to fill the 
Chair of Theoretical Physics, "There was already•" Frank tells us, 
"a group among the Germans who propagated the idea of the •master 
race,• aad frowned upon any intercourse with 'inferior races.•3 
Since 1888 1 when political quarrels had caused the Austriaa 
gover.maent to divide Prague into two separate universities, there 
2ct. Smith1 Muzzey and Lloyd, World History, Ginn and Co., N. Y. 1 1955, 355-387. 
3Etnstein; His Life and Timef 1 80. 
had been little connection• and less goOd will, between the two 
institutions. Frank continue•• *'(T)he general attitude of 
superiority and hostility agalnat the Ollech• waa quite evldeot 
among the German profeaaora and t:helr familiea."4 
4 
The 1rratioaa11ty Of the aituation made a lasting imprea• 
sion on Frank, who often• in Later work, used example• from. 
Europeaia politic• to demonstrate Che da.agera of non•aclentlflc 
thinkt..ng. ••one of the cemarkable alld frequently cond.cal aspects 
of thia hoetilityt 41 Frank. coanenta, "was that there was not even 
the slightest difference betveeA the GeJ:t'Dana &Ad the Csechs in 
Prague ao far as race and origin were concerned. The question of 
which nationality one belonged to vaa often a question of personal 
taste and which offered opportunities for earning a living."S 
Frank gives, as a.n example, the CAM of Anton Lamp&, who waa 
instrumental in bringing Eiaatein to Prague. Lampa1 a C.ech by 
birth, waa juat as b.oetile to tbe Cllecb.a ae were the Gerllan8 1 and 
clloae to enter the Ger:man Utd..veraity S..O Prague, where he became a 
student of Ernst Mach.6 
It la intereating that Frank himaelf chose to remain in 
Prague, although. hi.a pbiloaopblcal ldeu •tarted I.ta Vienna, and 
contl.n.ued to center around Che VlaDrul Circle which he helped to 
eatabliah there. He later started vb.at mi.ght be called the 
41.Ji!W.. t 8 0. 
s1lU&,., s1. 
61W,., 81. 
s 
•Prague segment• of the Vienna Circle. He alao managed to inatl• 
tute a <l'&air of Natural Philosophy at Prague, and to persuade 
Rudolf car.nap to fill it. Perhaps tbe geographical isolation from 
Vienna was to Frank'• liking. It ia certain that it added to his 
sense of detachment from the activities of the Circle. Cernap 
supports this point, speaking of Ma own daya at Prague. "My life 
in Prague, without the Circle,• C&rnap tell• us, "was more aoli• 
tary thaA it bad been in Vienna. 1 used moat of rq tlme for con• 
centrated work, especially on the book on logical syntax. .By 
frequent visits I also stayed 1.n close contact with my philosoph• 
ical fri.enda 1n Vlenna.•7 
Re11giOA waa a.nother factor 1n the curtnoil. Frank tells us 
that Franz Josef refuaed to confirm Einstein'• appointment to 
Prague, unleae the latter should expreaa his connection with a 
•recognised cb.urdl. 1 Although Einstein bad bad no formal connec• 
tions with Judaism since hie high amool days, he complied with 
the Emperor•• wi.sht putting his religion down on the appointment 
forms as "Monie," wbicb. waa the name given to Jews at that time. 
lt was, incidentally, only after ha became acquainted with the 
condition of the Jews during b.la days at Prague that Einstein 
became personally CO!llllitted to a particular religious denomina-
tion. His general taste was more for vb.at he called a 'co8Jlic 
religion.• 
71! '9~lo12R1&r Rf Ry.del.f QuMR, ed. P. A. Scb.ilPPt Open 
Court, 1 • • 
6 
The poai.tion of the Jewa i.o the Pr:agua comnunity was para-
doxical. Frank, hi.Blaelf a Jew by birtb1 notes that 1'More than 
baLf of the German-speaking inhabitant• in Prague were Jewish, so 
that their part among the Germana, who comprised only about five 
per cent of the total popu1ati0ll was extraordinarily iaportant."8 
To the Qaechs1 there was no practical dif fere.nce between Jw and 
German. Botb. wece to be a\i.at.ruatad aa agents of a f or:eigA power 
which wae apparently bent on driving Chem lnto war. Frank clar-
ifies tbis paradox. 
an t.be other .band, the relation of the Jews to 
the other GeJ:ID&na had already begun to assume a 
problematical character. Former Ly the German mln-
or1ty in Prague had befriended the Jews as allies 
against Che upward•atriving Czecb.s1 but tb.eae good 
relations were breaki.ng down at the ti.me whe.n 
Einatein •• in Pr:ague. Wb.en the racial theories 
and tendencies that later cane to be known there aa 
Ndi cceed were st:ill almost unknown in Germazay 
itself, they had already become an lmportant influ-
ence among the Sudetan Germa.t:UI. Hence a somewhat 
paradoxical situation existed for the Germana in 
· Prague. They tried to live on good terms with tbe 
Jews so as to have an ally against the Czechs. But 
they also wanted to be regarded as thoroughly German 
by the Sudetan Germans, and therefore manifested 
b.ostilit:y agai.nat the Jewa. 
Such idiocy within and with.out the academic community, as 
Frank here outlines in regard to Einstein, must also have had much 
influence on Frank h1mse1f 1 who was not only a close friend, but 
also Einstetn•s moat able interpreter in the 1ntellectua1 com-
7 
munit1'• It was Ei.Aatelll who bad determined that Frank should 
replace hlm, when the former left Prague lll 1912. There can be no 
question that Frank was greatl.7 affected by the abuse directed at 
many of the men whom Frank ltnew and respected. How much more must 
have been b.is horror wb.eA hi• peraona.1 friends and he had to flee 
Europe or be killed by the Naaia. Morita Schlick was aaaasalnated 
in 1936t by a fanatical student at Yieua. Ludvig Berwald and 
Georg Pick were killed ln concentration Cflllpa. '?be latter, who 
vas Chairman of the liathematics Department, had been Einstein 1 s 
closest colleague before Frank arrived. 
3. Kt'b.tBfH Dt7t Ma V&MQA 
Frank received hi.a Ph. D. fr• V:leml& University ill 1907. 
The next f ev years, until bJ.a appolllt:ment to Prague, he spent in 
fruitful r:eaearcb Aftd wt.ting. Having ilab1bed EiAatei.rl•a theory 
of 1905 more thoroughly tha.n any of his contemporaries, he must 
also have seen it•' philosopbical implications more sharply, for 
he began J.nmediate1y to write papera relating to the philosophy 
of acie.n.ce. He published "Kauaalgeseta W1d Erfatu:ung" in 19071 
''Mechanismus oder Vitaliamua?• in 1908, 0 Gibt ea ei.ne abaolute 
Bewegwigt" in 1910, and 11Daa .Re1atlv1t:atapri.nzip und di.a 
Dllrstellung der physlkalisdlen Eracheinunge.n im vierdi.menslonalen 
Raum" in 1911. lb.e fl.rat paper, Oft causa11ty1 waa ve11 received 
with reservations by Einstein; it was sharply condemned by Lenin. 
1ll his characterlatic modesty, Frank says of the paper that it 
p 
8 
contained some raah ovaratataaenta.9 He cltea, as an example, the 
thought that causa11ty "can be neither confirmed nor disproved by 
experience; not, however, because 1.t la a truth known a priori, 
but because lt ls a purely conventional definition."10 
During this same per1odt Frank spent many enjoyable hours 
eaeh week in informal discussions wb.S.eb. led eventually to the 
founding of the Vienna Circle and Logical Positivism proper. He 
tells us. in the Introduction to tlo4!li!1 Sgiease AQd ltt ftije~o,2bz. 
I used to associate wltb a group of students wb.o 
assembled every Thursday night in one of the old 
Viennese coffee bouaea. We stayed until midnlght and 
even later, discusaing problem• of science and phiL-
oaopbJ'. OUr i.nterfft was spread widely over many 
fields, but we returned again and again to our central 
probl•: How can we avol.d the tradi.tiona1 ambiguity 
and obscurity of ph11osop!J.Y? ilow can we brlng about 
the cloMat poaaib.Le E'Plf .... I betvee.n philosophy 
and science? Sy •scieJ.'lce~ not mean •natural 
aet.ence• only! but we included always social stud.lea 
and tb.e hunan ties. 
The broadness of scope indic:ated here waa not just an 
academic openmlndednese. Frank tells us that one of his asso-
ciates in the group, Otto Neurath• even joined a Theological 
seminary for a year in order to learn more about the Catholic 
faith. Theirs was a real living coamitment to the advancement 
9t.. N. Ridenour, Review of t1QSBQ Sc&~ l!lf~fil ~&L-
012oh1, in i:J.1$YJtdat Be:ln ti'. !:iS&ASY&'lt Juyo~ , ~ 
10c1.ted in ~ro ,SQtACS! yd 1;1 fh&l2101?b.Y• Cambridge• 
Mass.• 194-9• 54. 
p 
of understa.ndi.ngl We shall discuas the Vienna Circle movemeat 
below, in Chapter 11. 
4. fraols'• lAfomaL §PLt 
lt is important to etresa the l.nforma11ty of these coffee 
house seaalons, for it is illustrative of the deaire Fra.alt had, 
as a teacher and student, t:o make learnt.ng a delightful thing 
instead of a drudge, and t:o laaure tbat ldeaa ehould relate to 
the students• real experience outside the classroom situation. 
9 
In this attitude, P'r&nk waa advancing t:achnlques that are being 
studied today in educational pqcb..oLogy. Einstein and Frank held 
similar views about the motivation to learn. Frank says of 
Einstein, "Tile charm of Illa lectures vaa due to his unusual 
naturalneaa, the avoidance of every rhetorical effect and of all 
exaggeration, forma11tyt and affectation. He tried to reduce 
every subject to its alanpleat logical fora and then to preaent 
this simplest form artiatlcal.ly and psycbo1oglca11y ao tb.at: it 
would lose every semblance Of ped&Atry, and to render it plastic 
by means of appropriate, strik.1ng picturea.•11 
These same traits were even stronger in Frank's own teach-
ing style1 as is evident from the c:onaenta made by many of his 
students and colleagues. la some reminiscences given 1n honor of 
Frank.1 prefacing the 1965 volume of l21t2n S%1!5"t!! 1n the 
10 
na.101opb.Y of Scl:Mfiilt .Raymond Furth pictures his former teacher 
and colleague thus. 
tb.e flret leccure course he gave (in 1912) waa 
OA Maxwell'• 1:1utoxy of electro-magaet1a1 aod •Olle of 
USt 1.ncludt.ng C2aarlea Loa'llOel." &ad the late Arthur 
Wi.nterm.tz, had selected thi• courae although we were 
only begiAnera. At f1rat Prank did net reallae tb.a.t 
tba courae would be attended by ft.rat year atudenta, 
who had .ao knowledge of partial derlvatt..vea• differ• 
e.atial equat:iOAa and vectors; but Oil being told so 
he took great trouble in helping WI to overcome these 
difficulties. 
His style of lecturlq was, on the face of lt, 
rather eaay golng and slow, ud he normally devoted 
the f 1rat quarter hour of each lecture to a repetl• 
tlon of the ccmtenta of the preceding lecture. But 
1n tlda _,. be made WI understand the subject 
thoroughly, 1a spite of our iaexperience, and to 
arouse our enthuaiasm for it. ••• 
frank alao 11ked to t•cb. apecl.al.ised and top• 
lca1 IUbjecta by way of aemlnara, where tb.e more 
aenin atudeata were given tbe task of reportlag 1n 
turn oo cbaptei:a of book.a or papers. He did, of 
courae, moat of the talking himself, interrupting the 
students freque.ntl;y 1.n order to emphasize salient 
pol..nta and to make c-.nta. 1 especially r:-.mlNtr 
a aeud..nar on relatlvity theory, Frank's main field of 
1.ntereet at that ttme. We found the•• •-i•r• moat 
enjoyable because they were conducted in an informal 
a.ad f rien.dl;y acmoapher:e and brought WI 1n closer 
personal contact with Fra.nk..lZ 
Another of Frank'• ex-students, Peter Bergmann, voices the 
aame admiration for Frank'• manner, especially effective in the 
pre-World•War•ll decade. Bergmann had been forced to Leave his 
native letlin 1A 1933, and took up his further studies at Prague 
F 
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b$cause it was nthe Least inexpensive by a considerable margin."13 
In this overheated and jittery atmosphere there 
was one fatherly figure who represented all that was 
best at the University, Philipp Frank. As Einstein 
once said of him: "His shirt migllt show grease spots, 
but his mind was always in apple-pie order." Philipp 
Frank never, in the three years I was at his Institute, 
began a class on time; he might be late anywhere from 
twenty minutes to over half an bour, and that for a 
forty-five minute period. But he was full of sparkle, 
fttl.1 of stimulus. After class he would drift into 
the Institute library where wa11auachek and I took 
care of the collection of book.a, and he would talk 
about politics, about physics, about anyth1.n.g that he 
might have picked up at the "Kaffeehaus." He encour-
aged all of ua students, and he gave WI the f ee11.n.g 
of a wide-open intellectual window, open to things 
that happened ln and out of physics, and open to 
things that happened outside the country as well. 
Philipp !'rank. saw to it that there was close contact 
with philosophy of science, presided over by carnap, 
with experimental physics at Furth's Institute down-
stairs, and with pure mathematics, which was taught 
by Professors Berwald, Lowner and Winternitz. 
Time and time again, the trait which aeems most to have 
impressed Frank's students, friends and colleagues, was his 
ability to accommodate and distill his great erudition into 
Language that could be at once humorous, exact a.nd inspiring. 
One is reminded of a comment Frank made about Einstein, which is 
again equally applicable to himself. Frank notes that the latter 
seemed to look upon life with aft attitude of amusement, which 
came not from any disdain, but from a confictence baaed on great 
knowledge that what seems dreadfully important at present will 
13"Philipp Fran..~ in Prague," in PJ:}.ilipe Frank1 1884-1966. 
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soon change in the great acheme of thlnga.14 
Frank's acquaintances in America were equally impressed 
with his humanistic manner as had been his European friends, even 
a.f ter he was old enougb., and knowledgeable enough, to warrant a 
certain degree of dogm.atiam. Gerald Holton notes his "pursuit of 
these diacuaaiona in a hwaane and deceptively informal setting, 
rather than in a atuffy 1 ex 2•5.b.t!IEI maaner.ulS Slailar praises 
come from another of hie Harvard friends, E. c. Kemble. 
Hia waa a gentle, unassuming spirit combined 
with a Luminous mind and gif ta of simplicity and 
humor that endeared b.im to all. He underat:ood the 
nature of truth and the criteria that must be used 
to separate truth from mythology. He was a humanist 
aa well as a scientist and philosopher. He under-
stood the predicament of modern man as men who 
devote themselves to a single discipline cannot; he 
understood because he was a reader as well as a 
thinker, a historian aa well as a scientist, a co~­
versationalist as well as a writer and Lecturer.16 
Let o.ne more citation auff lce for now to demonatrate 
Frank's effect aa a man upon hia atudenta• personal development. 
Kurt Sitte recalls that FraAk 1a iAitial lmpreaaiona were .not 
14ct. ii1!1t1W!: Hie L if 1 a.gd Ii.Mt• 
150ne wonders why Professor Holton used these, and other, 
identical worda to describe Frank on three separate formal occa-
aiona, one of them being before Fraok•a death. Fi.rat, in his 
contribution to tb.e Preface, "In Honor of Philipp Frank," of 
Bfatog ~tudi11, Vol. 11 1 1965. Second• 1n the Memorial MeetLng 
c ted a ove, Note 12, and third, in an article entitled, "In 
Memory of Philipp Frank, .. which was signed by Holton, E. C.Kemble, 
w. v. Quine, s. s. Stevens, and M. G. White, and which appeared in 
PQ&101opbz of SS\fACA 35, March, 1968, 1-5. 
1884 _19~~~Pnilipp Frank's Years at Harvard,u in Pf;l11i2p Frank, 
always good, especially for tbe aggreaaive atudenta. 
(W}e thought him lazy at first, until a little 
of bis wisdom1 so generously and in good humor shared 
out to us, had rubbed off to give us tile rudiments of 
maturity. He uaed to come very late to bis lectures, 
a.ad then to present the creu only while leaving all 
the dirty details for us to work out. Again in bis 
seminars on the then modern qua.Qtum theory he seemed 
content to learn new tM.terlal through our poor efforts 
• though. when we got stuck, it waa alwaya a sharp 
remark of hi• which pointed the W&1' to ua. By that 
time Philipp Frank had become deeply interested in the 
philosophical problem• of science, and thla, of course, 
accounted for what ve pb.11iatinea bad deemed hie 11azi-
aeaa.1 But we learned from him in this field, too, 
almost without knowing it. I atill recall 1113' amase-
ment when by his words auddaaly my eyea were opened 
to perceive lnterrelatioaa which 1 bad never eve.n 
vaguely auapected • and withouf7hia help, mi.gh.t not have realized for a long timt1. 
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Outside as well as in the classroom, Frank was entertaining 
and friendly. He and his wife, Hania, vere welcome guests on 
social outings, among the students as well as with the faculty. 
The Franks were forced by economic necessity to lead wh.at might be 
caLLed a rather bohemia.n lif•t aside from th.air natural proclivity 
for spontaneity and coffee house geniality. They lived in Pra.ak'a 
office at the Ph.yaica Laboratory1 during the early part of their 
marriage. Mra. Frank, who had little domestic training, was 
forced to cook meals on a Bu.o88D burner. Frank tell• an amuaiag 
atory about this peri0d 1 wh.en Einstein paid th .. a vlait after a 
number of years absence from Prague. After touring some of their 
p 
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old cafe b.aunta, Frank aad Einstein went back to the apartment for 
lunch, bearlng some meat that El.natein had purchased aa a kindness 
to Mrs. Frank. 
We came home (Prank relatea) brlftging some 
calf 'a liver that ve bad purcbaaed. While my vife 
bega.n to cook tbe liver o.ra the gaa burner, 1 aat 
with Elnatei.A taUd.ng about all aorta of thiJlga. 
Suddenly Einstein Looked apprehensively at the 
liver and jumped at my wife: "What are you doing 
t:heref Are you boillng the liver 1n water? You 
certainly know that the bolliftg•point of water is 
too low to be able to fry lives: 1n it. You muat use 
a substance with a higher boilillg-poi.ftt such aa 
butter or fat.". My wife had bee.a a college student 
until th.en (1921) and knew little about cooking. 
But Einatein'• advice aaved tbe lunch; a.ad we got a 
source of amusement for all our married life, 
because 'Whenever 1E1nate1n1a theory• was ment1o.aed 1 
my wlty8remembered h1a theory about frying calf 'a 11ver. 
5. f,;fA\<. ae ! §St\9L1; 
In spite of all this apparent informality and good-natured• 
neaa, Frank was a hard worker, and a profound thinker. Oae reason 
he was so effective as a teacher is that he knew all the back-
ground and ramifications of the problems he vas addressing, and 
could pick out the clearest, most appropriate illustrations, and 
acconmodate them in language suitable to the student. One of his 
students at Harvard, Jeremy Bernstein, discusses Frank' a ••almost 
incredible erudition, 0 and its effect on those who aaw it. 
p 
He seemed to have read and digested the great 
ph11oaophlcal• literary a.nd acientiflc works in an 
e.normous vart.ety of languages. He 0t1ce told me that 
he had studied Arabic, •• a young atudent, in order 
to be able to read the great texts in that language 
and, fifty years later, he r--bered it sharply 
enough to be able to write out, micb 1 once saw him 
do in a diacwsaio.n vi.th a.n Iranian. student, acne of 
tbe paaaagee 1n Arabic that bad iAtrigued hlm. This 
vaat general culture waa alao worn inatiACtlvely, 
without prate.nae, and with the same maatery that 
characterized hi• sc1e.nt1tic cultivation. lf aome-
o.ne pressed him in diacuaalOA b.e would dig one Level 
deeper 1n bis atore of k4ow1edge to reapo.nd. Aa a 
atw:tent 1 bad the f eeliag tb.at Wbat he taught ua 
repreaented Ollly
1
§.b.e pure diati11atio.n of a vast 
reaerve beAeath. 
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In his work, Fraok kep't pre'tty well to himself, not gener-
ally teaming up with other teachers or stud.ate to aolve problems, 
or to eatabllah research projects. Be waa cordial, and often 
sb.art>...d ideas with his colleagues, but be preferred to think through 
by nimself the problems whic::b moat interested him. Apparently he 
b.ad no taste for experlmeAtal vorkt altbougb he recognlaed the 
need for it, and actively supported it. In this regard• he asked 
Raymond Furth, wbo was OAe of his student•• to do some research 
related to problems Frank vaa working on; and b.e put the Depart• 
ment 1 a laboratory fac111tiea at the dispoaal of hi• young student. 
Furth MY•• 
l was overjoyed by his offer, a.nd proposed to 
investigate the phenomenon of critical opalescence 
19"Ph1Lipp Frank as a Teacher in America, .. in l!!J.&i?S 
Frank, 1884-1966. 
of bi..ouy liquid mixtures of which 1 bad read in 
Perri.ft'• famous book the A1:91!f • Frank gave his 
assent. and aalvely unaware~ tbe dlfficultiea of 
this problem and my limited experience in experi• 
mental work, 1 started cheerfully to assemble the 
apparatus under Frank's admiring eyes. ••• 
For a short time in 1922 1:he 'black room• 
(Furth. 1s Laboratory) became a centre of attraction 
for colleagues and friend• when, together with my 
fiancee. vh.o too was one of Frank's students, I had 
built a radio receiver, and there va• great excite• 
ment 1.n the evenings, when we were able to pick up 
f ragmenta of the experlmental broadcasts of some 
European stations. As time went by the 'black room' 
became more and more crowded with my experimeatal 
research. students and their equipment, and Frank was 
always interested la tbet.r work although be never 
took a.n active part l.n lt. 
Nevertheleaa 1 awtpeet that be was not too aorry 
when, upon m;v appointment to the Cb.air of Experi• 
Jl8Ata1 Pbyaica, in 1931, thie part of tb.e activity of 
hia DepaJ:tment came to an end. ae vaa particularly 
pleased When, on ray suggestion, we got peraiaalon to 
exchan.ge the axperiaental equipment of tlle theoret• 
lcal Department vltb. the books and journals of the 
experimental Department. 'lb1s arrangement put a 
very good library at his disposal which was accom-
modated 1A the vacated black room (after lt had 
changed its co1ourl) 1 and from then on hla department 
llNtcame Oll8• again entirely devoted to theoretical 
phyaica.2 
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After World War 11 Frank ape.nt illcreaat.ng effort on quee• 
tlona of generality and ph11oeophlcal import, aa the titles of his 
publications lnd1cate1 e.g. "Die Bedeutung der phyaik.alische.n 
Erkenntniathaorle Macha fur daa Ge1atea1ebe.n der Gegenvart" ln 
1917, and "Wiaaenscb.af t urad Theologie• 1n 1920. Peter G. Bergmann 
20neaoa scucta..1. vo1. 11, xvt.. 
describes Fraak.'s work of this perioct.21 Frank lectured to 
seminars at Prague and at the Urania• with other "diati.Aguiahed 
visitors" such as Neuratb.. At the Hll8 time, he vaa ft.aiahi.ng 
17 
the second edition of 1Prank•aad•M1•••' encyclopedia of matb.e• 
matical physics. Re turned hia two-year course ill introductory 
theoretical physics over to Walter Glaaer 1 who later unfortunately 
became a tool of the Nazia1 so that he might concentrate on 
"frontier eubjecta.• like Dlrac•a theory of th• electro.n1 and the 
two relativity theories. Bergmann con.elude• b.ls homage wltb. tbia 
summary statement: "OUr att1tUdea toward acience and rsaearch 
were formed by the attitude that pervaded all your taacb.i.Ag and 
writing act1vltlea; the quest for understanding• and th• search 
for unifying principles.• 
6. [.r!.{lJs goyes Se th! United Stat11 
In 1938 Frank came to give a series of lectures on a tour 
of the United States. That aame year CZechoalovakia vaa sacri• 
ficed to tlle Nazis at the 1.nfamoua Munich Confere.nce. The sub• 
sequent war in Europe prevented Frank from going home. Consider• 
1ng the long time be bad watched the build-up of Nazism, Frank. 
could scarcely have been caught unawares. Numbers of his profes-
sional associates bad already left Europe. especially those of 
211tftoms.ge to Professor Phi.Lipp G. Frank, .. in Bot~2!.! 
3iugi•lt Vol. 11 1 x. 
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Jewish extraction• like Einstein and W1ttge.natein. Nonetb.el•••• 
rra.ak was not able to take up his work 1n America without a hitch. 
try1.t'lg first to get into Olicago University, he found that lnsti• 
tutio.a to be already overloaded with refugee professors. After 
his lecture tour, he and his wife wnt to Boston. Ba.rvard bad no 
suitable chair for him to fill either, but with the support of 
Harlow Shapley and Percy Bridgman• a position was made for him 
temporarily as "research associate in physics a1ld philosophy." 
Two yeara later he waa given a peJ:'llalleAt job at Harvard, with the 
title of Lecturer on Pb7slca a.Ad Mathematica, on a b.alt•Cime 
basis • oae semeater at HaJ:"Vard • the next away. Thia arrangement 
allowed him to teach at other universities around the country, 
and added to b.ia f1.Mnc1a1 support. Frank filled this post until 
19541 when he retired.22 
The same year Frank came to the United Statea-1938--carnap 
and Neurath, who had left Europe earlier, along with the American, 
Charles Morris, publiahed the first part of their LoC•£PttiQP!l 
EnsxsLQR!s31a of U'!drf1&4 ssi!!1Rlt at Chicago. Frank contributed 
Number 7 of Volume 11 t:9YIJd1tiqna of fb.Y•ic1 1 which was also 
publiahed under separate covers 1a 1946. Thia essay could be 
called the culmination of Frank'• thougbta ill th.a strict vei.D of 
Logical Positivism. After thia ti.me, Frank seems to have 
22cf. E. c. Kemble, 11Greetlnga to Pbilipp Frank,n in l21ton 
Sg.e1, Vol. 11, and also E. C. Kemble' ttPb.111pp Frank's Years 
at rvard 1 " in Nllc2R F;W1 1884-19§ • 
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moderated hia zeal for the unity of science movement, thus aetti.ag 
himself apart from lta more enthuaiaatlc supporters in the Vienna 
Circle• especially Neurat:.b.. Robert Cobell comments on Frank's 
conception of 'unity of science• I.A memorial remarks of 1966, 
asking rhetorically vb.at Frank t.bougbt of tbe "aclentif ic co.ncep• 
tio.n of the world." 
Did he believe he vaa part of a revolutionary 
trendf or if .not h•• ••• perhap• tbe uaity of 
acie.nce movemea.t and the logical empiricist ohi1-
osophyT ••• (Neuratb. bad •struggled for it;l 
carnap was 'toucb.iagly hopeful' of l t) the same 
hope ahinea through Philipp Frank's papers, partic• 
ularly I.A the selection iii ~ ~ciu,c,e a~ lg• 
e'JroagQl'lY. Frank's life worwaa auccessfu, ~ut 
was modest enough and intelligent enough, to see 
that the unity of science waa not a directly public 
affair. True, it was a public movement of some 
scientists and philoaopbera for a decade or two, 
but 1 believe Philipp cherished it more as an 
international sa.mtnar and coffee-b.ouae. ••• 
Finally! unity of science meant unity of all forms 
of know edge and awarenesa 1 and it was for Frank a foundation for humane education. 
Witb. good friend•• b.e brought the lnatitute 
for the Unity of Sele.rice alive 1nto the American 
philoaopbical world, with publications and witb. 
meetings here in Boato.n and elaew.bere. The last 
major aaaem.blage of the laatt.tute, at which he pre• 
aided• was its joint meeting with the Amert.can Asao• 
ciatioo for the Advancement of Science 14 Boaton in 
1953.Z3 
Ln certain reapecta, one might characterize Frank'• 1.lfe 
in America as his pragmatic period, for it vaa here that: ha could 
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put to practice, in. a wide variety of writings and lectures, the 
tb.eories he had developed in Europe. He began to concern himself 
more a.nd more with the philosophy of education, and the real 
effects of science on society. In his little book, Rtla£ivitv; 
A BA:SMu& ]Fp.tt}J4 he defended scientific relativism as a healthy 
attitude, and criticized the anti•scientific reactions of a war-
conscious public. He wrote criticisms of sciencF< teaching, and 
offered practical solutions to the faults be noted. His own 
teaching at Harvard became more and more popular, attracting many 
students from non-scientific curricula to attend - often as many 
as two hundred fifty per course. 
ln addition to these strict academic efforts, Frank found 
time to participate in a variety of organizational work. He 
became a director of the Conf erenee on Science, Philosophy and 
Religion, which. met annually in New York from 1940 to 1950. He 
presided for ma.ny years over the Philoaoph.y of ScieAce Associa-
tion. The Institute for t:b.e Unity of Science, co-founded by 
Frank and some of his friends, also had bis services as president. 
He addressed many international congresses in science and phil-
osophy, including, for example, the 12th International Congress 
of Philosophy in Venice, 1958, at which he gave the opening paper. 
Tho Harvard Shop Club o.n the Science of Science often heard his 
ideas, as did the frequent Boston Colloquia for the Philosophy of 
science, at which he uas a regular, a.nd active, attendant. The 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences held a special conf crence 
21 
in 1958 on "Science and tho Modern World View," and dedicated it 
i.n honor of Frank and Bridgman, who were reti:d.ng from active 
teaching. Similarly, the Proceedings of the 1962-1961.1 Bos ton 
CoLloquiurn bears a preface containing 0 Greetings to Philipp Frank0 
from many friends tiho wished to do him ho.nor. 
7. f;apls's lnterest M1 fh3'l210Qb.Y 
Aa has been said above1 and illustrated by the papers he 
wrote and the organizations he worked in, Frank had a llf elong 
interest in philosophy. Yet it waa not always expressed :Ln the 
same way, or to the same intensity aa in later years. He tells 
us about an important change in bia approach that took place after 
the end of World War 11. 
ln a.11 my writing before 1947 l had stressed 
the point that science gives no support to meta• 
physical interpretations, of whatever type. I had 
discussed these interpretations only as reflecting 
the social environment of the philosopher. However, 
after that timel as a result of my contact with my 
students and fe low teachers, l became more and more 
interested i.n the question of the actual meaning of 
the metaphysical interpretations of science • ideal• 
istic, materialistic, relativistic, and others. For 
the fact that a great many aeientista and philoso-
phers advance such interpretations and cherish them 
ie aa firmly established, by our experience, as any 
fact of physics.25 
Frank's c:h.ange of view, mentioned here, wi!L be examined 
more closely below, in Chapter Ill. 
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A few more passages are offered here, to complete this 
general picture of Franlt and his usefulness. First, Ernest Nagel 
discusses philosophy of science, as Fra.nl< saw it .. 
Indeed, he believed th.at his cudinal aim of 
obtaining a stable perspective on Life can be best 
achieved through. a persistent and aelf •conacioua use 
of the critical intc1Lectua1 method of modern natural 
science. ••• (T)he logical analysis of the language of 
science, or the articulation of precise rules for 
assesaing evidence in conducting scientific inquiry, 
are undoubtedly centrally important tasks .... But 
as he saw it, a philosophy of science that is limited 
to the discussion of such matters ls incomplete; and 
to be adequate, it must also include certain socio• 
historical considerations. ••• Franlt was thus not a 
purist in. his conception of the philosophy of 
science, and did not hesitate to .. thicken" its con• 
tent even6tnough this disturbed some of his purist friends.2 
Joseph ~Lark, a Jesuit, underscores Frank's difference from 
the rest of his Vienna Circle companions, in rather emotional 
terms. 
For the violent revisionists of th.e Witelf: ~ and the pontificating propagandists oft e 
early issues of §.;k~tnif did .not, I thin.k.1 deae::ve the substantl support of our dear 
departed, gentle, genuine, and generous Professor 
Frank. He vas too good, too gentle, too generous 
26"Ph1.11pp Frank and the Ph.iLoeophy of Science•" in 
Philipp F;f.9151 1384-1266. 
, 
and too gc..."lUine for th.t:!r trenchant• in1;!e,ed • but 
traumatically truculen~7company. AnrI he knew it, but never said a word. 
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Although these Last woxda seem too honeyed to be serious, 
they are not out of keeping with the genuine respect and affection 
which Frank inspired in his many atUdents, colleagues and friends. 
R. Seeger, of ~· National Science Foundation, described him as 
"the ph.yaicist•s philosopher of physics.n28 G. Holton was 
impressed by h.is "apparently paradoxical combination of serious 
power and effortless style.•29 E. c. t<emb1e praised the .natural• 
ness of his teachine. "He has not been a victim of th~ common 
delusion that ideas expresi!ed in tf'c.hnical jargon are. in some way 
more important an1 profound than those expressed in plain F.ngliah. 
Nor did he ever subscribe to the notion that the difficulty which 
a Lecture course presents to its students is a measure of its 
va1ue.tt30 H. Margenau saw Frank aa 11un.1que in his generation as 
a philosopher of science who combines an expert knowledge of 
modern physics with professional competence in philoaophy.•31 
27•Pbi11pp Frank and Metaphysics," in F!U.11pp [;ank. 1§84· 
28191ton St~~''• Vol. II, x.xvl. 
29lJWi. • xviii. 
J 0 lll.W.· t x.vix. 
31 JJllsl. • '°'. 
Finally, :~iir,el liken~:d hi;n to the admirable carpentez: wb.om 
Einstein onc..-e d$serib(Jc in a parabolic atory to Frank. He is 
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the one who wouLd rather struggle 8Ad struggle to drill a single 
nice hole i.n a rotten, knotty board, than to dr11l dozens of nice 
holes in an easy board.32 
32~ •• xxv. 
CHAPTER 11 
FRANK AND LOGICAL POSITIVISM 
1. in;rodyctiog 
In order that the reader may aee Frank better in context, 
this Chapter is devoted to a conaideratlon of the philosophical 
environment with which he associated himaelf 1 and which he helped 
to develop over some thirty years. It is a movement which baa 
come to be called Logical Positivism. It should be emphasized at 
the outaet that Logical Poaltiviam ia, in fact, a movement - an 
effort at philosophical growth - rather than a fixed system of 
thought. It should also be remembered that Logical Positivism is 
an openended phenomenon, historically speaking, without sharply 
defined cut-off dates. At one end, it represents a eontlnuatlo.n 
of empirico-positlviam, stemming from the thought of men like Hume 
and Mill ln F..ngland, and Ernst Mach in Germany. At the otber end, 
Logical Poaltlviam opens to some of the moat fruitful themes of 
contemporary philosophy• especially Llnguiatlc Analysis, which 
have continued to the present. Nevertheless, we vlll concern our-
selves here oaLy with the main stream of this movement, from about 
1910 to about 1940. Thia represents the growth period of the 
Vienna Circle • the center of organized Logical Poaltivlam • from 
ita lnceptlon to its disruption by World War II. 
25 
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One wonders where to place Freak in this movement• if be 
belongs at all. In the firat place• tbe movement contained such a 
wide variety of per:sona11t1ea and opiaiona that it is difficult to 
define it ill more tb.aA broad-br:usb outlines. Secondly, aa baa 
been suggested above, Frank himself was not a static thinker; he 
developed within and without tbe main thrust of the Vienna Circle, 
wb11e managing always to keep a rather objective detachment from 
it. Especially with respect to metapbyalca, he gradually moved 
away from the main drift of thia group - more ao after World 
War 11 • when his contact with American teachers and students 
widened his outlook on philosophy. 
2. tJ.\! settiu: A Cr1•ii1 y ss&.ep~ifi.s thoygbt 
Frank presents a short history of Logical Positivism ill his 
book zwg1ra kltnct Md &ti £hlL01om. There he tell• us that 
the turn of the twentieth century waa characterized by feelings of 
uneasiness over the apparent failure of science (!11,.. mechanistic 
science) to give truth, or, in Frank'• words "a real understanding 
of the world." J. c. Maxwell's work in electromagnetic theory, 
and the experiments of Michelson and Morley in optics had cast 
doubt on the certainty of Newtonian laws. which bad theretofore 
been accepted as the irrefutable pictus:e of the universe. In 
mathematics. great changes were brought about during the nine-
teenth century which added to the confusion. David Hilbert• for 
example• developed the vi.w that geometry 1• a purely formal 
science, and has nothing to say about the real world. The thought 
, 
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th.at mathematics haa exiate.ntial content goea back at least •• far 
as the Greeks, yet Hilbert auggeated that the connections we 
normally make between the axioms of geometry and the things of our 
experience are only coave.a.tiona; aucb coaventiOAa in .a.o vay tell 
ua that geometry la a true picture of reality. In order to 
establlllh thla idea, Hilbert widertook, aucceaafu1Ly1 to build a 
complete formalization of Euclidean geometry. Without changing 
the ayatem at all, be e11111nated every c:o.a..nect1on between the 
atatementa of geometry and those of nature, auch as the process of 
determining congruence which 1.nvolvea auperimpoaitag one figure 
upon another to aee if they coincide. Later mathematicians, sucb 
as Richard von Miaea, were critical of thia effort toward purity, 
which seemed unrealiatlcally extreme. After all, aa Frank aug-
geata, if all m.atheaatica la truly tautological • i.e. baa nothing 
to aay about reality • it would not be reasonable to apply terms 
like point and triangle to empirical sciences legitimately, yet 
tbia la done regularly with aucceaa.1 there must, Frank and 
von Mi••• auggeat, be acne real connection, in order to yield such 
fruitful reaul.ta. At an,y race, Hilbert'• brilliant work left a 
broad area of unanavered queationa that center around the relation 
of aymbola to reality • ooe of the primary concerns of the Vienna 
Circle. 
l•eoncerning an Interpretation of Poaitlv1i:£; a review of 
von.Miaea• jttW• Llbr)Nsb 4•• bt1Siy1ayf• in 33• June, 
1942, 683-6 • 
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Albert EiAatein, publiahiAg b.ia Special a.nd General tbeodea 
of Relat:Lv1ty1 l.n 1905 a.nd 1916 rea.,.ctlvely, added to the growing 
skept1c1• about reallty. lt waa evident that hla two Principles, 
of Relativity a.ad of Conatancy, were mutually contradictory, 1f 
interpreted 1n the light of Nevto.ai.aa Mdl&nlca. Yet if this 
interpretation were disallowed, they led to observable results 
that held up nicely under teat conditions. O.ne of the moat spec• 
tacu1ar of th.eae teats was Eddi.agton•a expedition which discovered 
the bending of starlight by our aun, exactly ln keeping with 
Einstein's predictions. The question then waa: "How are prin• 
ciplea of high generality to be interpreted, if at a111• "la the 
only interpretation needed the confirmatory results of testing?" 
Thia la what Moritz Schlick• Friedrich Walaman.n, Rudolf car.nap and 
others of the Vienna Circle were to auggeat t..n their diacusalona 
of the criteria for meaning. W&lsmann'a version was, for example, 
"'lbe meaning of a statement la the method of ita verificat1on.n2 
Bridgman added the weight of hia work to this view, in a phase of 
sc1ent:l.f1c method now termed 1 operat1onatiam.• 
Max Pluck• wb.oae work led to Quantum Theory, initiated 
still further ramiflcationa oa tbe question of rea1lty. Here, the 
concern was in the poaalblllty of ft..ndi.ng any law at all. Frank 
cbaracteriaea the situation aa f ollowa, 
2K. w. Britton, in "Logical Positivism," !fCYSL2Q!dia B~!&!9t.r1.. 19661 attributes tb.ia statement to WaSJiiann. R. W. 
A by, .,,ogic•l Poaitiviam, 0 in A Q(lCical ii•torf of We1t1ra Q11oaophx, ed. D. J. o•eonnor, attribute• it to Sch [ck. 
The .a.ew acience of quantum theory gave rise to a 
repetition of the crisis that had been precipitated 
about 1905 by the relativity tb.eoa:y, but with even 
greater intensity. Again 1t vaa maintained that 
acient1f 1c method had failed. 'J.'be new theories do 
not even claim to give an 1expla.nat1on1 of the 
physical phenomeaa. They claim only to offer math•• 
matical f ormulaa from which the observable phenomena 
can be derived. ••• The ar:gmaent went mostly that 
relativity as well as quantum theory gave mathemat• 
1cal patterns without any causal juat1ficati.on.J 
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Frank says that such thoughts aa deacribed above in acien• 
tific thought threatened to bring about a violent reaction against 
science. 'I'his revolution was manif eat 1.n the tendency of certain 
thinkers to return to the old metaphya1ca for answers. To Frank 
and his associates, raised in an empirical, positivistie environ• 
ment, this would have seemed a disastrous setback. They examined 
critically the ideas of their predecessors, and their contempor-
aries, 1.n the hope of aavi.ng science from "going down the drain." 
We shall look briefly now at some men • Ka.nt 1 Macht Boltama.nn1 
Poincare1 Rey and Duhan - whose 1deaa were of major influence on 
the young Frank and his Viennese friends. 
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la view of the poa1t1Vlata 1 reactloA to •tapb.yaica1 men• 
tioned above, it 1a interesting to find that Immanuel Kant -
certainly a aetaphyalctaa - bad an important effect on the early 
thi.nking of Frank and his associates. J(ant 1 s influence was both 
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positive and negative. Fr&n.k's group agreed witb Kant's powerful 
presentation Of the active role that an obaerver playa on the 
knowledge he •Mk•. Even in the plainest of deacrlptiona, 'the 
scient1at•obaerver b.as certain physical and mental qualitlea that 
deternd.ne 1 in a sense, uh.at he diacovera. To put it ln more con• 
temporary torma 1 nature can no longer be considered as an isolated 
and objective thi.t\g to be knowt. Or, as Werner Heisenberg has 
suggested, 1.n :rht fb.Ytt.S&.15 11 Cgagee!i2A !( NfSlH"tt which Fra.nk 
reviewed favorably, ffMethod and object C&G no longer be aepar• 
ated.n4 
On the .negative aide, the Vienna group disagreed wt.th 
Ka.nt'• conviction tbat tb• fona of experience are permanent. 
Neo-1.afttlua, try"in.g to maintain this permanence, divorced meta• 
physical pr1nc1pl.ea frGll acS.eace "1' making th.- out to be prior. 
UatortunatelYt Frank auggeata, t:bla la a frultl••• effort. Such. 
a view aaeana 1 he H7'•, S that the ".metaphyalcal background has no 
releva.nce for science pr~; it ia separated by airtight valla 
from the domain of acientlflc dlacourae. In tbi• vay, acie.nce 
became aut0J1omoua vi.th re•peet to aetaphJ'aica, but the validity 
of the metaphysical assertions in the background could not be 
4c1ted 1A "Mall C0t1front• Blmaelt•" i&S»l"cJ!Y Rey,..,, Qf 
~lSt;IQIEI 41, Oct. 251 1958, 20-21. 
5tioaera §slMSft Ind lJil DJ.'919phx, 24. 
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checked by any experimental teat."6 
Ernst Mach, who held the chair of Pblloaopi:'q' of Inductive 
science at Vienna, frcm 1895 to 1901• •• another intellectual 
forebear of 1:be Vienna group. ln a at:rang17 antlmetapllyaical 
approach, he proposed that acientiflc l•••t which claim to give an 
"exp1anat10A,. of pbenwna are really juat ahortba.nd 11deacr1p• 
tiona" of ll&D7 nut•• ?beoret1cal science, then, does not have 
to be given ln tez:ma of ucha.n1ca, more t:baa in terms of any other 
branch ot science. nda meant, for Frank, tbat the i8N.ftent fall 
of med\al'lica • at l.eaat Newtonlan mecb.aalca • need not drag the 
rest of aclence down along with it. Needless to say, Frank's 
friends were relieved to discover this tl»ught as a possible way 
out for science. 
On tbe other band, aecor:ding to Macb., ao•called pure 
scleacea, J.ike mathematics a.nd symbolic logic, are no aeurce of 
truth eltber, because they are always true, and tell nothing about 
the world. Later poait1viata 1 differing from Mach, wished to make 
good use of 1:b.eae tautologoua ayatema, which they considered aa 
their primary tools for re1at1ng tbeoq and observation. 
6ct. ai&pter IX of ~~s Set.pee aM ltf ft!ilo102hz:t 
where Frank praises Ernst ~~rer as one who tr!ed successfully 
to bridge 1:be gap between traditional and modern philosophy in 
the face of mode.rn science. Yet Casairer tends to couch his 
th.oughts in terms that are too reminiscent of idealism. 
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Mach wae, in Frank'• worda, ".not the moat poverfu.l stimulus 
to ou.r actual worlr.."7 Mach did not give enough credit to matbe• 
matics and logical reaaOAing to suit Frank and his friends. some-
how, a scientist had to be more than a passive collector of facts. 
Indeed• one had to admit the organl.zl.ng functions of tb.e human 
mind; Kant had ab.awl this. Yet Kant was to be avoided as a temp• 
tation toward metaphysics. 
Macb. 1s successor at Vienna, Ludwig Boltzmann, filled his 
chairmanship from 1902 to 1906 • the years during which Frank was 
working on his Doctorate. It is surprising that Boltzmann, under 
whom Frank worked directly, apparently bad little influence, 
although he was a great thinker. True, Boltzmann was an atomiat, 
rather than a poaitiviat proper, but this did not really set him 
fundamentally apart.a Boltzma.an•a apparent lack of influence 
stems more from the way be aald things than from what he said. 
Frank tells us, 
1 remember the lectures of a great phyaiciat, 
Boltzmann, on the philosophy of physics, which 1 
attended ae a student. Despite the personal great• 
ness of the lecturer, the effect of the course was 
aligbt, because of a lack of a coherent approach. 
We can noticep on the other hand, that scientists 
who built tbes.r books around a central ldea have 
7Mod5p Ssklast Md It• fbi&oagz:, 7. 
81.n ··~=- ;fS' l~Di,ommR:r• 1401 Frank says, 
"In realitY e ~na o at a, Maxwell and Boltzmann, were 
exactly of the aame opinion. concernl.ng the getJ.eral nature of a 
physical theory as Hertz aftd Mach.• 
shaped the ml.Gd• of science students for decades. 
I mention'9 just as examples, Mach, Po1ncare 1 and 
Bridgman. 
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'lb.is must have been a good object lesson. for Frank., whose 
great concern with clarity was mentioned above in Ol.apter I. 
What was needed was a bridge between description of f acta 
and general scientific principles. Prank's group discovered part 
of this bridge in 1:be ideaa of Henri Po1.acare, Who admitted the 
function of mind, but not 1.a the 1Caftt1an a prlorlatt.c way. For 
Poincare, scientific lawa are COllVelltlOAa that are useful for 
organtzlag and predicting evellta. In 1:1'-.elvea, however, tbey 
say nothl.ng about facts (and for that reason they caanot be 
checked by experimentation), nor do they derive from the innate 
form of the human ad.lld. 
Frank canparea Mach and Poi.near• ln a single aentaru:e, 
thus: •According to Mach the general principles of science are 
abbreviated economical descrlptloae of obHrVed facts; according 
to Polacare t:b.ey are tree creatt.oaa of tile hUll&ll mlad which do .not 
tell anything a~out observed facta.•10 Frank adds, "The attempt 
to integrate the t:wo concepts into oae cob.erent ayat• •• the 
orlg1A of wbat was later called logical emp1r1c1• ... 
Abel Rey• a French historian and pbiloaopher of aclence, 
9tmsl1rn sc&Mc• yd 1g1 Pb;il,9•2Pb.tt 250. 
10l.l?Jr.d_., 12. 
-.. 
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seemed to present another element of the aougbt•f or Lntegratlon. 
Bia wa• the cleareat view of tb.e •.aev poa1t1vlamt 1 aa tb.e Vienna 
group 1!.ked to tbink Of it. Hi• book, Le Dw&e 41 m•icsme cbll 
J.-11 RbnlaQl•ee goagwnpog91p1, publt..Mecl 1a 1907, bad co.naiderable 
airing among Frank'• aaaociatea t.n tb.e coffee bouae meeti.ftga. ln 
this book, Rey writ••• 
What waa lacking 1.n Cante•• or Mill's positivism 
••• waa their ••• failure to bave eatabl.i.ahed ita a 
new form a theory of categories. Objective experience 
&nd m.1.nd are functloaa of each o1:her1 imply each other, 
and exist by virtue of each other. To say that the 
relations between ptv-alcal object• d•lve from the 
nature of these objects and to say that these relations 
are co.ostructed by OU&' ld.nda are two artlf lclal tbe• 
ortea. ••• OUr experle.nce la a ayatem,1• relation of relations. 'Dle relation la the given. l 
A third element in 1.ntegrat1.ng the roles of observation 
and theoretlzlng1 was Pierre Duhem. Dub.am emphasized the fact 
that a structural 8)"stem tell• ua nothing about tb.e world of 
observables. this French Thoad.st, Frank saya1 "exerted a atrong 
influence upon our group, and, particularly, upon my own think• 
ing."12 Part of this influence ia evident in Frank'• apparent 
study of 1 and frequent citations from• the vorka of Thomas Aqulms. 
This ls certainly not characteristic of the Logical Positlviata. 
119Q.. au,., 392, cited 1.n !iidern sc&ma !S4 lt• Mls>t• RPJD:. 10. 
12t:155H9 SQit.f!S! qd &ti ftlilOfS?RUt lS. 
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Duhe polnted out: that a acient1f ic thaoq t.s a ayat• ot 
propoaitiou, wbicb at..m, i.n tb.e •illp1Ht poaalble way, to ax.plain 
observables. Because it is a complex qat•, it will .not stand 
or fall on the baais of one so-called •crucial experiment.• Also, 
the fact that pbJ'al.cs tries to explala experimental law through 
theory 1.nd1cataa the need tor a l:U.gber level orderlag process. 
In Dub.em's opinion, "It Che object of pbyaical t:beoriea la to 
explain experime.nta1 law•• 1*1'•1ca1 tlleorJ' la not an autonomous 
scie.a.ce1 it is suborcU.nated to metapb.ysics. •13 
Dubem repreaenta the .neo-'1homlat or neo-Ariatotell.aa efttl:ta 
to lAcorporate modern acleace lnto the older utapbJ'alca. lut 
more often, Pr&Dlt suggests, t:be Mt:aphyalclana, lncluding both 
.neo-7.homiata and neo-Itantlana, tended to dlvor:ce science and meta• 
physics, aqt.ng that tb.e science was autonomous. Unfortunately, 
as has been mentioned above, t:bia divorce meant tbat tbere •• no 
way to teat the val.idlty of t:b.e metaphysics by experimentation. 
Rather than hold aucb a diaaatiafylng truce as just des• 
cribed, certain writers pcef erred to make a complete break with 
tradition. These were tb.e real advocates of the new Logical Poa1• 
tivism, of '1hom the leading representatives were Moritz Schlick, 
Hans Relchan.bach• Ludwlg Wl.ttgenat:ain, and RUdolf Carnap. 
'1\Jentieth•century positivi.am admita concepts, Frank says, 
that-tan.not lte deduced from sensory raw material," and this 
admlea1on "1• exactly t:b.e point which dlatlnguiahea twentieth-
century 1og1ca1 empiricism from .nineteeAth century 1poaitlvlsm1 
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of men like Macb.."14 Such concepts, for example, as gravitational 
field, are developec! in the 1mag1aat1on of the scientist, and 
afterward confirmed by experience. "Tb.ere la even the question," 
Frank adds, "whether Mach (himself), if pinned down, would not 
have agr~ed that the general conceptions of science are not 
'derived' fran sensory experience, but constructed by the human 
imagination to derive observable facts logically from these con• 
cepts.nlS Or, as Rudolf C&rnap was to say, •The calculus ia first 
constructed floating in the air, so to speak; the construction 
begins at the top and then adda lower and lower levels. Finally, 
by the aemant1ca1 rules, the lowest level ls anchored at tbe solid 
ground of the observable facta.n16 
Whatever dif f erencea there may be between the older and 
newer positivlatic achoola 1 however, it is certain that both were 
agreed on the need, flrat, to ellmlnate metaphysics, a.n.d second, 
to make philosophy ac1e.ntific. Thia ag~eement brought about a 
sense of unity that helps to explain why the movement was able to 
14"!instein1 Mach and Logical Positivism, .. in 6lbert 
J~•teini Ph\Lqsoeher•Sfientist, ed. P. A. Sch.ilpp, Chicago, 9, ~8 • 
15.1.ll!!· 
161Jll..s!., 276. 
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accomplish so much work.17 
4. J.anguage AnaJ.x1ia 1p the VieMa Group 
From the considerations above, one can see how the Vienna 
Circle movement came to view philosophy as primarily the effort 
to see wh.at statements mean. Meaningful philosophy can find truth 
only by the scientific critique of Language. ln the introduction 
to Modt£n Sgbence and lt1 fbiLoaophXt Frank describes aome of the 
men wh.oae seminal ideas grew into the Vleana Circle. Two of 
these, Schlick and Ralchenbach1 whose primary concern was the 
Logical uae and metapb.yslcal abuae of language, came from Berlin 
to make a lasting impression on the coffee house meetings they 
attended. Later these two came to be leading personalities in the 
movement. 
By way of introduction to the development of the Vienna 
Circle proper, r·ra.nk writes about events in Vienna after he had 
left to teach. at Prague, 
At that time (after 1920) Bans Hahn waa profeaaor 
of mathematics at the University of Vienna, /and/ Otto 
New:ath atarted world.Jlg f cr the City of Vienna, organ• 
izing adult education in the social aicences 1 ••• Hahn had started intenaive work with advanced atude.nta 
in the field of symbolic logic and the foundations of 
17K. w. Britton, in "Logical Positiviam, 0 in Eec;yclo21dl:f! 
~''t.anlcat 1966, notes aome other points of difference 6etween 
the old and new poaitiviata. He suggests that the Vienna Circle 
dif f era from Hume and Mach in placing the baai• of knowledge in 
public experiment - that la, in experiments which many persons can 
verify - rather thaa 1n private personal experience. Here one 
•••• the social criteria of truth 1 advocated by men like James and 
Dewey. 
matbematice. ln 1922, he choae aa a basis of their 
discussions the new book by L. Wittgenstein, :rracta;ua 
Logict::f9&l!t~1c!f • 1.'beee di•cussions were the germ 
ol many utw:y8 eve opme.nta ln the philosophy of science. ••• 
Frank continues, 
Hahn became very entbuaiaatic, starting a close 
cooperation of the new men with our Viennese group. 
He envisaged the appoi.ntment of M. Schlick aa a pro• 
fessor of philosophy at the University of Vienna. Re 
met, of cour .. , a atiff real.atance among the adhere11ta 
of traditional philoaopb.y. But the interest of the 
acieatleta in the philoaopb.ical background of acieace 
bas been traditionally high at the University of 
Vienna. Ernst Mach bad wed bi.a appo1at:meat to tbia 
predilection and Bahn succeeded in en.listing a sUf • 
f icient number of acieatiata 1n a drive to carry 
through Scb.11ck1 s appointment in 1922. In this year 
a close cooperation between Schlick and the old Vienna 
group began. Thia common work gained a great deal in 
1nte.na1ty a.nd momentum 11beo9Sehli.ck persuaded R. carnap to move to Vienna 1.n 1926.l 
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Morita Schlick waa a physicist vho had a personal acqualn• 
ta.nee with Rilbut• Planck aAd Elnatein. At the aame time, be was 
a philoaopb.eJ: i.n an. environment vbich afforded the moat ecclectic 
view of philoaopb.y in tbe region. While moat Garman. universities 
maintained their J.C&ntian ideanliam, Vienna offered at:u.diea in a 
wide range of 1deaa • Brenta.a.o, Deacartea, Leib.t:U.zt and Hume 
included.20 For tbia reaaon1 Schlick waa well aulted to be the 
1812QKA $SUAS! AAd It• r1\l.~1•RRbZ1 31. 
191l!J:4. t 32. 
20ct. Frank'• "Co.ncernlng an Interpretation of Posltiviam, 11 
12£. ~· 
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•first interpreter of mod.era sciel'lce.•21 publishing his book §HS! 
pd :f' N y C9GS'DR95"an: &J1i91 1.n 1917 • 
Ludvig Wl.ttge.a.ateil'l could be called a spiritual leader of 
the Vienna Circle, although he did aot aeet wt.th the group per&Oft• 
ally, due to his retiring cb.aract:er. Many of WittgeAeteln'a ideas 
developed il'l response to the work of hi• teacb.er 1 Bertra.ad RuaaeU, 
who b.ad published, la 1910, the vuy important llil\slJlK H!l!!a• 
ptica1 collaborating wi.tb. A. N. tribiteb.ead. Wlttge.neteln'• own 
work, 1n • s1m11ar vein• il;•st&hl La1sa:ML9•9"1c;u, was pub-
lished in 1922. ln tbia book., Wittgenatet.a. likened philosophical 
problem• to flies trapped i.A 1tott1••· <me baa only to see b.ow 
they gO't in to k.Dov how tbey can get out again. 1.'he problems Of 
traditional philosophy stem f ram a alaunderata.ndi.ag of language • 
fram making the wa:ong llagulatlc turn l.nadvertently. To put it in 
Wittgenstein'• own worda 1 "Wl:leD Che answer cannot be put into 
worda 1 neither can Cbe question be put 1.nto word•• 'l'be riddle 
does not exist. lf a qu.eatioa can be framed at au. 1 11: la poa• 
alble to answer lt.a22 
For t:be early Wittgenatela, language la a picture of real-
ity. '1he structure of this language will correspoad to the 
structure of the reality it pictures, if th.a language ls meaning-
2lct. Vi.ctor Kraft:, tU ~M'" Ql,;s;L1, transl. A. Pap1 
Ph11oaopb.1ca1 Library, N. Y., I . 22-· 3. cited in J. Hartnack, JAttar.•s= :tranal. M. Cranaton, Double-
day, • Y., • 
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fu1. Of course the language may become distorted, la. which case 
the resulting ideas will be nonaense.23 
Schlick was la. agreanent with WU:tgenste:t.n i.n tbJ.s regard, 
adding that language ls the form through. which experience ls 
revealed. Tb.is revelation of e:aperl•ce one calla knowledge. 
J.C.nowledge1 vb.icb. la vbat ia to be connunleated, constitutes the 
form, tG.ile experlea.ce le the content. COgn1tlon1 or understand• 
ing1 for Schlick, la tb.e process of eatabliehing a 1correapondenctl 
between facts and •Jlllbola, or *4t la the .... , between the con• 
tent and the form of experlence.24 To deteral.fte Che truth of a 
proposition, one must reduce it to its c011ponenta, and elUUld.Ae 
these sl.ngly. They are true, 1n turn, if they ean be lanedlately 
caapared with reality1 1.e. wltb. the data of experience. For the 
empiricists of the Vienna Circle, the aimpleat possible aentenQ)te, 
upon which scientific discourse can be f ounded1 are those which 
describe directly ae.n.ae perceptions like red, warm, deflected to 
the left, etc. Suell etatmaenta were called "protocol aeit.tences." 
But it aoo.n became obvl.oua that there was always, even l.n such 
simple protocol atatmranta, an element of subjective lnterpreta• 
tion that waa bothersome to a strict emp1r1c1at. Thia point 
remained a source of contention 1n the Vienna group. 
23wtttgenste1n' a lleaa are a'8Mr1zed 1n Hartnack • s book, 
JAttgWSIWl MS MgdlfQ Pb.l.'21cmilYt .ia• Q.;,. 
24ct. v. Kraft, i;ae YI.MAI "*''-'• 
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Rudolf carnap decided tbat it awat be a •tter of co.nven-
ticm Where to draw tb.e line in tbi.a process of reducing language 
to aense-data. la Carnap's worda1 -There are no absolutely basic 
sentence• in the construction of act.e.nce.•25 How far back ought 
o.oe to go1 in eatablial:U.ng tbe grouada for: ver1ficat1ont Schlick 
suggested that atateMDts wb.ich could '8 uaed to derive future 
predictions of eventa are aatiaf actorily certain, if they can be 
contirmed by protocol atat..,.ts of the form, 1Such and such is 
occurring here and now. 1 'l'hla idea too•• promptly criticised 
for I.ta appareAt au1>Ject1vi.ty. Karl Popper, for example, asked 
how one could hope to eatabli.ah a acientif lc law, if all certainty 
involves the 'here and AOW 1 type of atateanen.t 1 w.hicb. muat be 
repeated over and oves: for ner:y different experlmenter. Diacua• 
ai.D.g this, Victor r.r:atc• ano'Cber member ot Che group, says, 
All empirical knowledge consists 1.n the formula• 
tioa of hypotheses wbicb. al.ways u. UJ:gad tile g1vu1 
always a.aaert more than the latter, even if they are 
aiagular atatame.nt:a. H71>0Cbeaea are not verified 
once and for all by obaervationa Mtecedent to their 
formu.J.atioa1 but tbey •l•Y•.have to be confirmed by 
subsequent teats. Tb..elr verification depends upon 
co~eapondence with !tteraubjectlvely acceptable 
observation-reports. 
lihat was needed waa a way of eatablisbJ.ng universal state• 
ment•• such aa the laws of acie.nce, whicbt on the one band, are 
2SIWNJ'8il 31 2091 cited in TAI YitmlA QU'sLth 119. 
26tg YieAM Qi&slit• 131. 
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not exbauated by a 'finite maber of caaea' of observation, but 
d:licht on the other band, yield predictions about actual future 
eventa. Of courae tb.1• mean.a that there would be AO way to prove 
their validity for all time. It vaa C&rtl&p who worked to estab• 
Lish the validity of such •unrestricted un1versals.• One of 
car.nap•a efforts in th.is respect was to clarify the mea.n1.ng of 
induction, on the baaia of probabll.1ty. 'llli• topic will be d.is• 
cussed below, la Q\apter: Vl. 
Rudolf Car.nap moved to Vienna 1n 1926, under Schl1ck1s 
perauaat.on. He bad received hi.a Doctorate at Je.na ln 1921, after 
a period of atud7 that was i.nterrupted by World war 1. lA 1928 
Carnap published R& ld!ll.IW AUOl'I de Welt (Tbe Logical Struc:• 
tur:e of 1:b.e World). Frank eaya that the Vlenna group conaider:ed 
tlU.• Mok to be the s;vntbeala of Mach ud Polncare for vb.leh they 
had been searching. 0 carnap•" Frank •Y•• "gave the new phi~ 
ita 'claaaical sbape.• He col.ned many of I.ts terms and phrases 
a.nd endowed it with a aubtleq and ai.mplicity. ln the form 
created by car.nap it became a center of interest and a target of 
attack on a large acale.•27 
Perhaps the explanation of Carnap'• laportuce 1n the 
Vl.enna movement is Che breadth of his vine. He waa able to eyn• 
tb.aai.Ze ideas that bad ae..ct to be at odd•• becauae his attitude 
was baalcal.17 pragmatic. Frank AOtea thla la several places. lt 
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tells ws that Frank. always recognilled Che probl•• attendallt upon 
too pure a theoretical viev. It: baa been not:ed above t:b.at Carnap 
was willing t:o admit terms of unrestricted universality, so long 
as they could lead to obaenabl••· caraap•a view ia paraphrased 
by Fraftkt tbua, 
'l'he world 1• to be described by statements that 
may contat..n any ..,.-.Ol•t pro\'lded that fr• them 
statements can be logically derived that contain noth• 
lng but assertions about aimllarlt:y betweea sense 
1mpreaa1ona. ••• When 1 read this book (Frank con-
tinues) it reminded • atrOAglJ' of WU11am Jamea• 
pragmatic requirement1 that the mea.n!.ng of any state-ment la given by ita cash vatue,• t:b.at la, by wbat 
lt means as a direction for human behavior. I wrote 
lmnedlately to Carnap. ••• 2lJ1• vaa aa aatoniahitlg 
to him as it bad bean to me. 
The expreaalon •a dlrectloa for b.Ull&D behavior• 1n tb.e 
clt:atlon abo¥e t.s Uluatratlve of the an direction th.at Pr&ftk.1a 
tbougbt •• taking as be grew away frca the M1n body of Logical 
Poeitlvlam. Thia 11111 be developed furt:Aer below. 
Another illustration of Caro.ap•a pragmatl• ls glven ln 
Frank'• contr:Lbutlon to 1.hg DlliAlfPhZ pf R.uQQI,( '"8&Rt edited by 
P. A. Scb.11pp. C&rnap dlatlngulab.ed three components 1n any situ-
ation where language ls used: the pragmatical. the semantical, 
and the logical. 1.n. Frank's words• in "any complete theory of 
language," there must be first "tb.e action, state and environment 
of the speaker (1.e. pragmatical). ••• Sec:ondly1 there are the 
28112.W.· 
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,."Ord• as element• of a certain 1Lnguiatic ayatem ( sematitlcal) • and 
thirdly, th• properties of tbl.ngs to '11b.ich tbe speaker refers when 
he uaea a certal.n word (logical).n29 
In keepiAg wlt:h their apirlt ot enthusiasm, which promised 
the successful emplOJ'lle.Dt of •cientif lc aethod in all area• of 
study, including the social and paycb.ological, the Vienna group 
started a concerted push to eatabllsh a aingle l&AgUage • a 
'thing•language• • to bring a greater sense of unity. In a rather 
extreme effort to keep •tapb.)"alcs from •ci:eeplag SA' to their 
thi.nld.ng1 they even wat through a period of c1eut..ng out •l.l 
terms that nd.gbt admit of 4ft7 HA•• of aubjectlvlty and Checa of 
idealism. Neuratb1 eapeclally, wbo did not &bare the same back• 
ground1 and thue Che aame SJ'B'l>&tb.1' toward ldeallatic thoup.t as, 
say, Sch.lick and Carnap, joklngJ.7 suggestoo an 'index• of prohil:d.t'cl 
words, to include uppermost on the list, 'essence,• 'thing,• 
•reality,' and •mind.' This strict view, Frank tells us, which 
occurred around 19301 was mistakenly viewed by outsiders as a 
whole new approach. Actually, lt was only a 'ch.apter• in the 
developmcn~ of logical empiric1sm.30 
s. Plt Ynl:U 2( ISl.IASI HR!IM1t 
Frank tell• wa t:tlat Scb11ck &.Dd Carnap expanded the new 
29"The Pragmatic Component la carnap•s El:lmination of 
Metaphysics," i.n 2Jl• ~·• 160. 
30cf. ''Einatei.A, Mach and Logical Positivism," .lr.2£• £J&.. • 
276 a.nd Me4Fa isuca IN ''' lAlla••ntD'• 35. 
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positivism into a system • a •general logical basis of human 
t.11.ou,shc." '1."hese two came into personal contact with Fraak'a 
cronies ot 1:b.e coffee house days, eapect.ally Hahn and Neuratb., but 
that bi• OVA co.ntac:t• wce 11mlted to vacatiOtl periods. Undet: tbe 
unifyi.ng leaderehi.p of SCb.llck, the group began to look upon iteelf 
aa u agency tor change, eapecially through tbe build-up of a uni· 
fied science that would embrace all sciences. frank says, 
ln 19291 we bad the feeling tbat from tbe c00pera• 
tlo.n that was cencered in Vienna a definite new type 
ot pbiloaophy had emerged. As every tather likes to 
show photographs of hi• baby, we were loold.ng tor means 
of coamwd.catlon. We wanted to present our &rain child 
to the world at large, to find out its reaction, and to 
receive 1'lew etimulatlo.n. 
We decided f lt:'st to publiah a monograph about our 
moveme.nc, next, to auaage a meeting, and eventually to 
get CGD.t:rol of a philosophical journal so that we would 
have a W§Y' of getting the contributions of our group 
printed.:11 
1n 192 9, a moaor;rapb oa tbe work Of the Vienna group was 
written by carnap1 Hahn and Neuraeb, to bet.rag tbelr tlloughts into 
public camllWllcatlon. 1he title of thls work alone • W1•119• 
•s\Mf1ilnlsbl WtlaC11lfC•l'l!IS I Rel IAMG llt11 (The Vienna Circle: 
lta Scientific WOC'ld-co.neeption) - gives an indication of the 
global .nature of it• proponents• views. !b.e name Viea.na Circle 
(IJ.Ms ktl•) was gi'Va.n t:o the group by Neurath• tlbo felt that it 
wouJ.d add a little aa1ea appeal to t:be1r work, 1.n 1:be manner of 
the Vienna Woods, or the Viennese Waltz. 
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Ln Che same year, 1rl conjunction with a congress of physi• 
cists a.nd nt.at:hemat1ctans lihich Frank bad organiaed in tbe .normal 
course of his otfice1 t:he Circle decS.ded to work acme of their 
philosophy into the meeting lf poaa1ble. Accordl.ngly, Frank gave 
the ope.a.1.ng paper• on the subject• "Epia<temology of the Exact 
Sciences." Connantlng on this debut 1 Prank aaya, 
The German Physical Soc1ety1 which was the 
official aponaor of this meeting, did not partlc• 
u1arly like the idea of comblning this serious 
sci.Mtif ic meeting witb st.ICb. a f 0011.sh t:h1ng aa 
philosophy. HOWe'Ver 1 I was the chairman of the Local committee 1n Prague, and t:b.eq could not re-
fuse my serious wish. ••• This meeting was to be 
sponsored by the Ernst Mach Association, wbicb. 
..,., the legal orpnl.zati.on of the Vienna Circle, 
and the Society lor Empirical Philosophy, which 
was organized 1n Berlin, and2fo1loued 1A general the line of B. Reicbenbach.3 
1he paper wat well received, 1A aplte of acme trepidation 
on Frank's part. ••After the meetlnth however," he tell• us, 0 our 
ecmmlttee received a great man:r letters fran ac1ent1sts who 
expressed their great satiaf ac:tion th.at an attempt b.as bee.a made 
toward a cohere.at world conception Without contradictions between 
science and pbilos~."33 
The following year• the first volwne of a periodical was 
publ1a..'1cd, edited by Carnap and Neurath. Thia publication, 
kiMASOl.lt became tbe mouthpiece of the Vienna 01.rcle until the 
32DW, •• 39. 
331W, •• 41. 
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war stopped it. Frank cltes some of the optimistic lines which 
sc.'llick wrote for the firat 1saue, under: the title, "The Turn in 
Pb.iloaopb.y." In t:hat article, Schlick aald, "1 am juat:t.fied, on 
good grounds, i.n regm::ding the sterile conflict of ayatema as 
settled. OUr time, ao I claim1 po•••••• al.ready the method.a by 
which any co.nfllct of this kiAd i.a rendered auperfluous; vb.at 
matters ls only to apply theae methods r:eaolutel.y. 0 34 How ironic 
are these hopeful words, when o.oe recalls tbat three years later 
Hitler roee to power, and three years after that Schlick was 
murdered I 
6. ses:ui am &'Cbirsat 1gftYtQC01 
One of the most notable aspects of the Vienna Circle move-
ment was its view of morality as a language of meaningless pro-
scriptions. carnap 1 for example, held that the specific content 
of value judgments does not admit of theoretical formulation. ln 
&r"8n,G&I Vol. 11 (1931) he says, "The objective validity of a 
value or a norm cannot (even 1n the opinion of axiologiata) be 
empirically verified or deduced frca empirical propoaitiorua; hence 
it cannot even be mea11logfu11.7 aaaerted.n3S Siad.larly• A. J. A)w1 
at Oxford• the leading lrit18h spokesman for Logical Poaitivism• 
maintained that ethical etatemente ue .not acatementa at all, but 
expressioiis of emotiOA, such as approval. or d1aguat1 with no 
34cited 1n JJ?.J.4. • 41. 
183. 
35t:;k.e.n&!t&• 2. 2371 cited 1A Kraft, Ibl Viennl 9kcl11 
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cognitive content. 
Other thi.nkara felt more 8J1Dpathetlc to ethics, and tried 
to see whether: they might: not c0tatrlbute eomet:hing to tb.e eatab-
lisbmeAt of a meaningful. moral dlacou:r:ae. Generally, aucb efforts 
have gone no f urtber than dlacOV'ea:ing what a apeaker means when he 
make• an ethical atataaent. That is, ethics among the Analysts 
1.s, 1n the more acb.olarly lnataneea, a survey of popular language 
usage, and in lase seholarly lnatancea, alllply atl opinion about 
what a certain word means. 
Schlick., 11.ke tbe otb.ara, felt that there are no criteria 
for absolute values. Nonetheless, he thought that ethics 1• able 
to validate everyday ftOr.IDative statements, in scientific terms, by 
comparing them to f undame.atal norms vhlcb are accepted by a partic-
ular group. Of course th9 fund-tals Cbamaelves c:annot be 
justified; they are given. Yet, in Sch1lck1s opt.n1oa1 eeb.ics CAn 
explain theee .nor.as, from the •natural lava ot bebavior:.•36 
Victor I.raft auanart.zea Schllck.1a ethics as follows, 
Scbllck advocates an etht.ca of ld.ndness in con• 
traat to an et:b.ica of duty. lt la an etbica of the 
'beautiful soul' who deairea from inclination what 
the society aeta up aa a duty. 1.'bt.a must be regarded 
as a goal, to be approached by the process of evolu• 
ti.cm, wlloae attainment la far off 1n the future., ln 
the meantime an ethics of duty alone bas practical 
algnifleance as tbe past •• well as the present ~ove • 
••• ln my 1theory of value' (Kraft goes on to add) 1 
eAdeavor to ab.ow ln detail that bedordam is iaadequate 
for the explanation and justification of values. • •• 
There •;• also other equally important aourcea of 
value.3 
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Frank expressed few atatementa tllhich could be interpreted 
as lodicating a moral system of hie own. For tb.e moat part, lt 
seems that be remained in the trad1t1on Of Logical Poalt1.v:l.sa With 
respect to ethics. 1.'b.at ia to aay1 it la reasonable to believe 
that b.e looked upon moral lnjuactioaa flratt aa aubject1ve1 and 
not derivable fr• experience, and aecondl.y, aa tacts of cultural 
llfe which have to be accounted for, and which. have a real effect 
on the behavior of those who hold them. Where Frank probably 
differ• from the Vienna Circle is in the degree of recognition and 
concern he gtvea t:o moral beliefs, eapecia.lly 1n their role of 
directing scientific thought toward good ends. Like Schlick, 
Frank took moral belief a as being given, rather than derivable. 
Ria interest was more in the reasonable derivation of behavior, 
from the given moral foundation• than in the justification of the 
foundation itself. Rls interest, for example, in the moral 
reasons for accepting scientific theories (which we shall exam1ne 
more closely in Chapter Vl below) which lncreased to the end of 
his life, does not neceaaar111' suggest that Frank had a particular 
ethical viewpoint of hla ow.a. lt seems rather to imply Frank's 
bent for viewing all aspects of any issue, vi.th the dispassionate 
involvement of a critical judge. Frank's view of morality, then, 
37n.w. •• 185. 
so 
seems to be cm Che order of a sc1eat1f 1c and pb.11osopblca1 l.nves• 
tigation of aocieq, rather than a personal caanitment.38 
Thi• ls not to ••Yt of com:ae, t:bat Frank, or for that 
matter, the rest of the Vt.e.nna group, •• dlaintereated in moral-
ity. theirs was AOt a complete r:elattvl•, as might be auapected. 
After a11, the rise of Nazi• between Che World Wars, vlth the 
increasing alarm and disgust it inspired in the Vienna Circle 
members, must have afforded all of tbet'.ll good cause to entertain 
strong moral commitmenta.39 
7. fEMls'I PlrXBllACt frcg Sat Th;Hft 2' L21'4stl f211t;1:y1,ra 
Frank's differences with the Vienna Circle movement are not 
so much over specific doctrines aa they are a matter of the genaal 
approach to science and its meaning. As has been poiftted out 
above, Frank was a thinker of broad scope, a.ad humani.stic bent. 
True, he embraced the primary tenets of the Vienna Circle, namely 
their interest t.n acience and logic; and their distaste for un-
f ou.n.ded metaphysical spewlatlon. But he aeems not to have felt 
the same revolutionary attitude - the same degree of negativism 
towards older thinkers th.at was expressed, for example, by the 
writers of the 1929 moaograph1 and the early lasuea ot Jgkepn1a1ia• 
381kW· 
39f or this reason, one can understand the attacks ai.med at 
tb.e C1rcle1 _*1ch frank MAtiOAs above• auch ••the comnent in r;o~ci~*'t!'';ualst• 1966, by K. w. Britton, that the Logical 
Pos t v ate Ld to a general undercutting of all ethics but 
their own, as being meanl.ngle•• because unverifiable." 
sch1S.ck had aaid1 for example, 11A1l cog.al.tion of the being ls 
achieved, in principle, by the methOda of the special sciences; 
every othe!: kind of ontology la enapty talk.n40 
Prank does admit to being caugtlt up in the ap1r1t of the 
"turn in phiLoaophy," 11blch Schlick bad described. Tbu.s 1 Frank 
writes• 
this atroog optimistic feeling la paydlologically 
t:he f ee11ng of a turn. You can ride in a car at high 
speed and you do .not feel a.nyth1ng so long as the 
•eloclty :.nat.na unchanged. But lf a turn or an accel-
eration takes place, you experience a strong reaction. 
Today the fllO'V'elle{lt of logical poaltlvl• l.a no longer: 
so conaplcuoua.41 
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The degree of objective detachment • call it hiatorlc per• 
spect1ve1 perhaps .. which la evident 1n thia passage lndlcatea to 
what degree Frank must have felt b.imaelf to be outside the Vien.aa 
Circle movement,, Of course it ia difficult to say whether this is 
a matter: of a ecte.ntiat•a power of observation, vhlch Frank bad to 
a high degree• or truly a teeliftg of personal estrangement. It 
seems llkely that it shows ua a little of both. 
Aside from t:h.1• or1gl..na.1 feeling of excitement, however, 
Frank did not dew Logical Poaitlvt.• as the last: word to be said 
i.n philosophy. Eapecla111' after lMO, he tried to aynthealze the 
new and old world views, just as he bad tr1ed1 before the advent 
4°t:t!!dtFa §S1Mse apd '"' ML212»1U't 41. 
41aw. •• 42. 
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of Schllclc., in the daya of bis coffee house diacuaalona. la 
tle.dtEG S<;ilAC' !M ltt ft!i,RIRQV,42 for example, Frau takea 
pain• to point out the aim11aritiea among the advocate• of the 
older aftd newer forms of positlvi• with which he waa acqualated. 
ln diacusaing idea• of meaning and understanding, for inataace, he 
suggests that Wittge.nateln, Schlick, Reichenbach, Carnap, and even 
Mach are •essentially no differe.a.t 0 in their ideaa. A suff1ci.ently 
broad interpretatlOA1 Frank goee on to uy, would also bring 
Pierce and James into the same language camp wt.th the others. 
What this bringa out i• Frank'• concern with ayntheaia, and hi.a 
recoga:aition that aay philosophy which conaidera itself to be 
totally DeW1 and totally autficient 1 ia a aalve and flippant 
effort at beat. Tb.ere ia reaaon to believe that the early members 
of the Vienna Circle proper bad a touch of just this sort of aver• 
confidence. 
The courses which Frank taught at Harvard are illustrative 
of his synthetic approach. He tells ua about them• thus, 
I now put the greatest emphasis on presenting 
pbyaica, and acience ifa general, as part of our general 
pattern of thinking and acting. 1 presented it on one 
hand as a logical syatem that haa to be checked by 
physical experimeats and on the other band as one of 
the means of expressing man's attitude towards the 
wor1d 1 the small world of society &Del politic• and the 
large world that is our astronomical wli.verae. Thia 
more historical approach has been familiar to me alnce 
my atudent: yea.rs from the meetings with my older fr.laada. 
All. my paper a written after 1940 f o11ow this line. 43 ·· 
4211!1d,., 32, 33. 
431W,., 51. 
53 
The historical and synthetic viewpoint illustrated by thla 
method of teaching distinguishes ita author from the mainstream of 
Logical Positivism. The same viewpoint is further confirmed vb.en 
one compares Frank's accounts of the beginnings of the movement 
with the accounts of other historians, sucb as R. w. Aahby,44 
J. o. Urmson,45 or Victor IC.raft .. 46 These writers indicate, at 
least indirectly by emphasis, that Logical Positivism began in 
1922, primarily through the organizing effort of Schlick. The 
impression Frank gives, Oft the other hand, ia that Logical Poai• 
tiviam developed out of, and was continuous with, the coffee house 
meetings that he and his atudent friends started, way back in 1904 
It was Frank, Hahn and Neurath who were, 1n. Fra.ok1 a words, "the 
moat active and regular members of our group."4.7 Schlick, Reichen· 
bach and Carnap • who are normally associated with the movement -
were not even present at that time. 
8.. 12.,1.aruption kl the Sec;;R.nd World W1£ 
The Vienna Circle proper wa.s forced to disband suddenly, in 
1938 1 although not to the great surprise of its members, some of 
44ct. "Logie~l Positi~ism11 in A {(ri;~11 1ti£t2ltl of Wesi:em 'tboYIJ!Jit ed. D. J. o Connor, F·ree Press, N. • • • 
45cf. "Logical Poaltivism" in A CPQq111 ff!!S!&l2ptsJl1 gf 
rt11$er13 !1'!"o'flfi r:d PJilo10~0£1, ed. J. o. urmson, Hawthorn 
Preas, N. ., art cle uns gned). 
46tbt Vj.MQa Ci;s;IJt, .22.• Q.£. 
47H2dern Sqiegce and 151 Ph~LosgpbY, 1. 
whan had left Europe earlier. Not only the Jews 1 but most llberal 
t.ntellectuals as well• felt the pressure of Nazi hatred. Herbert 
Feigl had gone to the Unit•d States ln 1931, and carnap followed 
in 1936 - the same year Schlick was murd•rnd in Vienna. Waiamann 
and N~ur.a.th went to England, "1hil~ Karl Menger 1 IC.urt' Godel, Edgar 
Zilse1 1 F~lix Kaufmann, Riche.re von Mises, Reichenbach and Frank 
came to the United States. 
'!hp perio~ical, ~(kgnetn1§ 1 also call~d the Js>\!*B!L o( 
:Qnif&ed Sclenci?t waa published at the Hague for a few years, but 
was soon forced to discontinue altogether. The lDttr!!!tigna1 
!ffisx:cLopts!&a o( Yalt(j,ed §S1t.RSth edited by car.nap, Neurath, and 
the American, Cb.arles Morris, which. vas published at Chicago in 
1938, could be called a continuation of the Er!Y¥M:!~il work. 
The members met wt.th a frieadly welcome in the areas they 
chose for their new homes. ln America, for instance, P. w. Bridg-
man, v. c. Qu.ine, E. Nagel, and Morris helped to bridge the gap 
between the old world and the new. Nevertheless, it must be said 
that the movement did not continue in its flower after the War. 
This, tor several reasons. First, the War itself presented a 
aiZable stumbling block for most international intellectual 
efforts, as the meager number and size of publications during that 
time can attest to. Secondly, some of the basic theses of the 
Vie.nna Circle, such as the 'criterion of verifiability,' were seen 
by many people to be untenable. Thirdly, other Lines of ph1losqlv 
were taking shape, p1ck1.ng up some of the leads the Circle had 
pointed out. 
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Some membera iJ:lclined toward language, some to mathematics 
and Logic, some to science, and some to social studiea.48 With 
this diversity of interests, it is surprising that the group helci 
together as long aa it did. Any weakening of the group's original 
sense of unifying purpose could lead to the aeattering of the mem-
b~rs. One discovers juat such a loss by comparing the Circle's 
earlier and later views on metaphysics. The pri.ma.ry goal of posi-
tivists had always been to do battle with speculative philosophy. 
For those who cair.e to feel metaphysics had been effectively clemo1-
ished - for example, A. J. Ayer - there was no need for further 
d~struction. Others, such as Frank, began to see in metaphysics 
a new interest and meaning, especially in light of the War's moral 
catastrophes. ln either case, the original goal became vague. 
Because of the Loss of single-minded purpose, the group of 
men who had accomplished so much together became a group of 
strong-minded individuals, with valuable and interesting ideas, 
yes - but with widely diverse opinions. When the original sense 
of unity died, so did the Vienna Circle. It had not finished its 
work, yet it had accomplished much. Summing up their contribu-
tion, Victor Kraft says, 
The nature of logic and mathematics was clarified, 
the relation of logic to language was even revealed for 
the first time, and the methods and foundations of 
48cf. Danto, A. c., and Harre1 R., •'The Philosophy of Science•" in .92• .£3..£•• Vol. VI, 289-~00. 
empirical knowledge were analyzed and clarified with 
a thoroughness without precedent. It can.not be denied 
that these accomplishments were accompanied by quite a 
few oversimplifications and one-side, radical views 
which have not yet been entirely superceded. • •• 
Imaginative conceptual poetry is surely more interesting 
for the average person, and the wisdom of a great per-
sonality surely has more significance for human life. 
Yet they are subjective, matters of opinion, unverifi• 
able. Lacking universal validity, they are matters ZS 
personal conviction, but do not represent knowledge. 
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ln the remaining Chapters we shall examine what Fr·ank 
retained from the thoughts developed within the Vienna Circle, and 
where he went beyond these early developments, especially in his 
views toward metaphysics, and the sociologlcal aspects of science. 
CHAPTF..R 111 
FRANK AS A CRITIC OF METAPHYSICS 
l. lllt t1!Saph1sis:1L lnterpretatj,2n gf S5i.eru;e 
It was mentioned above (in Chapter I) that Frank c:.onsidered 
his post-war views to be distinctly different from his pre-War 
views. in respect to metaphysics. Whereas he had early and effec• 
tively stressed that science proper does not support one meta• 
physics over another• he became aware of the need to explain why 
scientists do, in fact. frequently feel constrained to make such 
interpretations. Many great scientists - Frank mentions Eddington. 
Jeans and Whitehead• among others • have chosen to interpret the 
metaphysical 'meaning' of their discoveries. Although he dis• 
agreed with most of these interpretations• Frank came to see them 
as a fact of life, which was as real as any fact of physics, and 
which theretore needed examination. 
L. N. Ridenour summarized the earlier Frank in his reviewl 
of M9<!1;.a is&IASt 11!9 lta UU.&910QQY:, suggesting that the thesis 
of the book is to maintain "there are no significant 'questions 
that are so profound that they cannot be solved by the exact 
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sciellces.•n2 Ride.nour 1s paraphrasing is oversimplified. A better 
picture of Frank's earlier opinion, although perhaps it bad 
changed by tb.e time Mode£n SsJ&ii~I. yd lta BQlo!!?J?hr was written, 
is given in Ridenour 1s words, frm the same review, "We can erect 
a coherent system dealing with all aapacts of human knowledge and 
behavior, by the refinement. extension, a.Ad continued application 
of the methods which. have been so aucceaaful 1.n the exact sci• 
ences." It is doubtful that Frank ever felt th~ exact sciences, 
by themselves, could solve all hum&ll problems. However, the 
expression, the "application. of the methods" of the exact acienceua 
is sufficiently broad to describe Frank'• earlier confiden.ce in 
science as a way of thought. Even so, it emphasizes too much. the 
autonODIY' and self •sUfticienq of science as a source of truth. 
'Whatever personal confidence Frank may have felt in the methods of 
science, he was too DlOderata to use such irrevocable expressions. 
In this Qi.apter, aa elsewhere, we ab.all see how Frank fits science 
and •scientific method•' 1.nt:o a larger context of human endeavor, 
llilhicb. includes, among other thinga, metapl\7sics, aesthetics, and 
religi.0t1. 
2. Mftaehfsics aa Copqgn §Mii 
In his book, Moge;n ~simce and ltl lflllomhY, Frank aug• 
gests there is a tendency, within science as well as without it, 
2It is not clear why Mr. Ridenour puts quotes around the 
latter half of t:bat sentence. lf it is a quote from Frank, which 
1 have not found, it still says nothing about Frank's op1n1on, 
since it is an incomplete sentence. 
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to become so ac:custcmed to scient1f ic principles that one begins 
to Look on them as part of conmotl experience - self-evident• we 
might even say • and therefore above question, and beyond experi• 
mental testing. n1 regard metaphysica1 tt Frank saya, "•• a direct 
interpretation of acientif ic prtncip1ea in tei:ma of the language 
of everyday life experience. 0 3 '!here ia, of course, a difference 
between seeing a connection between the principles of science and 
tb.e ideas of common sense, and considering that the former derive 
from the latter. It is our natural tendency - perhaps part and 
parcel with the desire to integrate and generalize our knowledge -
to give the supremacy to caanon-aenae interpretatio.na, holding 
t':le.m to be 1ntu1tive1 and beyond the grasp of experimentation. 
,.'lb.is belief," Frank aaya 1 "is the very core of the metaphysical 
interpretation of science."4 
Two things become evident from this discussion. First, 
Frank's view of metaphysic• as a common•senae interpretation is a 
rather narrow use of the word metaphysics. We shall return to 
this point below. The second thing is that Frank seems to imply 
that auch a common-sense approach is inexact, in the best cases, 
and leads to dead ends in others. The use of common-sense meta-
physics, he suggests, is especially frustrat~d by contemporary 
developments in science, where theoretical principles seem to have 
3Mode;n Sci~npe and lts PQiL0190nx, 290. 
4DJ&.. •• 289. 
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retained little or no connection to everyday experience. For 
~xample, in the case of such modern theories as relativity, quan-
tum mechanic• and the de Broglie wave theory, their only justifica-
tion is their property of yielding observable facts by means of 
chains of logical deductions. In these cases, the connection 
betwc~n scienti.f ic idea and metaphysical idea is ~ada by a sort of 
correspo.ndence tech.niquo, whose c:ori:ect.nesa is a Uiat:te:: of opinion. 
In Frank's words, 
Metaphysics attempts a translation of the basic 
principles of science, but not according to aatrictly 
fixed dictionary; the univocal relation between a 
term and lta translation haa been replaced by an an&• 
logical relation. But we cannot tell !Y a.ny exact 
criterion vb.at ls a •correct• analogy. 
Although thes~ comments, which are in the vein of straight 
Logical Positivism• seem to disparage metaphysics for being un-
scientific, that is not to say that Frank feels metaphysics ghouLd 
be scientific. Whatever he thinks of metaphysics, he recognizes 
that it is distinct from the exact sciences. He points out that 
the 'truth' of metaphysicaL state~ents could not be dotermined by 
scientific methods - experimental criteria especially - or there 
would be no difference between the two fields. If metaphysics is 
a legitimat~ branc..~ of knowl~dge • wi11ch view Frank ca~G mor~ and 
more to support - t~~n its criteria of truth must be, decidod on 
3.ills!·. 290. 
other than experimental grounds. Frank comnents, 
In metaphysics, a statement or a system of state-
ment• is regarded as •true• t.f our coamon senae under-
stands the validity of the principles immediately 
without having to draw long chains of conclusions 
from these principles and without checking some of 
these conclusions against our observations. 
Certainly• men like Einstein and Schrodinger 
advanced their prl.ncip1ea by following acme require• 
ments of simplicity or beauty which may also be 
regarded as requirements of commo.n aenae. But they 
would never claim that the validity of the prillciples 
could be proved without checking the conclusions c: 
drawn from these principles by physical experiments.j 
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ln actual practice, the effort to find a common•aenae intEl'-
pretation for scientific principles consists usually in translat• 
ing the ideas of current science into the lacguage of an older 
science that bas become ao well established • such a common part 
of everyday thought • that its truths are held to be intuitively 
obvious. This tb.eaia is developed further ln fhi&910RV 9f Sei• 
tSSI • p!.e Link »ttxl!i!B isleace •IS l!Jlilo19PJJY, which lncorpor• 
ates the ideas Frank. developed after writing HUSO Sc1f:9S1 !QSl 
1;1 ftl11Ql2Pb.f. In the later book1 Frank contitmea toward the 
goal he aet in the earlier work, namely, "to break through the 
wall which bas separated acle.nce and philosophy for about one and 
one•hal f centuries. •t6 
5lJ?.1d• I 2 96 • 
61.W.·. 6. 
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3. I~e Sbi{; &n EraQls'a Y1!!fs 
As Frank himself tells ua, hia work took a shift in empha-
sis after 1947, towards a more generoua attitude with regard to 
metaphysics. lf we compare some statements from t122•rn sca:eoce 
yd It1 fb.!.Lo1gaz, vl'lich was written in the ma:Ln before 1947, 
with other statements from eQl,l21ARbz 2( SSit!!St • T!le L!nk 
Dttwe1n §S&MCI yd fbl.Luosmr, which was published in 1957, we 
shall get a clearer view of thia shift. 
In addition to the ideas from Frank's earlier work, out-
lined in the section above, we add the following two statements 
by way of suanary. Frank says, "What we call in a vague way 
•common sense• is actually an older system of science which was 
dropped because new discoveries demanded a new conceptual acheine, 
a new language of science.n7 And again, from the final pages of 
the same work, "The metaphysical interpretation ia actually a 
particular kind of sema.ntlcaL approach.; it is a translation into 
common.•aense 1anguage.n8 The tone of these statements is remin-
iacent of Logical Poeit1vism • the belief that ph1loaoph1cal prob-
lema are, at bottom, language problems; one need only express them 
in more exact terma, and then analyze them by critical logical 
means, in order to work them out. 
In the later book, Frank takes a broader view of the phil• 
71.W.·· 301. 
8 iw. •• 300. 
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osophy of science, as well as expressing himself in more general 
language. The Vienna Circle terminology is no longer evident. 
For example• in the preface to the book, Frank writes, **In this 
book we attempt to start from the way in which science is under• 
stood by the scientist in his most creative and critical moods.n9 
Thtl\ term ttcraative" here is especially indicative of the author's 
turn toward the subjective elements that characterizes his later 
views. No tonger do his ideas suggest the apparent fe$ling that 
one can eliminate as meaningless all psychological and sociologi-
cal factors that impinge on the scientist's life. Science is not 
done !o. vacQ!O. Th.ere is a context for scientific work• which must 
be accounted for; pure theory - that ia, theory that has D2 con-
nection with human needs - la as impossible aa lt is useless. 
Underscoring this, Frank says, •we need to complement the science 
of physical nature by the science of man.•10 In other words, 
science is not self-directing. It is a tool whose usefulness is 
determined by the one who employs 1t. lf science shows, for 
example, how to destroy, it also shows how to preserve. In 
Frank's vords 1 "Bluntly speaking, science proper provides us with 
tb.e technical means by which we can produce the weapons to def eat 
tb.e enemy, but the philosophic interpretations of science can dir-
ect man in such a way that he makes actual use of the weapons.nil 
012eax. 9~~::~~~-~i.5~!~::~od~c11ti! R~';Br~!;:01:.1.Qd l:lliL-
1 o111Ml.. , xiv. 
11~ •• 19. 
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lt is clear, from all of these examples, that Frank does 
not consider philosophy to be equated with logic, or reasoning 
processes. The Latter belong to science proper just as much as to 
philosophy. Rathert he is tryi.ng to emphasize the pragmatic• and 
nwnanistic 1 use that science performs. In a sense, this use 
transcends the scientist qua scientist, placing him in a broader 
perspective, in relation to all human endeavor. Thia more human• 
istic view tries especially to show the coanOA sea.ae .meaning of 
science, not as a prostitution, but as a legitimate way of main• 
taining goala.12 
Frank has often been miaUAderstood, in respect to his 
though.ta about philosophy ud its leg11:iaacy. One example may 
suffice here to illustrate. OWe.n Potter, commenting on Frank's 
paper of 1950 entitled "Metapb.yalcal Interpretations of Science,• 
gives an utterly false 1.anpreasion by quoting Frank out of context. 
Re claims that Frank considers philosophy to be the •metaphysical 
interpretation of science.• This view, Potter says, "must partly 
be ascribed to Frank's conviction that .. taphysics ia meani.ngleaa: 
11f ve apply to metapb.yaica the criteria of truth which have been 
generally accepted in modern science, ve ca.n conclude, on good 
grounds, that tenet• of metaphysics ••• are neither true nor 
falae 1 but me&Aingleaa.• •it ia the purpose of thia Note,~ Potter 
continues, "to draw atteAtion once again to the fact that the 
12"Rote oa Philipp Frank's Interpretation Of Sciencet" 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2: 5, May 195 • 58-60. --
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criterion of truth by which metaphyslca 1• reduced to meaningless-
ness is itself metaphysical, in wb.lcb. case Dr. Frank'• interpre-
tation must be treated with some reserve." 
In response to this cr1ticiam, one can do no better than to 
cite Frank's comments in full.er form, and let the reader aee the 
differe.nce. F"ra..nk says, 
If we apply to metaphysics the criteria of truth 
wbicfl nave been accepted generally in modern science, 
we can conclude• on good grounds, that tenets of meta-
physics (e.g. reality of the external world, mental 
character of the universe, etc.) are neither true nor 
false, but meaningless. Although this argument can 
hardly be refuted, the interest in metaphysics has 
abated very little. It is claimed that the concept of 
truth which has been accepted by science does not pro-
vide tile on.Ly valuable kind of truth. Metapl'lysica may 
be meaningless for tl'le scientist •as a scientist•, but 
may be of the high.est value for human life.13 
Frank goes on1 in this article, to give a brief history of 
the relation between metaphysica and science. He points out that 
:nany notable scientists favor metaphysics. Planck, for example, 
was one who "believed sb:ongly in a metaphysical interpretation 
of science. •14 F'rank suggests that there is a two-fold practical 
use for metaphysics - as an interpretation of science into comnon 
sense terms, and as a guide for human conduct. He also notes that 
there hav~ been two ways of reuniting science and philosophy. 
13"Metaphysical Interpretations of Science," friti11J ,zou;-
fo' th£ rn&1010P!'U: 2f ~s~eas@ 1: 1, May, 1950, 6 • 
14Dis!, •• 62. 
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Whitehead, Sartre, Heidegger and Bergaon represent the effort to 
build a new metaphysics. The pos1t1vista, on the other band, try 
to jol.n metaphysics atld science by 1clentiflc method and. language. 
Finally, Frank concludes, "If we regard metaphysics, as is sug-
gested 1n th.is paper, as a short cut between science and common 
sense, we acquire a new perspective of human thought in the. past 
and the present. 0 15 Clearly there is no one-sided positivism in 
these remarks. 
The metaphysician mignt wish to look upon the subject of 
nis studies as somehow more elevated than Frank's common-sensical 
view suggests it is. The metaphysician seeks to find .necessary 
truth, as opposed to the temporal and co.ntlnge.nt sense-oriented 
ideas of science. Yet it muat be admitted that metaphysics ought 
somehow to relate to human experience, or it ls, l.n fact, meaning• 
Leas. It is just this relation to experience which Frank points 
out so nicely1 as being primarily commonaens1cal or intuitive. 
Metaphysical discussions start from ideas that are meant to 
be self •evident. Yet the very fact that such discussions seldom 
resolve conflict suggests that self-evidence is not so easy to 
attain. It cannot Lie solely 1n observable empirical data 1 which 
are the groundlng of science 1 nor can lt lie in the axioms of 
Logic or mathanat1ca 1 which are purely formal, and therefore un• 
related to reality. What is left, but common sense, or intuition? 
1SU!1sl•t 90. 
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of course this foundation i• unsatiafyingly vague and difficult to 
define. But Frank is generous enough to point out that the faun• 
dations of science, too• and even mathematical systems like geom-
etry, are lik.ewiae vague.16 
4. Ihe gnaw tha; Link;1 sea.inst !!)d rQi~osophY 
Frank says there is a natural chain that links science to 
philosophy • a chain that bas been broken a.nd needs reestablish-
ment. One end of this chain is anchored• as it veret to direct 
observation of facts; the other to generalities called 11ntelli· 
gible principles.• Frank describes the chain• thus, 
We have along tbe chain statements of various 
degrees of generality. On the one hand, statements 
of fact; on the other, general principles that are 
clear and intelligible in themselves. Between these, 
we have statements of intermediate generality - aun•s 
Laws, Newton's law of gravitation, the laws of elec-
trody.namics, Mendel'• 1awa of ber:edity - not intelli• 
gible by themselves, but useful theories. 
This distinction ia obviously connected with the 
double criterion for belief. If we bave statements 
of intermediate generality - laws of pb.yaica, for 
instance - why do we believe that they are true? In 
science we use the criterion of truth1 which requires 
that we ca.n derive from theae laws facta which are in 
agreement with ex.perieAce. We say that the law is 
confirmed by experience. As we have mentioned, S.t is 
false to say tbat theae laws of intermediate general-
ity are ever 'proved' by experiment, or worse, that 
they can be 'derived from the facts.• one can derive 
a statement only from a more ge.o7ral statement, never 
from one vblch is leas general.I 
16cf., for exampl.e 1 •Geometry, An Example of a Science, 0 
Chapter 111 in Philosoph:r of Sclssmce: T!!t L~ 11£.Yeen sciencft. 
and PhiL012Dhy. 
17fq1Lq~ophr of Sciegce, 22. 
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Thi.a last sentence i.a of prim.a.ry importance, It goes dir-
ectly against the popular conception of poaitivlsm, and ties Frank 
into a broader tradition that includes Aristotle, Aquinas, and 
Kant• among others, whom he studied at length, and frequently 
cites in support of his ideas. one must add, however, that Frank 
does not suggest Positivism is guilty of the view that general 
theories derive strictly from observations. He notes tht!t even 
Comte knew that one must start from theories to observe order. 
ln fact, Comte accepted the .need for religious prl..aciples to get 
the ball rollt.ng.18 General statements are, Frank aaya, na pro-
duct of the human mind; this process may be called induction, 
inductive guessing, imagination. 1.n any case, it is not logical 
derlvatlon.nl9 
As we noted above, ODe eftd of the phl.1osophy•sc1en.ce cl\ain 
la baaed on 'facts•. Frank notes, first of allt that what the 
scientist actually observes are such tb.1.nge as scintillations on 
a counter, deflections of a needle, and liquid levels in a tube.20 
'What the scientist infers from these observations about the nature 
of the W'ldorlying causes is another tl\1.ng altogether, and is ope.n 
to question. There is always a certain mental element in science, 
18cf. "Einstein, Hach and Logical Poaltivlam,u in 6&.btES 
r~~f!e:yu Dll101opb.pr•St;Ja1Atl:s,, ed. P. A. SchilPPt Tudor, N. Y. t 
19fb,10fOpbir 2f isitRC!t 22. 
20.il!J.sl., 6. 
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cvfzn at the most basic: level. Kant tried to a.haw that one never 
nas a direct knowledge of •reality•, even though he himself 
believed th.at Newtonian science was true - in fact 1 necessarily 
true. What one observes 1 Kant suggested, is determined by the 
innate ordering capability of the human mind - not by the thing-
in-itaelf which is the underlying cause of our sense-experience. 
The Latter is beyond the reach. of human knowledge. 
Another point that Frank frequently makes against the •pure 
empiricists' is this: If the best scientific theory were the one 
which ahoutd confirm all observations, then a simple catalogue of 
data - a List of observables - would constitute the most perfect 
sc:ience.21 But clearly such. a view would be no science at all. 
Theories of this form would be as complex as what they purported 
to explain; they would be useless. There must be an element of 
simplicity in science. This idea will be considered again in 
Ch.apter Vl, under the topic of acceptance of theories. 
Modern science has come more and more to disr~gard the 
question of 'rea11ty 1 1 calling it an. irrelevant metaphysical con-
sideration. Frank comments on this, as follows: 
The other end of the chain comes from the longing 
to know 1why'. Science does not telt us 'why'; it only 
answers questions concerning what happens, not 1why 1 it 
happens. This longing to find out 'why' is nothing 
more than the Longing to derive scientific statements 
from general principle• th.at are plawd.ble and intelli• 
gible. Such a Longing stems from the belief that there 
are euch prl.nciples. There have been., of course, a 
great many opinions about tne criteria for what is 
plausible and intcllig1ble.2Z 
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How was the sclence-philoaophy chain ruptured? ln ancient 
and medieval times, science was an off-shoot of philosophy. Thus, 
for example, a philosopher such aa Aristotle might aay that all 
matter seeks its natural place, whlch is down, so that bodies fall, 
while fire, which is immaterial, seeks its natural place in heaven, 
and thua rises. Or one might believe, for another example, that 
the moat perfect motion, because the simplest, is a circle, so the 
planets, which are perfect, must d$acrlbe circular orbits. 
With this ancient kind of •science•, there was little con• 
cern with testing hypotheses by careful measurement. Not that 
careful measurement was beyond the reach of scientists. Rather, 
measurement and ~ata gathering was thought to be the work of 
artisans and mechanics • beneath the station of philosopher-
scientists who constructed theories. In this regard, Frank cites 
A. N. Whitehead, thus, 
All the world over (tiltlitehead says) and at all 
times there have been practical. men, absorbed in 
irreducible and stubborn facts; all the world over 
and at all times there have been men of philosophic 
temperament, who have brn absorbed in the weaving 
of general prlnciplea.2 
22.lJ!W., 23. 
23s~ilnce and th' l:loderg World, ~1acmillan, 1925, cited in 
fb.1Losopni o seienc1,!: 
Frank expands this idea of Whitehead, in these words, 
We might say that the 'lower' strata collected 
facts while the 1higher-ups 1 advanced principles. 
Contact between the two types of knowledge was dis-
cow:aged by aoc:i.al cu.atom. If a man of high social 
statue atte.mpted to apply his 'philosophy' or 'science' 
to technical problems, he was aeverly cr1t1zed. 
Experimental testing of general principles requires 
manual labor, which wae regarded by the ancient Greeks 
as the appropriate occupation of slaves but not of 
free men.24 
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However, the people at the technical end became interested 
in deriving their own theories to e..xplain their observations. 
They were unwilling to take a back place with respect to the phil• 
osophers. Frank continues, 
From about the year 1600, however, science became 
more pretentious; it wanted to derive practical mechan-
ics from theoretical mechanics. Then the chain split 
in the middle. From the principles of intermediate 
generality, the physical laws, observed facts could be 
derived. 11ScientistaH were no longer interested 
whether the physical laws ~Qu.ld be derived from prin• 
ciples of high generality.2' 
Because they have discovered that science can proceed dir-
ectly, for the most part, from these principles of intermediate 
generality to observables, many scientists have come to feel that 
it is useless to bother looki.ng for a>•ca.lled 'first principles•. 
Yet, as Frank points out, there is always the hope to find the 
24tni12s2ahx of ssience, 26. 
25~ •• 28. 
most universal law - tb& ovei:all ge.neral1ty - that explains the 
world. "The dream of science ia to derive all facts from one 
principle. tt26 
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From the purely acie.ntif ic poi.at of v1ew, one may not care 
whether or not the principles one uaea are 1 ia.te111g1ble 1 , but 
only whether from them one can derive obeer:vablea, by meana of 
suitable semantical rules, o.r: 'operational definition•'• aa they 
are commo.o.ly called. However, Frank wazne, 11.By taking this gen-
eral scielltific pol.nt of vtev, we have disregarded a large part of 
our chaln.u Thia philosophical part of the chain 1.nvolvea state-
ment• that cannot be checked by direct observation, but vb.lch 
should not, nevertheless, be dlaregarded. "Such statement• have 
just as practical reaulta aa the scientific onea; they have a 
direct effect on buma.n beb.avior.•27 
6. 'lllt ~HI 2( MeS1ar11i21 
There is a danger in the desire to interpret scientif lc 
statements by means of philosophical ones, even though the latter 
seem to come closer: to coanon sense. ln Cb.apter• IV and V below, 
we sh.all dlscuas some of the abuses tb.at thia effort has p11ed 
onto modern science. \!hi.le it is true, as Frank says, that "in a 
way, philosophy ls nearer to common aense than science," and that 
"the more science had advanced into the theoretical field, the 
2 6 JJ!Jr.s!.. ' 4 2 • 
27~ •• 37. 
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more remote from common aenae ita ge.neral principle• bave be• 
come,u28 science must often free itself from its metaphysical con-
text in order to advance. "lt la a matter of fact,• Frank notes, 
"that tbe advance 1n science haa consisted to a large extent in 
the replacement of the common•aeaae world by a world of abstract 
symbols." He continues, "If we vant to formulate general prin• 
ciples from which a wide range of observable facts can be derived, 
we muat discard the language of COBIDOA sense, and make use of a 
more abstract terminology.*'29 
Metaphysical ayatema can retard science by claiming that 
new ideas are foreign to what is accepted as true in common exper-
ience. One can aee the groundlessness of this view1 if one con-
siders that ac1entif ic theories which at OAe time were considered 
to be revolutionary, from tbe philosophical or common-aenaical 
viewpoint, have become so well established by use that they come 
to be looked o.n: themselves as common-senaical. Then they, in tum, 
are held up as criteria by Which to judge newer theories. Newtm's 
laws, for instance, are widely regarded today as intuitively ob-
vious. However, at tbe time when organism.le cosmology vaa popular, 
Newton's laws were considered to be totally contrary to intuition. 
Similarly, it ia the appare.nt: aelf•evide.ace of Newton'• laws today 
which male.ea it difficult for one to f ee1 com.f ortabte about con-
28~ •• 44. 
29,lW. •• 45. 
74 
temporary scientific theories like 1·elativ1ty, and quantum mech• 
anica. 
Bearing these tblAgs ln mind 1 OAe can appreciate why Frank 
seems to view metaphysics as a mixed blessing. On the .negative 
side 1 it causes sluggishness in pure aciance; on the positive side, 
it helps to direct and stabilize the work that acience does. What-
ever may be the personal tastes of a particular scientist for 
metaphysics, metapbyaics is a fact of human life, and tells some• 
thing about human nature. For tbt.a reason, no dignified scientist 
can fall to take note of it. 
7. lb.!, Y•L\W 2' Httapb.lsts1 
Frank does not make an explicit judgment about the value of 
the two•f old science-metaphysics chain of human endeavor that he 
describes. Instead, be clarifies it, ln the following summary 
statement, 
The scientific way (via mathematical derivation 
and experimental verification) is often a very long one. 
Therefore man requires a way by which these principles 
become directly plausible; this means a way by which 
they can be connected with common sense by a 1short 
c1reuit 1 ••• Philosophy introduces into science some• 
thing in which the sc:l.entist •as a scientist• h.as no 
interest. As a matter of fact, the scientist is also 
human and has his weaknesses. 1f one may call this 
requiring that tbe general principles of science be 
plausible in themselves a weakness.30 
30~ •• 47. 
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In this Chapter, it h.as been shown in what way Frank's 
vietfs on metaphysics and common sense have developed after the 
second World War. Che may say that they represent a Liberalizing 
of the strictly positivistie faith in science alone to snow the 
way to hut&an aC.va_l"lcement, and that uaetaphysics, because it is 
beyond direct co11firmation, is •me.aningless• at best, and harmful 
at worst. This is not to say, by any stretch of the imagination, 
that Franl<. became sOiile: sort of .myatic 1 or even romantic. He never 
gives the impression that intuitive thinking is to be exalted 
above the methodology of experimental sciemce. However, it does 
show ua how Frank as a philosopher Lncreased in scope, and to that 
degree how he came much cloaer to a true picture of the part sci-
ence plays 1n human endeavors generally. The following chapters 
undertake to examine what ia perhaps Frank'• greatest forte: his 
ability to see through the metaphysical miainterpretationsof sci-
entific theory, to the real meaning and nature of science itself. 
Ml:>lNTERPRETATlONS OF QUANI'UM fHEORY 
I. Q~tum Mechanic1 
Although quantum mechanics postdates relativity theory by 
two decades, it developed from work which was done in electro-
magnetic theory before the end of the nineteenth centw.:·y. Max-
well 1 s theories to describe electromagnetic phenomena wert"' origin-
ally exp~cted to support Newtonian mechanics, although he employed 
a wholly different mathematical technique. Maxwell himself tried 
to link his theories to N~wtonian models. But it was soon dis-
covered that the two areas failed to jibe well with respect to 
experimental evidence. H. Hertz said outright that there was no 
sense in trying to justify Maxwell's equations in terms of other 
theories; the laws of electrodynamics~ Maxwell's equations.l 
Frank points this out as one of the breaking points of th.e strong 
belief in Newtonian science. He adds that ther:e was a period dur-
ing which a dual interpretation was allowed - a mechanical world, 
explained by Newton's Laws, and a world of ether phenomena, in-
cluding Maxwell's descriptions of electro-magnetism. But this 
could not last. 
let. Philosophy of Science; The Link Between Scieece and 
PhilosoRhY, l~O. 
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In 1890, J. J. Thomson showed tnat a particle of very small 
m~chanical mass might possess a tremendous inertia. if its spp,ed 
or electrical charge were sufficiently Large. "Later on. u F'rank 
continuf>s, 0 one ventured the hypothesis that there might not be 
any real mass at all, and that inertia was a phenomenon of the 
electromagnetic field. From this hypothesis the great Dutch phy-
sicist, Hendrik A. Lorentz, derived that the apparent mass of a 
particle increases with its speed and increases beyond all limits 
if the speed approaches the speed of light."2 
This idea, that the apparent mass of a particle seemed to 
change, was an upsetting idea for those who were completely sold 
on the validity of Newtonian mechanics - especially those who gave 
the latter the. support of common-sensical or even metaphysical 
necessity. Yet the theories indicating such a mass change led to 
~xperimental derivatives more in accord with observation than 
those which held for the constancy of mass. This does not mean 
that it is true to say mass changes, and false to say it does not. 
Physical theories do not speak of truth• in the s~nse of demon-
strating the natw::e of •reality•. Frank puts it this way, 
The correct way of describing the situation is 
approximately as follows: The operational definition 
of mass which nas been used in Newtonian mechanics loses 
its usefulness and must be dropped. In order to keep 
up the continuity of physical science, we introduce 
2~ •• 131. 
I' 
again a term 1inass,' which is defined by an opera-
tional definition which cannot be identical wi~h the 
definition of tnass used in Newton's .mechanics. 
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Besides the problems of very small masses changing, quanttun 
theory al.so involves a view of th.€1 motion of small bodies that is 
called the 'uncet'tainty principle', which was first given a formu-
lation by Werne.:r: Heisenberg, in 1927.4 He maintained that the 
product of the uncertainties for coordinate and mom~ntum of a 
particle is a constant: 
A 1C. • .6p • h. 
We shall discuss this theory further below. However, for the 
present, we would note t:hat the constant (h) in the formulation 
above is the sa.rne constant that Hails Bohr discovered in relation 
to the permissible orbits of electrons in the so-called Bohr atom,5 
and the same constant that enters into the quantized picture of 
black-body radiation, and the photo-electric effect studied by 
Philipp Lenard,6 i.n which Light appears to radiate in packets of 
discrete energy (E)• of the form: E • hf (where 'f' is the light 
frequency). The constant {h) bears the name P1.anck 1 s Constant• 
3l.J2.is!.. 146. 
4cf. Zeitschfift fw; !:,hv1rd·!s 43 • 1927. 
Set. f!liLosofhicai ~~=~ 26, 1913, in t..~ree papers (Frank's r~ferencen Pfi i<(o of Sciepce, 373, Chapter 8, 
Note 18). 
6cf. Annalen de' fbY•i~ 8, 1902 for Lenard's experiment 
(Frank's reference ln fb\LosoRl}y of Scienc11 373, Chapter 8, 
Note 14). 
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after Max Planck.1 who proposed what Frank calls "the most revolu-
tionary hypothesis of the twentiety century".7 It was Planck who 
suggested, in 1901 1 the •quantum b.ypotb.ee1a 1 1 namely, tbat there 
is a minimum quantity of energy.a 
Bohr himaelf developed an idea similar to the uncertainty 
principle, which ls somewhat broader i..n. application. Noting that 
one can set up experimental conditions in order to determine 
either the position of a particle, or it• momentum1 but not both 
in the same experiment, Bohr gaaerali.zed Heisenberg's principle 
thus: "Evidence obtained under different experimental conditions 
cannot be comprehended within a a1ngle p1cture1 but must be 
regarded aa COCl2).f!1.1At1£X in the aenae th.at only the totality of 
the phenomena exh.auate the possible information about the ob• 
jects."9 
The problems of language abuse is one that has been of 
paramount concern, among the positivists of the Vienna Circle, and 
more recently among the so-called Analysts, especially in Engtand 
and America. Wittgenstein had early auggeated that moat philos-
ophical problems are paeudo-problema which would disappear aa soon 
7EBito12pbx 2£ s51ense. 153. 
8cf. ~iii d& w1~4, 1901 1 553 (Frank's reference in 
fbi1010PbY gSC~~ ; C pter 61 Note S), 
9ctted in AlbfE; Ej..npte1n: Ph1\01gph1r-sc11n5iftt ed. 
Schilpp, 220. 
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as their origin was discovered to lie 1.n the inappropriate use of 
words. Following this up, Neurath and carnap pus'1ed for the em-
ployment of a 1phyalcalist 1 language to eliminate confusion and to 
unify a11 the sciences, including the social. Carnap, for example, 
held that the confusion that haa surrOW'lded the meaning of quantum 
theory 11alwaya arises from the material mode of speech.• One such 
point of confuslo.n occurred, for inatance, ln J. J. Thomson's dis• 
cuaaiona about electron charges, which included the terms "real 
mass" and "apparent mass". Frank suggests, "(T)he miainterpreta• 
tion can therefore be avoided only if one tries to set up a direct 
short circuit between the physical principle and the moral prln• 
cipLe,nlO which might be done through the u•e of a consistent 
1phya1ca1iat 1 language. 
Frank discuaaea the tendeJtcy - an "unfulfilled longing", he 
calla lt - to bring back the old unity between science and phil-
osophy. 
Through the work of Galileo and Newton, anthro-
pomorphic medieval phyaica •• expelled from conacioue 
intellectual life. There rema1ned 1 however, an unful-filled longing to bring about the unity of animate and 
inanimate nature which had been present in medieval 
physics but was missing in the newer physlca. There 
was left only one problem, for vhich no satisfactory 
solution could be envisaged: to understand the pro-
cesses of life in terms of phyaics. For that was the 
necessary condition for a unified conception of phy-
sics, which had fitted in ao well with the vitaliat 
conception of Life.11 
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One manif estat1on of this longing to unify physical an.d 
animate nature 1s the effort to see in quantum mechanics certain 
proofs of the underlying spirituality of nature. It is important 
to note at the same time that Frank does not recognize any cor-
responding effort to develop a purely materialistic metapb.yslcs. 
That ls, if materialism is considered aa "the belief that all 
processes of nature can be reduced to the 1awa of Newtonian mech• 
anica, then this ia not a philosophic principle, but a physical 
hypotbesia.•12 
lf science ls to advance, and avoid. the linguistic pitfalls 
of traditional metaphysics, l.t must maintain the moat exact and 
unambiguious terminology possible. To this end, "A 'soulless' 
psychology and a 1matterless 1 physics have been established as 
parts of 'Unified Science•. Words like •matter' a.ad 1mind 1 are 
left to the language ot everyday life where they have their legit• 
imate place and are underatood by the famous •man in the street• 
unambiguoualy.•13 
lf 1 as experiments confirm, masa can seem to disappear, 
11JJ!.Wi., 159. 
12~ •• 160. 
13cf. "Man Confronts FU..mself," s1i;urday geview of \.i;e&:a• 
~ 41, October 25, 1958, 20-21. 
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does this not indicate that the mater1alS.atie view of .nature ia 
false? Does one not aee strOAg evidence that reality is ianater• 
ial - that it :ls energy and apir:ltf Frank says no. He warns that 
such anti-ma.terialiat:lc i.nterpretat:lona are not from science, but 
from what he calls the "humanized or popularized formulation of 
these resulta. 0 13 
Frank discusses several men vb.o hold to the views that he 
criticizes here. Bernard Bavink.1 for instance, wrote a book in 
1933 whose title alone, ti!J!Ykl& §gj,ence on 5bft P1Q tg &tla&aion• 
suggests the view in question. Another phyaici•t· J. a. Jeana, 
bas put forth aimil.ar ideaa1 1n his books, Iat tJ.Yt5fii2P! YQiYIR't 
and IM litm llSWW!¥1 fi'....Ss:;lata£t. He suggests that "Today there 
is a wide meaeure of agreement, wh1cb. Oft the physical side of sci• 
ence approaches almost to unanimity1 that the atJ:eam of knowledge 
is headi.ng towarda a .oomoecbanica.L rulity; the universe begi.n.a to 
look more like a great thOUgb.t than 11.ke a great mac:hintt. Mind no 
Longer appears a.a an accidental intruder into the realm of mat• 
ter.ul4 Still another physicist. A. s. Eddington, has voiced com• 
parable opi.nions, in hia book1 TQ.! l!U!Ee o( 1iQe fl\Y1jgc41 H2£ld· 
Tb.ese men al1 seem to feel that the twe.clt1eth century has 
destroyed the mechanistic model of the world 1.n favor of a math• 
ematica.1 1 and therefore a more numan1 model. But a clear look at 
the historical de'\relopme.nt of the old mechanics will show the 
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error of th.ls belief. Frank reminds his readers frequently that 
11 wton•s Laws are also a mathematical system. lt is only because 
tney deal with events that are close to everyday experie.nce that 
th.eY have received such. a high degree of acceptance. These laws 
certainly \lere never• nor can they bet "read off" the events 'they 
claim to describe. Newton's second law, for example. Which atates 
that a body's acceleration is proportional to the force actillg on 
it 11 and inversely proportional :o its ma.as (P • ma). does not 
follow automat1cal17 from OAe 1s observations of tides, falling 
bodies, and celestial orbits. evftft though it does predict these 
events well. Both Leibniz and Deacartea atudt.ed the same universe 
trust Newton stUdied, yet their mathematical descriptions of motion 
were different: from Newton's formulation. 
lt should be noted, a1so, that a mathematical. mechanics has 
not al.ways been thought to be closer to spirituality, or Divine 
Oun.iscience, than non-mathematical mechanics. Copernicus' censure 
by 1:he C.thoLic <llurcb 1a a caae 1n point. Hie ayst:• of celes• 
ti.al motions was upheld as being •mathematically true'• at the 
same time as lt was condemned for being 1ph1loaophically abaurd•.15 
Frank calls the distLnction between mathematical and mechanical 
models "inappropriate"• Re says• 
We kn0tf today that the motions of bodies with 
velocities comparable to that of light can be de•• 
lSct. :"'tetaph.yeical Interpretatio.na of Science, u 22.· £ll.., 
Chapter t I I , 1"lote 13. 
cribed only with the help of the reLativity theory of 
Rinstein, the motions of the smallest particles in the 
atoms only with the help of quantum and wave mechanics • 
••• If we understand by mechanics the doctrine of the 
motion of 1bodles of average alze with moderate velo-
cities,• then we can rightly say that modern physics 
has established tbe impoasibility of a mechanical basia 
for the processes of nature. lf we say, however, that 
the mechanical foundation has been replaced by a math• 
ematical one, it is, in my opinion, a very inappropriate 
mode of expression. We ought to ••Yt rather, that the 
place of a special. mathematical theory, th.at of newton, 
has been taken by mory
6
seneral theories, the relativity 
and quantum theories. 
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From the time of Newton, there has been a dispute over the 
nature of Light. Some held th.at light was a wave phenomenon, 
whereby the propagations wer:e due to disturbances moving in a 
medium, like ripples moving through a liquid. Huyghena developed 
the idea of interference and reinforcement between waves, to ex-
plain the common optical phenomenon of interference patterns. lf 
two waves have their crests 'lined up•, the light will be intensi-
fied or reinforced, while if the crest of one wave coincides with 
the trough of another, the waves will interfere. 
Although this wave picture was adequate to explain many of 
the common optical phenomena, it had some basic set-backs. For 
example, all attempts to discover what the 1medium 1 is in which. 
light waves travel have failed. lf this medium, called 1ether' 
exists, some very sophisticated experiments have not been able to 
16J:12S!l(n Science 4Qd lS! PAi1012ph7, 131. 
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detect it. One of the moat conclusive in the series of such tests 
was the famous Michelson-Morley experiment of 1881. In Chapter V 
this experiment will be described in some detail. For now, we 
simply point out that the failure to discover ether might be ex-
plained by assuming that the ether alters the very instruments 
which are used to detect it, in such a vey that it remains undis• 
coverable. '!bat is, if, in accordance with Maxwell's theory of 
electro-magnetic radiation, all lnatrumenta undergo certain forces 
from light that tend to contract them in the direction of light 
propagation, they will yield one and the same reading for two dif • 
ferent events. Thia contraction hypothesis which was suggested, 
and formulated mathematically by Lorentz, has been strengthened by 
experiment, although it was originally suggested only as a very 
unlikely explanation for the negative reauLta of Michelson and 
Morley's work. ln any caae. the relativity theory, which will be 
described below, assumes that whatever ether may bet if anything, 
it cannot be discovered. 
Another problem which the wave theory tacea la the explana-
tion of so-called 1black•body radiation•. The wave hypothesis 
would suggest that a light sow:ce emits light uniformly in all 
directlo.ns in a 1pherical wave that loaea its intensity aa the 
inverse square of the distance from the aow:ce. One might expect 
thus to find that the intensity of light energy falling upon a 
detector, such as a screen, would diminish along a continuum, and 
that no matter how far the detector were placed from the source, 
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some light energy would always be found falling on it. However, 
this ia not the case, experimentally. lt is discovered that the 
intensity of detected light does not fall off smoothly and contin• 
uously, but by discrete increments, so that at a sufficiently 
great distance from the source, the detector records only distinct 
bursts of intermittent energy, with a certain discrete, Least 
a.mount of intensity, or else none at all. Thia experiment, car:ried 
out by Lenard in 1902, was interpreted to mean that light is 
emitted in small packages, called photons, rather than in a con-
tinuous undulation. The discreteness of these packages is the 
origin of the term •quantum•, or 'definite amount•. 
lt is obvious that the wave model, unaltered, cannot account 
for this phenomenon. Yet it ia equally clear that the wave theory 
is useful for moat optical phenomena, which Newton'• laws for 
particle motion cannot explain. Frank tells us of Einstein's 
efforts to keep the moat fruitful aspects of the wave idea. "In 
order to alter the undulation theory as little as possible, 
F.instein assumed th.at light should remain a propagation of waves, 
now electromagnetic waves, but that the energy shouLd not be dis-
tributed evenly in the wave homogeneously. 'Ihere should be con-
densation of energy that will propagate like parcels 1n such a way 
that the screen can never be hit by leas than one parcet. 0 17 
Another area in which the quantum idea was confirmed deals 
17~ •• 199. 
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with the orbits of electrons around the nucle11 of atoma. Accord-
~n.~ to claaalcal mechanical analya1a, one should observe orbits 
with a range of energies that ia theoretically infinite. Yet 
spectral analysis shows that atoms actually have only a limited 
numbei:- of orbits, with veey definite '4•rgy levels that occur over 
and over. In h.ydroge.o, wb1cb is the •~lest atom, Bohr discovered 
that only those orbit• are fouad wboae angular mcmentum i• an 
integral multiple of h/2~ (where h ia Planck'• Constant, described 
above, ~ which also enters 1nto the discrete energy levels found 
in the radiation of light from black•bodiea.) 
It 1a well to remark again that this quantised view of 
orbiting electrons la only a JBathematical model which can Lead to 
appropriate obaervatioaal results. No one knows for aure that 
particular orbits are actually excluded, since it ia not certain 
that electrons are really orbiting, ln the sense that pla.neta 
orbit the sun. Indeed, it is not ••ea certain that electrons may 
legitlllately be conaidered as little pieces of charge, nor that 
they act the sue in atoms aa they do in radiation, or 1a a con• 
ductor. 
Noting these dlacrepancies v1th respect to light phenomena, 
and the failure of the wave theory to explain th•1 ~de Broglie 
tried.to justify, or modify, !lewtoniaA .. chanics in order to 
account for all the known obaervablea. He decided, in effect, to 
•iev all auch phenomena, &lld also those of particle aotion on the 
larger acale1 as part of the aaae general behavior. Thia behavior 
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can be described• accordlag to de Broglie• by wave mathematics, 
which involves second•order differential equations. 
Frank tells us• 
To make this generalization1 de Broglie assumed 
that a type ef wave could be introduced (called by l11m 
"matter waves,• later Broglie waves) that accounts for 
the trajectorlea of material puticlea by a theory of 
undulation accounts for the paths of light rays ••• 
De Broglie's b.ypotheaia waa simply that a pacticle'a 
motioa vaa deterai.ned by a radiation, the photo.na of 
which had the aaae moaentum aa the particle. Thia 
means that the wave length A of thia radiatioA ls 
determined bya 
P • llV • hv/c • h/A1 or, )\ • b./mv1 
known aa 1de Broglie's equation.• De Broglie'• law 
for the motion of particles th.en was: If small 
particlea of maaa m and the speed v are moving 
through alita in the diaphragm or around obstacles, 
they behave llke photon• of a wave length h/mv, the 
1de Broglie wave length.• 18 
ln these examples, there seems to be little justification 
in holdi.ng that light, or for that matter, particles either, are 
wave phenomena any more than they are particle phanome.na, follow• 
ing the common•senae use of those terms. One does aot really know 
what the underlying nature of these eve.nta is; but o.ne can use 
theoretical models to describe t:h•. The models which Newton em• 
ployed are close to one1a daily experience, because they describe 
things that are close to our daily experience. The de Broglie 
wave theory 1a far from satisfying to cOBDOA sense, yet lt seems 
1so1101opl)r gf §clegco, 204·205. 
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more adequate than the older theory for deriving confirmatory ex-
periment, about events which are far from one's daily experience. 
It should be noted that the de Broglie 'waves' are not three-dimen-
sional waves; they are a matluunatical picture. By the same token, 
one must look critically at the idea that wave theory supports 
metaphysical idealism. As Frank states, rather bluntly, "It is 
hardly more plausible to regard beauty and mystical communion with 
God as de Broglie waves than to regard them aa material masses. 
All the mental entities, beauty, religious experience, etc., are 
no more a part of quantum mecha.rd.ca than they are of Newtonian 
ph.ysica. 0 19 
5. I!!t Qasm:;ttiQSY fElQC~Pit 
As has been stated above, it is found, in confirmation of 
de Broglie's hypothesis, that beams of small particles undergo the 
same sort of scattering and diffraction phenomena as light beams 
undergo. That is, if one beams electron•• for example, through a 
slit onto a screen, aome electrons wi.11 be bent out of their 
straight path to form a aeriea of light and dark bands or fringes 
to the sides of a central bright band that Lies directly in line 
with the beam's path before it passes the slit. The distribution 
of these bands wi11 follow the typical 1bel1 curve• that is common 
in probability theory. Thia is to say that some of the electrons 
will apparently receive a component of momentum perpendicular to 
19~ •• 239. 
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the original path, when they interact with the al1t. If one nar• 
rows down the slit, thus hoping to define the position of the beam 
more precisely, this sideways component of momentum will increase 
proportionately. There is no way to determine the final path of 
any single electron. However, with a large number of electrons, 
it is possible to determine with great accuracy the fins.1 distri-
bution of bright and dark bands on the target screen. 
From the wave equation, it is found that the uncertainty of 
original position, that is, in tbJ.a case, the width of the slit, 
is related to the sideways component of momentum imparted by the 
slit, by this equation: 
6x~p•h 
This principle, which states that there is no way experimentally 
to determine simultaneously the exact position and momentum of a 
particle, bears the name Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. 
Frank explains tho principle in i~O\Hldati2n1 of ft+Isics. 
We must alway• declde in what reault we are in• 
terested: in the position of the particle passing the 
diaphragm, or in the momentum of this particle. In 
each case we ca.n make a prediction. ln the first case 
we can predict the dif fraetion pattern on the screen. 
ln the aecond case we know the momentum which the dia• 
phragm gets from the particle, and we ca.a make predic• 
tions by means of Newton's mechanics. We can predict 
the motion of bodies which are hit by the diaphragm.20 
20foundationa of Phfaics, Vol. 1, No. 7, of Encys\92ed\f of 
Unif!eg §clen;1, Cfilcago, 938, 473. 
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Again, in the same article, Frank continues, 
If we consider a great number of particles pass-
ing the slit of the width A'X, most of them have a 
momentum Fix, • h/ ~-x. parallel to the screen. But also 
all smaller and greater momenta will occur with a car• 
tain frequency according to the Gauaaian distribution 
of errors. 
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As a result of theae expeximental and mathematical findings, 
interpreted by metaphysically oriented persona, it has been sug-
gested that there exiata, ln tbe pb.yaical universe as in the mental 
universe, a bui.lt•in indeterminacy, that is akin to 'free will'. 
Rddington, for example, in bis book It!! H•tYE:• 2f ~ht Ph)!sicaL 
Hot:Ld, 1928 1 suggested that only after 1927 (the year Heisenberg 
proposed his Uncertainty Principle) waa it possible for thoughtful 
scientists to feel justified in their religious beliefs.21 In a 
later book, Dlt fD&L21ephr of .ft!.l'1is1L ~S~!BSI (1949), Eddington 
denied that one c&n support the belief in free will by Heiaed:erg'a 
principle.22 Nevertheless, according to Frank, it ls Fddington'a 
earlier idea that bas remained popular. 0 'I'he philoaopbers and 
theologians vb.o advocate tbia belief, .. Frank. tells us, uare not 
intereated in advocating indeterminism in physic•, but in claiming 
21Ib.I ~£YE• of fh! ~rslctl W2fLS, 350, cited in fb.ilosq::hy ~ 2fl1eose, 2 • Cf. a so 7rank1s rev ew of Heisenberg's I.b.£. 
11iciftfi• rfni'm2°:£fi t?lt:Y£!'h under the heading, "Man con-
fronts ae f, • • 
22cf. fbiL010PAX of Ssieacg, 255. 
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that there are events and phenomena that follow laws that are dif-
ferent from the physical laws.n23 
Arguing against the 'ftee wi11 1 intexpretation of the 
Heisenberg principle, Frank uses the thoughts of Nalim K. Brahma, 
a Hindu philosopher, who is favorable to metaphysics, but who 
realiz~s its inappropriateness in this context. Brahma says, 
If future experiments reveal to us that the in· 
determinism supposed to exist in the movements of the 
electron is really nonexistent, philosophy would find 
itself helpless to prove its position if it now accepts 
the argument of Professor Eddington ••• Freedom and 
other metap~ysicaL truths cannot be proved in the 
sphere of phenomena where space4 time and causality are the only categories that rule.z 
'l'he ideaa of Eddington 1s earlier book are echoed by another 
British phyaiclstt James Jeans, in his book of 1943• f!!ttiS! !Qd 
{>h&,Losoetq. In Jeans• opinion. "'the cLass1caL physics seemed to 
bolt and bar the door leading to all freedom of will; the new 
physics hardly does this; lt almost seems to suggest th.at the door 
may be unlocked if we could only find the handle.. The old physics 
showed us a universe which looked more like a prison.n2S 
At an early period, Frank warned against such overstate-
ments as Jeans makes here. ln the EnCXS12Pft9i! of ygif~$d Sc!@t!s;e, 
tor instance, he wrote• 
231l?J:s!. 
24c1ted in !l!i:4· 
25c1ted in llU.lo12eh1 o( sc1ens1, 240. 
We muat carefully avoid the misunderatandlng 
which has been caue~d by the way s01ne physicists have 
discuased the relation of uncertainty. One hears 
sometimes the statement: "lt is impossible to meas-
ure almultaneously the position and the momentum of a 
small partic:Le. 0 This sounds as if there would be 
small particles which possess certain positions and 
certain momenta. We are told that we can measure 
either of them but that nature is so diabolic as to 
preve.nt us from measuring both aimu1ta.neoua1y. This 
statement is rather misleading. The expression "• 
particle with a certain poaitlon and a certain momen-
tum" has no operati9.oal meaning if de Broglie's hypo-
thesis is accepted.26 
93 
Twenty years later, Frank had much the same thing to say, 
'lheae laws for the behavior of particles are, of 
course, very different from the Newtonian laws and 
very different from our COt11Don•aense ideas about 
particles. As Bohr pointed out• we muat avoid ascrib• 
iAg to an atomic object (auch as an electron) tradi• 
tional properties of a particle. Aa we have tearned, 
"position and velocity of a particle., la an expression 
wlthout2~ratio.nal meaning if applied to small par-ticles. 
1. ~sgpLemegtar~tv 
1n keeping with the findings about indeterminacy, as out-
lined above, Neils Bohr put forth a more general idea that appU.ea 
to other fields of knowledge in science. In a paper entitled ttnls• 
cussions with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Phy• 
sics," Bohr said, .,Evidence obtai.Aed under different experimental 
conditio.na cannot be comprehended wichin a single picture, but 
26.Qa. • .Qt, •• 474 
27fh1Los2ph1 o' Ssi111c1, 243. 
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must be regarded as compllf9lntf'X• in the senee that only the 
totality of the phenomena exhausts the poas1b1e information about 
the objects.«28 
Frank bas put the principle of complementarity thua, 
Under.: certain circumstances, the lanfuage of 
•positions of particles' or •point events must be 
used; in other circumstances, excluding the ones 
above mentioned, we speak of •momenta of particles• 
or •impulse events.• lf we make use of all possible 
infoxmation about the present atate of the world, we 
must use both Languages. Then we can predict a11 
events which our actual science enable& us to predict.29 
A similar idea vaa proposed by Heisenberg in Tb.t JllYl\si.st~ 
Qgpception ot, f';1turt• There he suggests that whereas nineteenth• 
century scientists looked for knowledge of the world as something 
Lawlike and permanent apart from the knower, modern science is 
characterized by a more "modest 51 view, ill which. the role of the 
scientist is exa;:nined too. One no longer looks for atoms 11.n 
themselves' but as the scientist experiences them. In other wcrds, 
"Hetb.od and object can no longer be separated.n30 
'lb.e point these authoi:a make• and Frank agrees, is that the 
scientist's knowledge of the world depends in large measure upon 
the language he uses to describe it, especially with respect to 
the operational <lefinitions he gives in order that the theories 
28Cited in fb:ilOSOQb;[ gf SS~fBCCe 220. 
29touruitk12QI o,_fbXsics, 476. 
30cf. Frank•• review• J'Man Confronts Himself, n .Ls.£. si.£. 
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may be teated. Metaphysical mialnterpretations, Frank aaya over 
a.nd over again, stem from the m1suae a.ad confusion of the language 
which describes scientific work. In one of his last publications, 
in 1958, Frank put the idea 1.n these words: "the new physics does 
not teach us anything about •matter• and 1 sp1rit 1 , but much about 
semantics. 0 31 Similarly, in another paper of the same year, he 
said: "I believe th.at the advances in philosophy which have been 
stimulated by twentieth-century physics, like relativity and quan-
tum theory, are not advances in metaphysics, but advances in sem-
antica. u32 
Robert Oppenheimer expressed a certain disagreement with 
Frank in relation to the origin and meaning of complementarity, 
which ls we11 to point out, in cLos1.ng this Chapter. Oppenheimer 
said that wh.ereas Frank feela that science seems to lead the way 
toward cultural advancement, while philosophical interpretations 
follow up with their support, lt must be admitted that Bohr's 
complementarity idea dld not develop in this way. In fact, it did 
not come from science at all, but from Bohr's rather metaphysical 
leanings. Complementarity, according to Oppenheimer, sprang from 
Bohr's ttea:r:ly interests i.n the complementary character of the 
introspective and the behavioral description of man, in the com-
plementary character of dealing with experience in the light of 
31°The Present Role of Scie,nce," 1.'h• Htl!HUl1f5 19, 1959, 8. 
32°eo.ntemporary Science and tbe Contemporary World View, .. 
Daed1&u1 87, 1958, 63. 
Love and in the light of justice, and from t:he ••• tensions of 
c01nprehending in one description causal explanation of behavior 
and moral condemn.ation of behavior. ,,33 
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33ct. "The Growth of Science and the Structure of CUlture: 
Comments on Dr. Frank's Paper,*' Da19tly.4 87, 1958• 67-76. 
CHAPTER V 
MlSlNTERPRETATlONS OP Itll..AtlVlTY THEORY 
1. &el•tlvitr i.q Conte; 
As has been pointed out above, Frank demonstrated a partic-
ular ability for placing the advances of science in their histor-
ical perspective. This is especially true vith respect to rela-
tivity theory, because Frank was a student and personal friend of 
Einstein, from the time of the latter's first impact upon the 
scientific world, in 1905 • the year he pub1iab.ed his Special 
Theory of Relativity. As waa pointed out in Chapter l above, 
Frank was the man whom Einatein chose to replace him at Prague. 
Relativity theory developed as an effort to synthesize 
older theories that seemed at first to be incompatible - theories 
which had been presented ln order to explain separate areas of 
observable phenomena. Specifically, Newton's laws for the motion 
of particles, which had such great aucceaa in their proper realm 
of middle-sized objects, and moderate velocities, failed to ex• 
plain experimental results when they were applied to the behavior 
of light. Light phenomena were observed to upnold, instead, 
Newton's Theorem of Relativity. In effect, thla law says that it 
is impossible to determine the motion of a reference system, such 
as the world, by examining the motion of bodies relative to this 
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system, if the system in question is not Wldergoi.ng acceleration. 
The same holds for the motion of Light, as will be explained below. 
Newton's Theorem of Relativity is described by Frank• thus. 
'nle positive formulation ts: By knowing the 
relative initial condition of maaaea 1n a vehicle• we 
can predict their future relative motion without know-
iag the speed q of the vehicle itself. The negative 
formulation aaya: By observing the motions relative 
to a vehicle• we cannot find out the constant speed 
of this vehicle, provided it is moving in a straight 
line relative to an inertial system. We can also aay: 
a vehicle moving with uniform motion relative to the 
inertial system (S) is itaeLf an inertial system that 
may be called (S 1 ). From these considerations it 
clearly follows that the speed q of (S 1 ) relative to 
the inertial system, or, according to Newton to absol-
ute space cannot be derived from any pnysica1 experi• 
ment. This speed q has no operational meaning in 
physics and was givyn a meaning by Newton witnitl the 
system of theology. 
2. The tu.ch.tLson•Ho;11x Eytrwns 
The Michelaoo•Morl.ey experiJDent of 1881 waa an effort to 
confirm the presence of a medium• called ether. in whicb light 
might travel as a wave disturbance. Such a medium had long been 
assumed• aince light phenomena had been derivable geometrically if 
they were Looked upon as the propagation of waves. Since Huyghens, 
at Least, the wave explanation jibed well with the optical experi• 
menta known• such aa image formation, and diffraction patterns. 
the experiment was baaed on reasoning that goes aa follows: 
lf there la an ether, which is fixed 1 or absolute with respect to 
lftg&R@ORhY Q( Scien;1; DI l=MJli Bttytta Ssimst and i'Jll:l-
osoph.r. • 
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bodies, then the earth wi11 travel through the ether, and any 
Light propagation which originates on the earth will feel, as it 
were, the effect of an 'ether wind'. lf the light ia travelling 
with the ether, it will be speeded up t>y the etber. lf it is 
travelli.ng perpendicular to the ether, it will be pushed aside, 
but not affected in the direction of its propagation. Analysed 
algebraica1ly1 two identical light rays, travelling through the 
ether at rigbt angles to each other might thua be expected to take 
different times to travel the same measured distance on the earth's 
surface. 
J.Ceeping this analysis in miad. 1 the tvo experimentera, 
Michelson and Morley, built an apparatus which aent two beams of 
light out at right angles to each other. The beams were reflected 
by a aeries of mirrors and b.alf•nd.rrors back to a single fln1ah 
point which was a telescope. 'D1e two paths were made identical in 
length and optical qualities, to the best at&ndards available. lt 
was expected, from principles of interference, that if either beam 
were slowed dovn in its path more than the other beam travelling 
at right angles to it, one ahould expect to see destructive 
interference, to the extent that the beams were out of phase. The 
whole apparatus was mounted on a heavy atone table vbich could be 
rotated. In this way, either beam could be di.reeted in any sense 
relative to the points of tbe compaaa, to insure that they might 
be oriented appropriately to the ether wind, wherever it might be 
produced. Also, the rotation of the table could allow one to 
i 
, I 
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check on the length of the two light paths. lf one path were 
Longer, through an error in the apparatus, light would obviously 
take a longer time to traverse it th.a.ft tbe second path, regardless 
of ether wind. But by rotating the table, one would observe the 
same inequity in. the new position. 
When the experiment was carried out, no change was noticed 
that could be called interf ere.nce, at any position of the appara-
tus, at an.y ti.me of year. This lack of result could easily have 
beeA explained simply by assuming that ether does not exist; yet 
the belief in ether was so well entrenched that other explanations 
were offered instead. 'lbese reasons are summarized in J. A. 
Coleman's little book, &tllSiv&~l (qr taa..1azmta•2 which may be 
paraphrased as follows. 
First, the earth might be fixed ln the ether, with every-
thing else moving relative to the earth and the etber. Of course 
it was not seriously considered that the earthsb:>uld occupy such a 
unique position. 
Second, an ether wind would not appear, if the earth drageerl 
the ether along with lt, but thia sugg•st1on had problem.•• too. 
Ether dragged along with the earth would drag incoming starlight 
with it, causing us t:o observe all. light to come from the sair.e 
direction, which clearly is not the case. Also, studies of the 
FreBAel drag coefficient indicated that the earth could not manage 
22Q.. ill, •• 37-41. 
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a total drag. which waa required to explain this phenomenon. 
Third, if the light velocity was always constant with 
respect to its source, the velocity would vary with respect to the 
ether. The ether would not be detected, since the two light beams 
would have the same velocity relative to the interferometer. Tb.at 
the light might vary with respect to the ether. of course, went 
against tbe whole tradition of wave motion in media, and, for that 
matter, made the whole subject almost irrelevant. Also, astro-
nomical observations, especially those concerning double stars, 
made it highly unlikely that light velocity depends on the velocl.t¥ 
of its source. 
Fourth, and now most acceptable was an explanation con-
cocted almost as a logical exercise, to explain the experimental 
results. At first it was hardly thought feasible. In 1893 1 
Fitzgerald suggested that all objects moving th.rough ether con-
tract in the direction of their motion. This contraction would 
occur in whichever arm of the interferometer was parallel to the 
motion of the instrument, relative to the ether. Thia means that 
the light trave.lling along that arm would go on a shorter path, 
but because it would be slowed down proportionately, also, the 
effect could not be seen. The two beams - one travelling at 
normal speed over the normal distance, and the other travelling at 
a slower pace, over a foreshortened distance - would arrive at the 
finish point simultaneously. lbere would be no interference pat• 
tern to aee. Although this hypothesis - called the Fitzgerald-
!,orentz contraction hypothesis - seemed fantastic at first, it 
received considerable support in 18951 when Lorentz presented his 
theory about the electron composition of matter. Einstein'• work 
of 1905 added further to the feaaibi11ty of this hypothesis. 
In Frank's words, the Micb.elaon experiment .. showed that 
Newton's theorem of relativity holds also for the phenomena of 
light propagation in moving vehicles, although according to New• 
tonian mechanics and optics this abouLd not be the case. F.i.nstein 
ventured, therefore, the hypothesis that the principle of relativ• 
ity might be a principle of higher generality than Newton's laws 
of motion and the ether theory of light."3 
3. F.in1te'n's Special Tgeor.I. of itLativiSX 
Frank describes the ell.mate which these findings produced -
the climate in which Einstein proposed the Special Theory of 1905. 
Frank says, 
During a certain period, physicists gave a 'dual• 
iatic' presentation of their science. One part waa 
regarded as 'physics of matter;' mechanics, acoustics, 
heat; the other part, the 'physic• of the ether• con• 
tained electricity, magnetism, and optics. Very soon 
lt became apparent that auch a clear-cut division did 
not yield a aatisf actory derivation of all experiences 
about the interaction between tbe motion of material 
bodies and electromag.netic wave propagation.4 
Very soon after the Mlchelson~Morley results were published, 
lf1!,Lo102bt of Sctencs, 134. 
4,bid., 131. 
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start1ng with Hertz in 1889, pbyaicists began to drop the idea 
th.at all phenomena lhould be reducible to Newtonian mechanics, 
because the latter simply could not account for •11 the observ• 
ablea. the thought of dropping Newton's system was not a comfort-
able one; it went counter to generations of thought. As Frank 
says, 
Maxwell's equation• for the electromagnetic 
field and Lorentz's hypothesis about the distribution 
of electric charges in •material' particles were ac-
cepted only because the observed fact• about the mo-
tion of bod1ea and the propagation of light could be 
derived. Thomas Aquinas• criterion for the 'inferior' 
type of truth, tb.e 1ac1entific 1 , not the 1Dhllosoph-
1cal1 truth, became the decisive criter1on:5 
Einstein's goal, Frank. tells us, was to set up principles 
from which the interaction between light propagation and the motlal 
of material particles could be derived, in tbe simplest possible 
way, without recourse to the ether hypothesis, which had proved so 
fruitless, or to Lorents•a ideas of the distribution of electric 
charges 1.n bodiea.6 It ahoul.d be noted that the principle of sim-
plicity, about which more will be said in Cb.apter Vl, is one cri• 
terion for choosing a certain hypothesis over another, especially 
if a theory is to have a high degree of generality. lt was Ein-
stein's hope to find a most general Field 'theory which could be 
used to derive IJJ. the phenomena of electromagnetism, mechanics, 
51.JzJ&.. t 133. 
6cf. PQilosoebY of Sc\enS•t 134. 
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and gravity. lf he bad not ~1.ad a deep conviction of the unity of 
tlle universe, in a ph11osoph:Lcal sense, it is doubtful that he 
would have pushed h1a idea as far aa he did 1 or that he would have 
influenced the work of contemporary science so greatly. 
Ii • ginsts;i.n' 1 Tuo fl:S.ncipl.t§ 
From. observations about the ether theory, Einstein general• 
ized the Principle of Constancy. 'nl.is can be stated as follows: 
Tb.ere is a system of reference (F) 1n the world 1 
with respect to which light is propagated through 
vacuum with a constant speed c, whatever the speed of 
the source of light With respect to (F) may be. 
SecOl.'ld.171 from the laws of motion, Elnatein took the Prin-
ciple of Relativity, '1h1ch can be stated aa follows: 
A vehicle system (F) may move with a constant 
speed along a straight line wt.th respect to (F 1 ). 
We start any optical or mechanical experiment with 
given initial co.ndltlona relative to (F1 ). Then our 
principle says that the outcome of the experiment ls 
not dependent upon q, or, 1n other words 1 if the initial conditions relative to (F') are given, the 
further motion and light propagation with respe~t to (F 1 ) are determined; they do not depend upon q. 
Immediately, one might well object that the last principle 
seems to lead to absurdities. If the two systems (S) and (S 1 ) are 
moving relative to each other, say, with a velocity of v, and 
light travels with a constant velocity c with respect to s, its 
velocity with respect to s• must be c•v, or c+v, depending 'Whether 
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s is moving faster or slower than s•. To aay that the velocity of 
Light is c with respect to !!2Sh syatema is to say that c-v, (or 
c+v) is equal to c, while v is not zero. This is impossible, 
mathematically speaking, if not also logically contradictory. But 
it must be remembered that the argument against re1at1vlty a11wpes 
that one can measure c with respect to both s and s• at the same 
time. Actually, thia la impossible; our measurements are all 
operationally def!..ned in their relation to earth (S). Since one 
cannot check this principle directly by observation, it is safe 
from refutation. That is not to say the theory la in acme aenae 
metaphysical, more than any other physical bypotheala which claims 
to be more general than a liat of simple observations. The only 
refutation of !a!. theory is th.at it fails to lead to observables; 
the only proof of any theory is that it can be confirmed by the 
observables derived from it. lt must be noted that Einateln's 
principles have led to hypoth•••• that do jibe with experimental 
results• and which b.ave vary practical c0t1aequences in the kind of 
physics which goes beyond daily experience, auch aa nuclear reac• 
tiona, and apace travel.a 
5. Non-~usL&di19 Glgaetry IQd ~§&g. SQISI 
lt can safely be said that one of the prerequisites for the 
advent of modern physics was a certain softaning up of the prin-
ciples of the older science. The developments in measuring the 
~ ... :.1 ..1 -{f\1 
1'1r 
' 
) 
i 
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speed of light, a.ad the search for ether worked to help prepare 
the ground. Maxwell's equations also helped to break down the 
belief that theories must be intuitively obvious. ln a similar 
way, the development• in logic and pure mathematics dw:i.ng tb.e 
nineteenth. century greatly influenced co.atemporary views of epis• 
temology• and the relations between theory and observation. Among 
the moat important mathematical developments in this respect are 
those of non-Euclidean geometry, especially the work of Lobacbevslcyt 
Hilbert and Minkowski. 
According to the i.deaa of relativity theory, rigid bodies 
cease to have their normal rigidity in certain circumstances Where 
high apeeda are involved. 'Ihua, for example, yardsticks and cltlcks 
will be respectively slowed down, and ahortftlled 1 along the di.rec• 
tion of their motion, but not in the direction perpendicular to 
their motion. Thia idea waa p:r:opoaed in order to ex.plain the 
apparent constancy of 1igb.t velocity, in all referen.ce ayatems; it 
cannot be proven directLy1 aa baa frequently been stated. 
Rotating bodies such aa phonogi:aph. turn-tables, or the 
Milky way Galaxy, muat be distorted, since the peripheral speed of 
such bodies is greater than that close to their center of rotation. 
Of course no point on the phonograph turn-table ever reaches rela• 
tivistic speeds, ao for all practical purpoaea1 it remains rigid 
in the normal sense of tbe term. But in th.e case of our Galaxy 
there might be noticeable variations from Euclidean geometry. 
Consider, for example, a Large triangle whose vertex points away 
from the center of rotation, and whose base is near the center. 
r 
I 
Be.cause of its relativistic motion, the vertex angle 
than it would be at rest, while the other two angles 
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would be leas 
would remain 
almost unaltered, since they move little. In effect, this would 
produce a 1defect 1 in the sum of the interior angles; they would 
add up to leas than 180 degrees. lt would also tend to curve the 
lines formi.ng the vertex inward, so th.at the vertex vould appear to 
be closer to the base than it really ••· Of couree there seems to 
be no way to determi..ne vb.ere the vertex •really t.a•. 
ln a long chapter from fhl:12•StPIU' gf SSl:•SA! Tb.a Lisnl.\ 
kg,t?en Sc&t.0c1 yd PQ1&21omz, an "Geometry as an Example of a 
Science,• Frank discusses the relation of Euclidean geometry to 
physical things.9 His main argument ls that mathematical geometry 
in its purest form bas nothing to do with •reality•. lt ls an 
axiomatic system of an 1if 1 then' character, which is consistent 
within itself• and is not sf uted by measurement of thin.gs in the 
world. Thus Hilbert, for example, tried to make a strict formal• 
ization of geometry, 1n which. there •• .no intuitive meaning 
applicable to any of the term•• such as point, straight lt.ne, or 
coincideaee.10 On the other hand, there bave been geometers, e.g. 
Reimann a.nd Helmholtz, mo held that the axiaaaa of geometry "were 
result• of physical observation, and that, therefore, the theorems 
were of no greater certainty than any statements of phyaics.~1 
9cf. Chapter lll Of l!B~l910eAZ 0, S~\ta!CI• 
lOcf. FgYS9at~gnp pf gegpatgr, 1899. 
llFrank, fbiL01opllf gf §s&swse, 84. 
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There have also been attempts to coordinate the physical and 
mathematical real.ms of geometry. Here the work of Polncare• Ein-
stein and Bridgman has been most influential. "According to Poin-
care," Prank state•• 
••• the terms which are defined by a system like 
Hilbert's are physical things. • •• lf we want to cheek 
whether a triangle of Light rays in empty space actu-
ally has an a.ngl•·•um of two right &Agl••• ve face a 
particular difficulty. lf we find that the sum in ques-
tion la dlffer•t from two rigb.t angle•, we can alao 
interpret the result by saying that the 'defect• is not 
due to the AOA•validity Of Euclidean geometry, but to 
the fact that the rays have been deflected by some 
hitherto unsuspected law of pbyaics. • •• PoiAcare con• 
eluded that we can check whether or not light rays ful-
fill the Euclidean axioms only if we know all the 
physical laws about light rays.12 
Einstein felt that one could, in a practical sen••• test 
the validity of Euclidean geometry. He says, in a paper "Geometry 
and Experience, .. in 1921 1 
According to axiomatic geometry, only the Logical-
formal ls the object of mathematicaJ but not the 1ntu1• 
t1ve content th.at ia connected with the logical-formal. 
••• The sta~ements about physical objects are obtained 
by coordinating with tbe empty concepts of axiomatic 
geometry observable objects of physical reality. ln 
particular: solid bodies behave according to the the-
orems of three-dlmenaional Euclidean geometry.13 
One way of relating phyeical. and geometrical axioms was de-
veloped by Percy Bridgman, whose ideas of •operational definition• 
12nw •• s6. 
13cited 1tl l'l!iL01gPAz: of SSl:IQS!h 87. 
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nave been one of the primary bre&k•throughs in modern science. 
Bridgman saya, for example• n'I'he concept of Length is• therefore. 
fixed when the operations by which length is measured are fixed. 
That s.a. the concept of length involves as much aa a.ad nothing 
more than the set of operations by which Length is detemined.nl4 
lt muat be noted that the conventional nature Of geometry does not 
1Han it is just whimsically arbitrary. lf there were no bodies in 
the world which obeyed Euclidean geometry• for example, it xo914 
be only a logical exercise. O.ne recalls that geometry was first 
developed by Egyptians and Greeks trying to solve practical prob-
lems about the world they observed. 
Recall that Ei.natein1 s ideas showed a cloae connection be• 
tween distance and time. Tb.us• one cau talk about a point eve.nt 
alternately in space at time ti and 4llother point event at time t2. 
One can talk about an event as bavi..ag four coordinates, three of 
which are spatial, and oue of which is temporal. To W'lify this 
process, and make it simpler. Mink.owski suggested in 1908 that one 
can construct a four•diz.nension.a.l space to describe events. Think• 
ing in this way. one couJ.d describe motion as a static curve in 
the four-dimensional space. In this syateD'lt each event might have 
one set of four coordinates relative to one reference system (S), 
say x, Yt z and t; while relative to another reference system (S') 
it would have another set of coordinates, x•, y•, z' and t 1 • 
87. 
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'lb.ere is no way to determine wbich ref erenee system is 
truer• and by this argument, there is no way of saying one time 
(e.g. t as opposed to t•) is abst.\!ute. For this reason• some per-
sons nave suggested that the world is 'really' four-dimensional, 
and that all events in time are really already established. The 
apparent progression of events is ju.st due to one's taking up dif-
ferent •positions• i.n the time (t equal• a constant) plane. Yet 
Frank points out that this 'deterministic' view is really nd.aleac-
1Ag1 for in actuality. men deal only in the •now• pla11e (where t 
equals t 0 ). As Frank says, u.sy •now' we mean th.e crQss section of 
the four-dimensional ap&ce•time continuum that i! defined by tmt0 • 
Theref ore1 it is self-contradictory that any future instant of 
time t•to can exis't •now'. olS 'lbe four-dinlel'lsional way of speak-
ing is a useful tool, but it does not tell us about •reality'. 
6. BcL•t1v1tx o; BeA1;1v1sm1 
lt baa often bee.n suggested, by acne favorably, and by 
others unfavorably, that relativity supports the belief that there 
is no perma.n.ent: truth • nothing upon which men can count 1 as the 
basis for their human beb.avior. Trutb.1 it is aa1d 1 ha• became 
completely subjective, under tbe iafl.W!ltlce of modern science. It 
is only a matter of viewpoint • of the position of th• observer, 
as some have said. 
Frank has addressed himself to this criticism 1n much of 
--·--""-... ---·-· .. -· ____ .._...,.......,_ 
15Pbilosolt>:r. of Science, 162. 
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his writing; 1.ncreasi.ngly so in his later work. In general, his 
answer has always been of th.ls form: Sci.ent1sts 1 aa scientists, 
are never coacer.ned with the underlying reality of the world. 
What they undertake to do is develop theories which ca.n lead 
logically to tile events that are observed. They are never certain 
that any theory is true 1n any absolute way. This is not to say 
that there is no truth. lt is to say that the scientist wants to 
have practical consequences from his ideas, but not metaphysical 
interpretations. Thus, for example, Frank says, 
lbe physicist in his own acientif ic activity baa 
never employed any other concept of truth than that of 
pragmatism. The •agreement of thoughts with tlleir ob• ject,• as the school philosophy requires, cannot be es• 
tab11abed by any concrete experiment. In practice we 
encounter only experieacea, never an object; he.nee noth-
i.o.g ca.a be compared with an object. Actually, the 
physicist compares only experiences with other exper-
iences. He teats the truth of a theory1rirough what one is accustomed to call •agreements.• 
l.n earlier work, Frank puts the idea Chia ways 
If the statement 1 le.agth is relative• is under• 
stood 1.n its operational meaning• it is a statement 
about the fact that certain procedures of measurement 
yield different resu1ta 1 wb.ereaa it bad formerly been believed that they yield identical results. But if we 
transplant the statement 'length is relative' without 
its operational mean1nf into psychology or sociology 
or medicine, the word relative' is interpreted, of 
course, 1.n the way in which this word has been tradi• 
tionally used in these fields of knowledge. lt has 
meant there ~hat all knowledge is subjective or 
hlstorieally and ethtdcally conditioned. • •• 
What we can Learn from these examples is simply 
the fact that a presentation of physic• i• fit to be 
a part of the unified sciences only if the operational 
saeaning of every statemeiat ls explicitly formulated 
and carefully carried alon&7when the stat~.ment is applied to other sciences.I 
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This is not to say that tb.cre should be a strict dichotomy 
between facts and values. or experience of subjectivity• and 
belief in certainty. Such an ostrich view can have no practical 
value. l'"'urther 1 it is historically abort•aighted, since it 
0 ignores the close ties which have always and everywhere e.xiated 
between ma.n's picture of the physical universe and his picture of 
an ideal human aociety.nl8 Always Frank triea to differentiate 
between these two realms without trying to destroy either. In 
another address, he says, ••The work of the scientist is probably 
not fundamentally differe.nt from the work of 'the poet. 'Reality 
in its fullness• can be grasped neither by the scientist nor by 
the poet. Reality can only be experienced, never represented; ••• 
F.very presentation, scientific or poetic, proceeds from creating 
symbols.n19 
Science is not an effort to discover reality, so much as 
it is an effort to describe man's experience of it. caaairer, 
following Kant, suggeated tb.at reality ls somehow determined by 
17r;OM9i~&oo1 e' ftll•is:e. 12£. sU,., soo. 
18"The Present Role of Science," 12£. sJ.,£., 21. 
19"Contamporary Sele.nee and tb.e Contemporary World View," 
sa.;. •• 65. 
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the laws developed toward such a description. "".t'b.ere is 1objec• 
tivity• or 'objective reality'•" he e&7•• "becauee and in so far 
as, there are laws •not conver:aely.n20 this view like Kantian 
idealism, places lawfulness in the procesaea of human reaaoning• 
rather than in an outalde world. ln Frank'• oplnion, caaalrer 
represents an effort to work a middle ground between acience and 
traditional philosophy. He does not, in aplte of hi• idealistic 
language• f ael that modern physic• 1• a eonf irmation of lantian 
idealism. Freedom, tor example, is not proveA by the discovery of 
areas of uncertainty in nature, such as the incompatlbillty of 
e.xact momentum and exact position of particles. Cassirer says in 
this regard, "In itself it would be very bad for ethics and its 
dignity if it could not maintain authority except by watching for 
gaps 1n the scientific elucidation of nature and, so to apeak1 
creeping into these gapa.u21 
Einstein's own views about the relation between theory and 
object are enlightening. He apparently did not think that his 
relativity theory eliminated the possibility of transcendent laws. 
ln an argument concerning chance happenings, he once said, "The 
Lord God does not throw dice." Einstein upheld the existence of 
laws in nature as a basic tenet of his faith. He said• for 
example, "'nle most incomprehens1b1e thing about the world is that 
20ctted 1.n Hpge;p ssi!QCt ADG..l~ .£biL01~Rb!:1 178. 
cited i!l=~~t~a::Jr!i::lttt:Jh~oifi~ DfliS!t 1937, 
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it ls comprehenalble.•22 
Similarly, to the Conference on Science, Philosophy and 
Religion i.n 1940, Einstein tried to show a connection between 
faith and the i.dea of cosmic order. nTo tbls th.ere also belongs 
the faith in the poaalbility that ~he regulations valid for the 
world of existence are rational, that ta comprehensible to reason. 
1 cannot conceive Of a genuine scientist Without that profound 
falth. The situation may be expressed by an image: science with• 
out religion ls lame, religion without science is b11nd.n23 
7. Divegggp.t Y&n• 2' BeLiSlin£t 
Frank poiata out1 against the metapbyaical. mia1.nterpreta-
tiona of Relativity, that almoat every conceivable ideology bas 
used Ein8tein1 a ideas to auppoct it, although the conclusions 
reached by each of the various ideologues have been in many cases 
altogether i.ftcompat!.ble with those of the others. There are as 
maA.Y people who decry modern science for supporting materialism as 
there are those who uphold it for returnl.ng an element of idealism 
and Divine purpose to the world. The Soviets• for example, start• 
ing with Lenin.1 have lambasted relativity, on two points which, i.n 
their estimation, are a.nt1material1atic. Their first objection is 
that the abandonment of ether a• a material medium for light prop• 
agatio.n is lnconalate.nt with aense-perception and logic. Their 
22no.n ffl7aica1 Reality," 1936, cited in 8Einste1n, Mach an<l 
Logical Positivism, .. 12£. s!.£•, 284. 
231n "£1.nstei..n, Mach and Logical Positivism,• 285. 
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second object10A at.ma at the atatementa whicb. try to ab.ow that one 
cannot aay the earth ia 'really' moving, or that the Ptolemaic 
syatem is 'really• wrong~ 
If the Soviet• have criticized !inatein'• theories as being 
inillical to materlalia, a raft of writers have welcCllled them for 
brl.nging the ian.aterial back into a state of respectability 1 aa&lnat 
the dogmatic mechanism of traditional science. Fra.nk citea Llncoln 
Barnett, who has helped to popularize Relativity, to illustrate 
the latter view: 
Physicists have been forced to abandon the ordln• 
ary world of our experience, the world of sense per-
ception. ••• !Yen space and time are forms of intul• 
tion whicb. can no more be divorced from conaclouaneas 
than our concepts of color, shape, or size. Space has 
no objective reality except aa an order or arrangeaent 
of the objects we pttrceive in it, a.ftd time has no 
independent existence apart froa the order of events 
by which we measure it.,24 
Similar ideas are suggested, and cited by Frank, in writ• 
inga of British Philosopher H. w. Carr, Franch Philosopher Henri 
Bergson, Sociologist P. Sorokin from Barvard 1 Yale Biologist E. w. 
Sinnott, the British As1tmoraers J. Jeans and A. Eddington, and, to 
a leaser extent, by A. N. Wbltehead. 
On the other side• there have been suggestions that rela• 
tivity theory supports materialism.. For example, the Naais, who 
were very conscious of gaining scientific support for their ldeas 1 
opposed Einstein because he vaa a Jew and a materialist. Simi• 
116 
1ar1y1 aome aspects of Einstein's theory have been upheld by 
soviet writer• for their effect against the static metaphysics of 
Newton, against which dialectical materialism struggles. 
In all these conflicting ideas, Frank poillta out, there is 
an element that ls common. 'the misinterpretations all stem from 
the f alae appllcation of scientific statements by ignoring their 
context and their operational definitions. Using the coi:r.mon sense 
meaning of terms like •relativity'• \:onstant'1 1eonaervation• and 
'simultaneity' can. only lead to confueion. For example, some per-
sons argue that relativity baa shown that the md.verse is realty 
four-dimensional; yet the use of •1a• in this aentence ia widely 
different from the "l•11 in the sentence, "The universe 1a three-
dimensional." The first "is" involves time in a way that ls 
f orelgn to commoo usage. Jtour-dimellalonality is only a tool - not 
a description of reality. 
Other persons argue that the convertibility of mass to 
radiant energy militates against materialism, yet the matter and 
the energy can both be described by the current theories which 
employ operational definitions th.at involve earthly manipulation • 
just as much for the one as for the other. Again those who hold 
relativity to be more 1menta1 1 than traditional mechanics should 
bear ln mind the criticisms which were brought against the latter 
when they were introduced. As Frank points out, all scientific 
theories are ln effect •mentat•.25 
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Fi.aa11y1 the •subjective' element 11\ Relativity bears com• 
me,nt. Frank states• 
The appearance of subjectivity has only been intro-
duced in attempts to formulate the propositions of rela• 
tivity theory by some analogy to camnon-aense statements. 
lnatead of saying 'length with respect to a aystma of 
reference,' wl\ich is not an expression from our conuon-
aenae language1 we have used the e:xpreaaion 11e.ngth .W. 
an observer 11l the system (s). 1 Tb.en we could say th.at 
the table bas a 'different length '-. different obaer• 
vers.• This expression •tor an observer' is formed by 
analogy to the way in Vhicb. we express 1.n common•aense 
Language the fact that an object may look different to 
different obae.rvers for reasons of different perapac• 
t1ve1 or optical illusion or weakness of the eyes. • •• 
However, then analogies become harmful if we forget 
that they are analogies and regard them as strictly 
scientific statements. ••• The'obaerver• will, for 
example, disappea~6complete1y or be replaced by a yard-stick or a clock.z 
In closing this Chapter, one should remark that in 1950 
Frank wrote a book entitled B.,eLatix\!l', - A Msbm; T~h. This 
work will bear a look more closely in Chapter VII, as it is prim• 
arily an effort to vindicate modern science in the face of cr1ti-
c1ams that deal with its alleged degrading effe.ct on society. It 
is we11 to point out here, however, that the title itself shows 
there are some metaphysical overtones to relativity which Frank 
thinks are legitimate. 
It is Frank's contention in the book mentioned that rela-
tivism is both the most characteristic attitude of .modern science 
and a most useful quality to cultivate. This may at first appear 
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t=J contradict the 1dea1 so often repeated throughout Frank's work.st 
that metaphysical interpretations of scientific theories are in 
fact misinterpretations. Hovever, the question disappears when 
one sees that Frank is not here using relativity to support a 
metaphysical view, but rather is starting from a metaphysical 
principle • in this case, what he calls 'relativism' among scien• 
tists - and developing its useful connection to political and 
social attitudes. Hie express purpose in this book is to 'inter• 
pret the spirit of modern science•, and specifically to make an 
attack. on the 'enemies of relativism•. It 1• Frank's feeling that 
relativism "has not th.e slightest thiAg to do with agnosticism or 
skepticie, that 1.k 11 in e2 we bP1;ue ;o l:b.f nLu, .. M! .. etbJ.cal 
or democratic va1uea 1 that it is accompanying every advance in 
science and is nothi.ng but a signJ.ticant representation of human 
expresaion -..hich. is iaaeparably connected with our· gradual Ly 
increasing experience."27 
CHAP'l'ER Vl 
SCIENTIFIC METHODa..OGY 
i. le.!rrc2suctj.oo 
In thia Chapter we will present Frank's ideas on what might 
be called the philosophy of science proper • the methods and 
reasoning processes that are involved in the 'science of science•. 
We shall examine, as well, what seems to comprise a scientific 
attitude toward knowledge. including the conception of causality 
as the basis for scie.ntif ic prediction, as it has developed during 
the past century. Frank summarized his conviction about the need 
for this overview of science, in the article he contributed to the 
:&.isrc\oeedia of lJeified Sciegce. Th.ere, we read, 
Physics has been for centuries the spearhead of 
advance in human thought. ln a unified science it 
ahould keep lta role aa a description of the phyeical 
universe and should not deteriorate idto an incoherent, 
and somehow mysterious, aggLomeratiOll of symbols, rules, 
and recipes. ln this situation quite a few physicists 
have tried to avoid all these difficulties by •stick· 
ins strictly to the facts• and by keeping away from the 
dangerous enterprise of logical and critical analysis. 
There is no doubt that this attempt is doomed to fail-
ure. Scientists who looked at the world from such 
different angles as Ernst Mach and A. N. Whitehead have 
agreed on one point: a phyalclat who detdgea all logi-
cal analysis and tries to be a 'physicist and only a 
physicist• will imbue the presentation of his subject 
with some 'chance philosophy,• usually a very obsolete 
one.l 
ltntroductlon to Fouqd1£ion1 of fb.1sic1, 12£. sJ:S.., 428. 
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Besides this 'involvement• in critical analysis which Frank 
considered to be part of a worthy scientist's role, Frank came 
Later to include an even broader perspective. Ernst Nagel bas 
described Frank's view of the philosophy of science as a "catholic 
one. 0 Nagel says, 
Thua, on bis view, the logical analysis of the 
language of science, or the articulation of precise 
rules for assessing evidence in conducting scientific 
inquiry, are undoubtedly centrally important tasks that 
fall into its province. But as he aaw 1t 1 a philosophy 
of science that is limited to the discussion of such 
matters ia incomplete; and to be adequate, it must also 
include certain socio-historical considerations. • •• 2 
over and over again, Frank talks of the need to look at the 
history of science in order to understand the sources for the many 
misinterpretations it supports. The criticism that tnodern science 
is mental, and unnecessarily abstruse, for example, is often 
bolstered by comparing, say, Einstein's idea of relativity with 
Newton's laws of motion, which latter are held to be intuitively 
evident. Yet a cursory glance at history would reveal that Newton 
himself was criticized for being abstruse and mathematical, at a 
time when the organismic views of Aristotle were believed to be 
intuitively evident. Thia confuaion stems from the fact, often 
pointed out in Frank's works, that a scientific system will even-
tually be incorporated in.to daily thinking, and as it were, will 
2"Phi1ipp Frank and the Philosophy of Science," in fhilil?&? 
Frank. 1884-1966, J..2£. sit• 
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become petrified into a metaphysical view of life. Frank aaya, 
tor example, uNewton•a scientific theory became a 'phlLoaophicat 
system• • ..3 Again• elaewbere, he aaya. 
Aristotle's philosophy of pbysics is a petrifica-
tion of a pbya1cal theory which covered the experiences 
of Greek and oriental arttaans about physical phenamna. 
Kant's HtS•Dht•lc•t J!Ei~'Qllf o( RatP.&'•1 Scienc9 is a 
petrification of E nate~ s relativity and iohr's quan-
tum theory.4 
lf nothing else were to be accomplished by the bistory of 
science• as a study, it would at least tend to instill in scien-
tists and those who look at science in relation to the whole 
culture, an attitude of modesty. Suc:b. a.n attitude has been des-
cribed by Heisenberg as characteristic of modern science.5 The 
cause for such modesty is the recognition of so many major rever• 
sala in scientific world theories, and the realization that each 
theory had been tb.e foundation of a large and unyielding super-
structure of philosopbical vieva about the world, as it 'really 
1s 1 • 
Nowadays. there may at Least be le•• tendency, among first-
rate scientists, to go so far. Tbis modesty is evident in the 
behavioral sciences, wblclt have reacted, for a time• against the 
t.beorizing of Freud. Of course Freud was not just an interpreter 
3aittoaopby of §Si!ftClt 35. 
4f2uodation• of Ph11~c1, 428. 
Set. Frank's "Man Confronts Himself," a review of Reisen• 
berg's lb! fbX1isl1~'1 £9ncention oi 8!tYJ:t. 
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of science; he was a firat•rate scientist himself. But many have 
argued that hia generalizations were too broad, and too far re-
moved from observation to be validated. After a period of strict, 
almost picayune, experimentation and obaervation, th.ere has been a 
gradual resurgence of theory-making among psychologists. 
The need for historical perspective is also seen in the 
desire to understand oldex ideas more explicitly and thoroughly. 
One is able to see more clearly the correct application of an out-
moded theory after it has been replaced, threatened or modified by 
a newer one. In mathematics, for example, Euclidean geometry was 
so well entrenched before tb.e nineteenth century that one coulc'!. 
not see its Limitations. With the rise of non-Euclidean axioms, 
as, for instance, in Riemann's work, the former system came into 
sharper focus, and therefore 1ts application could be better 
defined, with practical benefits. 
The Copernican revolution is an older example of the same 
broadening of perspective. Of it, Frank says, 
To understand a phenomenon means to interpret our 
present experience as the repetition of a similar phen• 
omenon of the paat. Thia is true in science, but it 
is true as well 1.n history. Today ••• we understand 
the Coper.aica.n revolutlon better thaAJ.'11.neteenth•century 
scientists did because we are contemporaries of the 
Einsteinian ravolution.6 
Frank suggests that a proper view of the Copernican revolu-
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eion can give us a key to 'the central problem of all philosophy 
of science,• that la, to relate the world of aenee observations 
t:o that of general principles. It can help us also, he adds, "to 
appreciate the immense gap between these tvo worlds.•7 
3. ~utaliliJ': A)aolut;e 9' f.E•SMJij.ct 
In spite of Hume1 s criticism, it baa been felt in tradi• 
tiona1 philosophy and aaau.med by acieAtiats generally that caus• 
ality is somehow basic to all scientific tb.ough.t, if not to all 
reasoning. 'l'he discovery of laws, and their use in predicting 
events, presupposes the concept of causality. It 1• evident, how-
ever, that in spite of its ancient and wide-ranging roots in 
western thought, st.nee the Greek.a, and its almost universal uae in 
ever:yday language, the idea of causality ia a difficult one to pin 
down. Frank baa bad much to say about cauaality, in his earliest 
writings, and down to hia last. the first major paper he pub-
lished, after his doctoral work. was completed, was "Kausalgeaetz 
Wld Erfahrung• in 1907. This paper appears aa Chapter l of 
ttogerg §£i&SI !ed &t• PQi&9so9Qz:. 
Frank remark• that the paper was kindly received by Ein• 
stein• although the latter criticized some of it• overstatements. 
Frank's purpose 1.n the paper was to preaent causality as another 
of tbe principles along with t.nertia 1 and the c21lservatio.n of 
energy, which are neither empirical nor !. nrioElt but rather are 
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"purely conventional definitions depending on human arbitzariness.08 
the argument runa Like this. 'l'b.e moat general lormu.1at1on 
of causaU.ty is the following: lf a state A of the universe ls OAce 
foil.owed by a state B, then whenever A occurs B will follow it. 
It is important to understand (Frank notes} that 
the Law can be applied only to the whole universe and 
not to a part of it. 11\is, however, makes it impos-
sible to test the law empirically. ln the first place, 
one can never know the state of the whole universe, 
and 1.n the second place, it ia l.n general not certain 
whet..~er it is possible for a state A of the Universe 
ever to return.'i 
How does one know that state A has in fact returned, even 
in a limited region of the universe? One might uy that i.f all 
the perceptible properties were the same, the state would be the 
same. But what of the :Lmperceptible properties, auch as the in-
ternal structure of a magnetized piece of iron, which might out-
wardly appear the same as a non-magnetic one? One would have to 
include these, too, even if he did not know what all of the imper-
ceptible properties were. In this case, one could always justify 
causality by saying that, in cases where it appeared to fail, he 
had not accounted for some relevant property. Thus, Frank con-
cluded, "The principles of pure science, of which the foremost i~ 
the Law of causality, are certain because they are only disguised 
definition."10 However, Frank concludes, this argument holds only 
s~ •• 53. 
91JW1.' 54. 
io.aw.,., s1. 
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tor science. *'With the queation of world conception in the 
eth.ical•religioua sense• all this bas nothing vhataoever to do. 0 
ln some later writing•• Frank modified this early presenta-
tion soo.·ttawb.at, or rather 1 one ahould say he took a different view 
of what: should be called the law of causality. For example, 1n 
one chapter of MqS!Hn SSie;e last Ill fb.11Uaeb'lt written in 1930, 
he discuasea the relation of school philosophy to twent1eth•C81tur:y 
physics, allow!.Dg for a statistical interpretation of causality. 
He says, 11lf the aymbola conform to tb.e experiences in a very de-
tailed manner we speak of causal laws; if the correspondence la of 
a broader sort we call the laws atatistical."11 
An example of atat1at1ca1 causality is seen in the effort 
to predict the behavior of a airlgle electron 1n a beam. One can 
state the general distribution of electrons 1n cases where a great 
ma.ny of them are concerned, but cannot predict the single event. 
Frank points out, too 1 that even in so-called single eventa 1 such 
aa the st:rild.Ag of a target vith a large projectile, one ta limited 
as to accuracy of prediction, geaera117 talking about tbe •mean• 
behavior of a number of sucb. projectllea. He cloaea this diacua-
aion vitb. the observation th.at it 1a AOt necessary, "beside the 
thriving tree of science to assume a sterile region in which reside 
the eternally lnaoluble problems." lnatead the enlightened sci-
entist will gradually clarify such problems as space, time, and 
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causality 1n the same way that he perfecta bis observations. 
There are no boundariea between science and philosophy, Frank con-
cludes, if one sees science the way Mach suggested one should -
•to order the perceptions systematically and from present percep-
tions to draw concluaiona about perceptioAa to be expected.' 
In 1938, Frank viewed Caaa1rer 1 • thoughts about causality 
to be akin to his own, a.ad therefore praised the latter for bring• 
itll about a •disintegration•• of the classical metaphysical views 
of this law.12 ln tb.e same year, Frank restated bis thoughts 
about cauaaU.ty in the EQcz:s;LoetsUrl Stf \JA1(led SQISSI• in much 
the aw way as in the 1930 article. la the F.Q,szs;~ogtdj,a he sug-
gested, under the section heading "Physical Reality and causal• 
ity," that "One must not exaggerate the gap between the new mecb• 
anica of small masses and the Newt:onlan mecha.nlca." To aay that 
causality bolds more strictly in the latter would be "a very 
inadequate description of the new mechanics," because the two 
systems ca.nnot be compared fairly. They uae different state vari-
ables to describe physical reality. In Newtonian mechanics, one 
speaks of position and momentum; ln quantum theory, one cannot 
give an operational defi.nitioa for botb of these i.n the same des-
cription. 
Frank re-examined causality twenty years later, in atapters 
12cf. "Bemerkun.ge.n zu Ernst Cassirer: Determinismus und 
lndeterminlamus in der modernen Pbysik, 11 which is translated in 
Chapter IX of tlRde&:Q Scienct fYld lt1 f1U:Losgpn1. 
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X.I and XII of Ma r.b1LosgphY of sc;19s;1, which are entitled, res• 
pectively, "Causal Laws", and 0 The Principle Of causality." Ria 
ideas do not differ fundamentally in the two places. According to 
Frank the idea of eauaality stems from the .Judaeo•Chriatian belief 
in an Qnnisciellt Intelligence 1.n whose mind the future is "pre• 
determined" by all past and present events. But for science, 
"W'hat matters ia not lAfl. the future I.a determined, but !\21. it is 
determined."13 
One of the primary dlffleultiea of the principle of caus-
ality ls that one cannot find, with any certainty, wh.ich variables 
in an initial state (A) are relevant, so as to know when tbls state 
(A) returns again. Th.is is even more true in field physics th.an 
it ls in Newtonian mechanics, since ln the former, variables are 
co.nti.nuoua fuactions, rather than discrete. "The greater the 
number of state variables, .. Frank polnta out, 0 the smaller ls the 
factual content of the principle of causallty ... 14 
One can never know if b.e baa left out •OIDe important vari-
able. lf the .number of variable• becomes inflnit•• as the original 
view of causality might suggest, then the principle become• tautlOL• 
ogous. For practical purposes, of course, one aa8URlea a small 
number of state variables, e.g. a few ld.nda of force like gravity 
13f!!ilosgpb.Y of ss&tu!Ci!h 262. 
14~ •• 274. 
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and electromagnetiam. •we have a choice,• Frank concludes, •be-
tween makiag the principle of causality precise and tautological 
or vague and factua1.•15 Tb.• tautological form can be formulated 
simply as fo11owa: lf A recurs then B recurs also, •• la the 
principle of causality. lut if A never recurs, then the principle 
is valld whatever happens. 
lt is obvious, according to FraJlk.1 that "tb.e world process 
has happened only o.nce. lf we regard causality as the recurrence 
of sequences, it makea AO difference whether we say that the world 
process as a whole obeys or diaobeya the principle of eauaa11ty.•16 
For thia reason1 it is practical, and true of acience 1 to consider 
only 1 aubcyc1es 1 and •approximate' recurrences. 
Tb.ere is another point that one must con.sider, 1n eumi.ning 
this subject. lt has to do with the way in which one determi.nes 
or not that the original state (A) has recurred. ln the example 
mentioned above about the outward appearances of magnetised and 
no.n•magnetized pieces of iron, it was assumed that one could 1 by 
teats 1 eatablish whether or not the iron was magnetized. As Frank 
NY•t 111.hua we can learn that if a certain group of experillenta 
perfomed with a piece of 1roa ylelda certain specific effects 1 
the iron will alao have the effect of a mag.net.a17 
151!?14· 
16.llll:1l,., 285. 
1711W!.•t 187. 
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Yet here oae sees that be has inadvertently ••!Wiid the 
principle of causality with respect to bia teata. Thia ia, in 
effect, the argumeAt wbicb Kant put forth, while trying to refute 
t:be disastrous crltici•a Hume leveled at the notion of eauae. In 
other words, aa Frank aays, "We must take the validity of the 
causality principle for granted if we wish to be entitled to say 
that a certain experiment reveals to us a certain property of a 
body; we must assume that the resuJ.t of our experiment is the 
'effect• of this properey.ul8 
Frank makes a final point that is important. Laws, as such, 
are distinct from the phenomena tney purport to explain. The con• 
nections between the Laws and the observables are never perfect. 
Thus, although the mathematical statement of a law may be exact, 
its confirmation can only be approximate, and needs many repeti• 
tiona to see the Limit which. it approaches. In Frank'• words, 
"lf we speak in terms of observable phenomena. all laws are stat• 
iatica1. 1119 
Certain statistical lawa, 11.ke the firing of a projectile, 
admit of limits. These Frank calls •causal laws.• But there are 
also statistical laws which approach no such limit. The tossing 
of a coin is an example. Although one can formulate the atatisti• 
cal law that the frequency of beads and tails will tend ~o be 
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equal as the number of tries increases, he can never say wnat tbe 
physical behavior of the coin will be on any specific toss. 
To sum up, Frank holds that the law of causality can have 
no meaningful. place in acience unless it is couched in terms ti.'1.at 
can be operationally defined. Even in such casea, it is a vague 
law• and does not apply equally to all phenomena. 
4 • 1ndus:tj,pe yd I.,ogiac IA §r;Mmtif ic t1eth22 
ti\at is tt'l'he Scientific Method"? Sometimes it is suggested 
that science differs from non-science by proceeding from particu• 
Lars to generals, 1n a process called induction. Th.is is in con-
tradistinction to the derivation of particulars from general prin• 
ciples - the method of mathematics and theology called deduction. 
However, Fri.I.Ilk has shown that such a distinction is a one-sided 
picture. Both inductive and deductive phases belong in science -
perhaps simultaneously, although they are analyzed separately for 
the sake of description. 
Briefly put, the aclentiflc method is a full circle, which 
may be described as follows: the scientist observes nature; then 
he suggests a theory which may explain what he sees; from this 
theory he deduces hypotheses wh1ch are testable; finally, he ex-
periments to validate or refute the hypotheses. If the tests bear 
out the hypotheses, he says the theory ia confirmed; if not, he 
repeats the cycle again, making modifications along the line, 
where necessary. 
'l'he deductive phases of the cycle present tb.e least prob-
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tems. They follow the rules of syllogistic reasoning that have 
been known from at least as far back as Socrates. lt is the in-
ductive pbases which are the most i11trigui.ng, because they do not 
easily Lend themselves to rules. or even to ex.act description. 
For this reason. the philosophy of science c&.n be called ths eff crt 
to discover the meaning of induction. 
When it comes right down to cases of scientific theorizing, 
onn is hard put to describe just what the scientist does to derive 
his theory. There seems to be a certain openness involved - a gap 
between the facts and the theoretical description - which the sci-
entist must bridge in his mind; it is a gap that allows of intui• 
tion and artistry, more than exact method. Frank notes this in 
uiany places, and cites, for example, Einstein and Ca.rnilp as two 
famous scie,ntists who are in accord with the idea. 
J. n. Woodger• on the other band, seems to fault Frank for 
taking a.n unnecessarily 1.nf orma.L view of scientific method. ln a 
review of Frank's M@tm Scil!J&e 1nd l~s Phi=Lo12Rlll• Woodger dis-
cusses F'rank 1 s views on what• exactly t physicists observe t and how 
the things they observe are related to the statements they make in 
their notes. He seems to suggest that a proper logical analysis 
of scientific methodology would in fact Lead to a precise formula 
wb.ich one might go about in order to find acientific truth. 
Woodger says, 
The problems vill never be properly cleared up 
until someone carrl.ea out the laborious task of making 
a complete f ormalizatioA and ax1omatiaatlon of a small 
part of physical theory, showing in minute and convin-
cing detail every step of the procedure from the labor-
a toey bench to the fully elaborated theory.. The Polish 
methodologists bave shown us how this ia to be don.e. 
But one curious feature of this book 1.s the complete 
absence of any meation of the great Pollsb school of 
methodology wb.icb. f lourish.ed between the two world wars 
and contributed so much to the clarlf lcation of the 
problems discussed 1n these essays and greatly inf lu-
enced some members of the Vienna Circle. The namea of 
Kotarbinski, t.esniew1~, Lukasiewica and Tarski do not 
appear 1.n its pagea.z 
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'lb.is criticism is typical of the comments which Frank's 
works receive, faulting him for an apparent oversight, when in 
reality, Frank simply does not agree with what the critic says .. 
Tlle article is also typical in misconstruing Frank's informal 
style and Lack of minutia for a shallowness of knowledge of his 
field, which Woodger, and other critics, are easer to supplement. 
The truth is, .as has been pointed out above, Frank's knowledge of 
these subjects is encyclopedic, and his broadly general presen-
tations represent a distillation of a thorough scholarship - the 
77cream0 , as one of Frank's students called 1t. 
With regard to the place of the scientist's personality in 
bridging the gap between facts and theories, Frank cites Ernst 
Mach, who described induction in these words: 0Above all, it is 
not a logical process although such processes can be inserted as 
intermediary and aux1U.iary links. The principal effort that 
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Leads to tb.e discovery of new knowledge is due to 11!•5r•st1.911 and 
Yl!&inaSisM•u21 
Ae noted earlier, it is clear that the scientist doea not 
simply 'read off 1 his theory from the facts he observes. A theory 
which is a simple enumeration of observations ts not a theory at 
all; it is a catalogue. Such a Listing could have no use, because 
it would be just as complicated as the world it 1described.•22 
Instead of this approach, there must be, on the part of the acien• 
tist 1 an intelligent guess as to a simple a.nd exact symbolic rep-
resentation of things which are neither: simple nor exactly know-
able. In th.is sort of enterprise, the greatest scientists are 
necessarily aJ.ao tb.e greatest simplifiers of nature. ?bat is, 
they are those wb.o cu symbolize a.a. infi.Aiteiy various nature, of 
which they have observed a ama11 piece, ltt language that can be 
grasped by a finite miad. 
Newton was able to synthesize into OJle system the realms of 
moving bodies, the celestial gyrations, and the changing tides. 
All of these bad been carefully described tor hundreds of years 
before him; it was hi• special contribution to see their inter• 
coanectedneaa. Such an ability indicates a strong conviction on 
Newton'• part th.at there was indeed an order to be discovered. It 
is the same conviction which one finds in Einstein's words, cited 
21fbi12•smbl of sstsrnse, 319. 
220ne wonders, in light of thia, what u•e is to be pex:fo.umd 
by various governmental agencies which gather •statistics•, on sub-jects which are not yet under study, on the assumption th.at they 
may soon be. 
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by Frank, "The most incomprehensible thing about the world is that 
it is comprehe.nslble.•23 
Such an overri.ew, or synthesizing approach, is the area in 
which philosophy aAd aclence meet appropriately. It belongs to 
what Frank calls metaphysics. Philosophy in this aenae deals with 
more than the search for goals to guide scientific knowledge. It 
also influences science proper by entering into the psychological 
make-up of the sciMtist, and coloring his choice of theories, 
coloring the experimental teats he deduces from the theories, and 
even coloring the very observations he makes. 
Frank has addressed b.imself to the subjective element in 
science, in m.&n7' places. In apaper of 1954, for example, entitled 
unie Variety of Reasons for the Acceptance of Scientific 'lheor• 
ies,n24 he speaks of some scientists having a 'double standard' of 
truth, including the 'bard facts• of their work, and the metaphys-
ical or religious belief a they carry outside their work. Tb.is 
duplicity is bound to arise it one co.nsidera science to be a 
'picture of realiey1 1 or a 1co1Lection of facts•. Actually, no 
theory is 1n full agreement with facts, let alone a complete pic• 
ture. lnstead 1 as Frank aays 1 .. several theories that are in par-
tial agreement (present themsel ve~ , and we have to determine the 
23cf. *Einstein, Mach and Logical Positivism, u 12£. W,. 
24Appearing i.ll 1A.I v•&~<li!;&gn o: ssiaJD~i,i; Ib~. ed. 
Fra.nlt, 1956. 
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final theory by a compromise.u25 Thia campromiae always takes into 
account the use to which the theory vi.11 be put. ln Frank's words, 
"Science actually la an instrument that serves the purpose of con• 
necting present events wltb future events and deliberately util• 
izea this knowledge to shape future physical events as they are 
desired." 
s. v;1L4atisa 9£ Ihto;iet 
Frank discuasee in several places the cha.Ages that have 
occurred hiatorically in the reasons for accepti.ng scientific 
theories. :the ucienta are salc:l to have proceeded primarily by 
deduction. For example, it is said that Aristotle started with 
principles of phl1oaopb.lca1 generality, such aa the idea of 
•natural place' to which bodies like earth OJ: fire, tend. However, 
practical science bas always u&ed both i.Aduction and deduction. 
As Frank points out• "Aristotle did not find his genera.l principles 
ln hi.a dreams, but advanced them on the baala of experience that 
cOJlslated in the sum of the individual facts that had been ob-
served. "26 He continues, "Tb.• difference between ancient and mod· 
ern science was not the use of induction - ancient science was 
based on induction aa is modern science - but the criteria by 
which a discovered pr:i.Aclple vaa recognized to be valid." 
252u,. si&· t 13. 
26&J.&i121$X 2' §s~ID.S!b 298 • 
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"How are theories validated?" "Why are they accepted?" 
These questions have two different answers, and one should consider 
them separately. With respect to validation, one might at first 
think that any theory which can lead by logical steps to statements 
confirm.able by experiment could be called valid. Thia ia not so, 
as Frank points out, with a bizarre example from Russel. 
We start from the assumptions that 'bread is made 
of stone,• and that •atone is nourishing.• Then it 
follows logically that 'bread is nourishing.• This 
statement can be confirmed by experiments. If someone 
claims for this reason that we have confirmed our 
aaaumptiona, he would certainly be ridiculous. Accord• 
1.ng to Russel, a great many ~gnfirmations of physical 
hypotheses are of this type.21 
It has sometimes been felt that the calculus of probabil• 
ities, a branch of mathematics, can be employed to establish the 
validity of physical theories. The process would be to establish 
the degree to which the theory is borne out by experlmentation 
that aims to test it. Frank presents at some length different 
theories of probability which nave been argued in the last ge.ner-
ation, including especially the ideas of Reichenbach, Carnap, and 
Bronowski. 
Reichenbach, and Richard von Mises, for instance, have been 
strict adherents to the *'relative frequencyu view, which can be 
explained as follows: Reic.i.~enbacb. proposes two methods of comput-
ing probability. ln tb.e "probability of the first kind," one may 
27foupdatiopf! 2' Phx1ic1, 431. 
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regard as the basic collective all facts wh.1cb can be logically 
derived from the theory. If there were 'n' of these facts, and 
'm' of them were actually observed in experiments, the probability 
of the theory would be given by 'm/n'. In the nprobability of the 
second kind," the basic collective is the realm of observables 
which have been explained by a group of theories. Let ua say th.at 
there are 'n 1 observables, e.g. the behavior patterns of light in 
a certain optical system; and the theories proposed are the 
Huygnens Wave theory, and NewtOfti.an mechanics. If the first tbecry 
were to account for 1m1 of these observables, and the second to 
account for 'k' of them, the probability of the former would be 
1m/n', while that of the latter would be 'k/n'. Actually, these 
~ kinds of probablllty d1ff er only 1n the operational cleflni· 
tions which describe their application. 
There are problems in trying how to decide which applica-
tion of the calculus of probabilities is appropriate. For example, 
one might suggest that t.f he threw a switch to turn on a light one 
thousand time•• and the light went on in all but the last trial. 
th.en the probability of the llght 1 a going on the next time would 
be 999/1000. Obviously• on the contrary, one would expect the 
light to fail the next time. 
Hilda Geirlnger suggests another example agalnet the 1rela-
ti ve frequency• JIOdel. W'ritl.ng 1n a paper of 1938, ahe says. 
Let us assume that someone advance the hypothesis 
H that •every triangle has a.a obtuse angle.• ln order 
to test bis aesertion1 we picked out a hundred tri-
angle• at random and measured them. The result may 
be that H is right in seventy cases and wrong in 
thirty cases. Then the scientist would obviously 
say that "H ia wrong 1 " 21'1d not that it is •valid with a probability of 7()4J. 1 
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Carnap presented yet another view of probability, which bas 
been called 'logical probability• and 'inductive probability.• It 
ia to be used in caaea where the relative frequency concept cannot 
be applied. It ia logical rather than empirical, because it con• 
sidera not the truth of actual observations, but the logical ties 
between these observations aa evidence (e) 1 and the hypothesis (h) 
which purports to derive them. Thus, for example, one Dligbt exam• 
ine the realm of Kepler'• hypothesis about the elliptical orbits 
of planets. By Carnap's analyai•, one should expect that any 
planet would lie between. two ellipses whose separation depends 
upon the range of error one might foreaee. The area between these 
two ellipses Carnap would call the measure of the hypothesis 
~(h~ • Each observation of a planet would yield its position 
within a certain range of error, which would constitute a small 
circle on the atar map. lf one added up all such little circular 
areas that correspond to the observed positions of the planet in 
question, he would have a measure of the evidence (m(e)J • The 
areas which are held in cOllllOn by the observed &Ad the theoretical 
positions is m(e&b.). Carnap'• thesis then may be stated thus: 
28•o.n the Probability of Hypotbeaea,• cited in PQiloaop9Y 
Rf Sci•nc•• 326. 
The inductive probability of Kepler's hypothesis ls mC~) 
me 
• 
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'l'h.ere are many cases, as carnap himself was quick to point 
out, which cAAL'lot be described so simply. °For instance," he 
says, "we can.not expect to apply inductive logic to Einsetin's 
general theory of relat1vity.n29 However, as Frank is quick to 
remind us, this lack of universal application does not destroy the 
usefulness of Carnap's idea; it just makes it another case, Like 
the law of causality, where the applicability depends upon the 
kind of phenomenon we are trying to describe. 
In spite of the differences between Reichenbach 1s and 
Carnap's approach to probability, 1.n many cases of actual applica-
tion, both methods come to the same result, and the arguments 
raised against the former apply equally to the latter. 
Jacob Bronowskit 1n 1953, brought in another criterion for 
validity, in order to avoid such problems. lt is the idea of aim• 
plicity or economy, applied in a new way. In cases where two 
theories have the same degree of statistical or inductive probab-
ility, Bronowsld 1 a suggestion is that the simplest theory is the 
most probable. As an exatnple• one might compare the ideas of 
Copernicus and Ptolemy. Both theories lead logically to the ob-
servables, but Copernicus• theory is more acceptable, because it 
is more economical. 
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6. t\scsmt!P&t of lh1o;les 
1he:e are a variety of reasons which Frank puts forward for 
~Y scientific theories are accepted in pr.sct1ce1 not all of which 
are strictly scientific or logical. The deairea and convictions 
of the scientist ptay their roles too. One might think at first 
that scientists would accept or reject a theory Eolety on the 
basis of its ability to support observable evidence, anrl that any 
so-called •countertactual case' would be grou."tds for eliminating a 
theory. But an honest look at any number of actual theories in 
practice will reveal that this is not always true. 
For example, it has been suggested that the earth was 
thrown off the surfece of the sun while the latter was still in a 
molten state• in tth.at hae been called the 0 Tida1 Crest Theory'. 
Considering the forces of gravity on tb.e earth, and the liquidity 
ot its original state, one would expect that the earth would have 
assumed a perfectly ~teal shape, approximately spherical. 
However, the careful observations accrued during the recent Inter• 
.national Geophysical Year (lGY) showed that the earth la 1n fact 
plum-shaped. This has not killed the Tidal Crest 'lb.eory, but it 
has caused it to be modified .. 
One might also, as a mental exercise• imagine th.at one day 
it is observed tbat a body thrown up from the surface of the 
earth does not come down again, but continues on up out of sight. 
Such a happening is inconceivable because the law of gravity is 
so well established b7 experience. ln an event of this sort, one 
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might undertake aay amount of reaearch to discover another reason 
for the unexpected behavior of the body than the failure of gravi• 
tational law. And if• after this research, one should fail to 
fi.nd a suitable exp1aaation 1 he would give it up as an anomaly, 
without ever doubting the law of gravity. Thi•• in spite of the 
general rule of logical analysis that atatea, 'If p lmplies q 1 and 
not q is the caae1 theA .not p is the caae 1 1 which ia the form of 
all auch cou.nterfactuals. 
Even i.n caaea that are leas unlikely1 acientiata are apt to 
refuse to change their vieva about a theory, unless argument• 
other tha.n purely logical ones are proposed. Nor ia thl.a attitude 
neceaaarily illogical. Frank has polated out that "we never have 
one theory that la in full agreement [with obaervatio~ but 
several theories that are in partial agreeme.nt 1 and we have to 
determi.ne the final theory by a cOllproaiae.•29 
Because theories are always 1.ncomplete as well aa very 
complex, o.ne cannot refute them simply by pointing to one area in 
which they fall to explaia the facts. fraalr. uya thla 1 i.n effect, 
when he diacuaaea tb.e poaaibility of a ao•called •crucial experi• 
ment•. ln Fraak'• word•• 
A single experiment can only refute a 'theory' if 
ve ua.n by 'theory' a ayat• of specific atat .. nta with 
no allowance for modification. But what is actually 
called a 'theory' ill science ia .never audl a ayat•. lf 
29ct. 'th• Vali;!jatioa of IS&•Sific IJHoa;, 14. 
we speak of the 'ether theory' or the •corpuscular 
theory• of light, or of the 'theory of evolution' in 
biology, each of these names covers a great variety of 
possible systems. Therefore no crucial experiment can 
refute any such theories. A famous example was the 
•crucial experiment' which Arago proposed in 1850 to 
test the corpuac:ular theory of light. Thia theory was 
refuted in 1855, but in 1905 Einstein again made use 
of this theory in a greatly modified form known as the 
hypothesis of 'Light quanta• or 'photona,•30 
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Two criteria for the acceptance of theories were mentioned 
above, namely, agreement with facts, and simplicity. At times 
these two are mutually exclusive, i.n which case a compromise 
between them becomes necessary. 'l'hat: which make.1 a scientist lean 
toward one theory or another is a complex matter. Th~ concept of 
simplicity, for example, involves a whole univ8rae of cliseourse • 
not just a mathematical dtgonst!:'ation. 
Prank suggests s:t 1<..~st the following '.;ort• c,t. co1.1~t( • .en:atiai 
in the acceptance of a th't'l~:·~,1: Conformity with religiou"' Delief • 
as, for example, a bf·~ ... :.~,f 1.l'! airacles; conformity with the philos-
ophy of the day• s1~cl:. ·) 1 A;..'"istotelian view of nature; the dynamic 
or fertile Aaturf> '-' -c··;~: tbeory, as demonstrated by its ability to 
generate other i. ''".:tF.; the compatibility of the theory with common 
sense or intuit.&.vP< feeli.ng, su dewtonian mechanics exhibits for 
most people today; and lastly• the support of desired moral behavkr. 
By way of analogy, Frank gives an effective, if somewhat 
oversimplified, example of such a compromise. In his book ft!:ilos• 
o;hy of Sciegce; U!:• LJ.ek lebf!tD Science and lhilosophft as well 
30fhilossmsr o( S;iapcg, 31. 
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as 1n an earlier paper, "the variety of reasons for the acceptance 
of scientific theorle•t"31 Frank liltena the problem to "the choice 
of an airplane." He suggests, for l.nata.nce, that one can •enjoy 
~he beauty and elegance0 32 of the plane, as well as that of the 
theory. One cannot speak of the truth or tb.e perfection of tha 
theory or the plane• in any absolute ••••· Rather, Frank says, 
0 We can only ask. Whether it 1a •good•or •perfect' for a certain 
purpose.• ln the p1ane 1a caae, aucb a purpose may be speed, or 
en.durance, or safety, or fun, or •convenie.nce for reading or 
aleept.ng.• "lt is l.mposaible," Frank notes, "to construct an air-
plane which fulfills all Cb.ese purposes in a maximal way; we mu.st 
achieve some ccaapromise. In order to d.Carmi..ne Che kind of com-
promise which 'should' be achieved, we must decide which is more 
important. ••• 'l'he a.tU'nHJr to this question can cer:tai.aly not be 
derived from &JV' physical or engineering science." 
lt is interesting to note that this analogy of finding a 
useful airplane s.-s to have upset one crU:ic of Frank. C. W. 
Kegley labeled Frank's compromise between the technological and 
soclologt.cal value of a theory aa "1.ncredible.• He eald• "It 
underscores Che confusion of acceptaace by the general public and 
by scientists, and confuses the grounrla of accept&Ace by scien-
tists. "33 He also called "aatonlah1ng•, what he interpreted as 
31In 11Jt Valisl.lt10Q Qf Asill&!i1(iG 'I'hegg:x. 
32fbl\!!cmht of SciMS!h 356. 
33"Philipp Frank on Scientific 'l'heory and its Relation to 
other Inquiries,• 1.n 6tt1 del fii '9!H'~!7 1DtKM•l2!11Lt <Ji fi1oaoti• 1 Vol. 11. Florence, o; • • 
144 
Frank'• dem&.Qd that acientists criticize and determine the 'human 
value• of thelr diacoveriea or tbeorles. Finally, in support of 
hi• criticism, Keg1.,. quoted Frank OU1: of context, thus: "He 
(Frank) writes that 1tb.e ultimate fouadatiOAa of all science• are 
strongly lftfluenced by sociology end antb.J:epology.•• Frank's 
actual idea was aa fo11owa: "fb.iloaopb.era of aclmtlfic backgt'ound 
who have attepted to consider the m.an enterprt.ae •• a wbole ba'\e 
clalmed repeatedly that the u1t:Lmate foundations of all sciences 
are strongly influenced by sociology and anthropology. ••• I sub-
mit that there may be much truth I.A it" •34 
Perhaps the f artbeat Kegley strayed from a valld inter:• 
pretation of Frank's idea• 1• when he auggeated Cbat the latter 
took.a upon induct10A aa a process of "derlvln.g scientific state-
ments from general prt.nciplea.n35 That Chis is false bas been 
ahown. a~e, ln. Cb.apter: 1111 Section 4. 
9?tliEl!!!~-:t~~~=•~tfii~:Rii1!~~~ef~ ~~!'t2~tlt Ill 
35r.eg1ey cites this idea from Frank's "Principles of 
Science,• p. 23. Pei=haps he means to say "Philosophy of Sci~nce," 
p. 23., lbere, Frank discusses the chain betwee.n science and 
ph1loaopby1 eayt.ng, ln part• "Tbla longing to find out ••• is 
nothing more than the longing to derive scientific statements from 
general principle• that are p1au.s1b1e and 1.ntelllglble.• 
the same criticllll'ft8 whlcb. Kegley raises in thi• article he 
raised earlier, in an article entitled 0 Ref1ections on Pb.111pp 
Frank'• l'hilosopb.y Of SClencel• i.n ~ If lsiJ.MSI 26, 1959, 
35-40. '1.his article la sharp 7 con~T. J. Rutherford, in 
his art1cle1 "Frank's Plllloaopb.y of Science RAW'lalted,• l'J!il~ 1fy§s1~ce z7 1 19601 183-186. Rutherford call• Keg1ey 1 s artcf; 
ater cal." 
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7. scient~fis Lang914g9 
Scientific language has been mentioned in passing, several 
tlmea above, with respect to operational definitions. It is 
appropriate here to discuss it more specifically. How does Frank 
view the way 1n which scientists put thil\ga verbally, and espe-
cially how does he see that scientific language can lead to .mis• 
understandings? It is well to comment first on the language which. 
Frank himself used. 
As was noted above, in Chapter I, one of Frank's moat 
frequently-noted characteriatic• waa his concern for clarity. He 
wrote in terms that were the moat economical and simple he could 
find, without doing injustice to tbe complex topics he undertook 
to discuss. For this reason, one finds it all too eaay to over-
look the depth of Frank's thoughts. It is only after sufficient 
time for ref Lection that one begins to appreciate the import of 
hia statements. Bia style of preaentation has been called decep-
tively t..nformal, and, as one etudent noted,36 hla 1phi1liatine• 
listener• were sometime• disappointed, and apt to accuse him of 
being lazy. 
Frank liked to gear diacusalons to the specific mood of his 
,listeners, using contemporary, even mundane illuatratioaa, rather 
than preacb.ing from the authoritative position which he obviously 
held. In cases vb.ere hi• sturlenta were unprepared for the intri-
cacies of theoretical mathematics, for instance, he modified his 
36cf. Chapter 1, above. 
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presentations in Language vhicb was familiar to them. One atu• 
dent•s comment • that Frank liked to atart eaeb class with a 
resume • point• out a characteristic that la evident in all his 
writing aLao. His major idea• occur over and over again, being 
couched in easy, comfortable Language, developed each time by many 
example• fr0tn his own experience, as well ae from the writings of 
men he bad studied. 
ln these traits, Frank ref Lects one of the fundamental con-
cerns of twentieth-century philosophy • first among the Vienna 
Circle followers and the Logical Empiricists• and latterly, within 
the circle of so-called Linguistic Analyata, especially in England 
and America. ln Frank'• opinion, it is in the developments of 
language that modern philosophy f1nda its forte. He aays. for 
example, "The new physics does not teach us anything about •matter' 
and •spirit', but mucb about setD&Dtica • ..37 And, again, u1 believe 
that the advances in philosophy which have been stimulated by 
twentieth-century phyaica, like relativity and quantum tbeory, are 
aot advances 1n metaphysic•, but advances in aemantica.•38 
la an article entitled 0 No.n-sc1entific Symbol• in Scl-
ence, tt39 Frank discuaus the way in which scientific language can 
be abused, on the one hand by those who advance the cause of anti-
37"Tb,e Present Role of Science," Loe., ca:t .. , 8. 
38ttconte.'tlporaz:y Science and tbe Contemporaxy World View," 
12£. cj,t. • 63. 
391.n ~Su=:b~=-=~~;&lllll~~p:.:....:.u.~:.-=~wi;p~ 
of the Conf erenee 
1952, Harper Row, 
r matter. such as J. J. Thomson and Rutherford• and on the other 
hand by those, like the Marxists, who hold matter to be good. 
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Both extremes comE~ from taking from scientific symbols certain 
1 overton~s• which are not to be found in their operational defini-
tions. Frank suggests that the positivistic approach, as a ttneu-
tral" or non-committal view, is most fruitful, and avoids the pit-
falls of the ex·i:remes. Se says, "'Positivism' attempts to clarify 
the status of no~-scientific symbols in science. lt does not deny 
their legitimacy, provided that this status is kept in mind.n40 
The positivistic view of Language, which Frank inherited, 
stems from a belief, first, in the efficacy of science to solve 
human problems and to discover truth, and, secondly, from the 
belief that traditional metaphysics loses all its meaning by in• 
corporattng a language of universals which cannot be put to the 
test of experience. The first manifestations of this latter view 
were put in reactionary and extreme terms. as in Qiapter II. 
Mach• according to Frank, considered that 0 physics is noth-
ing but a collection of statements about the connections among 
sense perceptions, and theories are nothing but economical means 
of expression for summarizing these oonnectiona."41 In keeping 
with this view, Mach advocated the elimination of metaphysics. 
Similarly, Peirce and James, wnom Mach met in Europe• leaned away 
40iw •• 348. 
4ltto<lei;n Science and lts fhiLosophI, 62. 
r 148 from metaphysics toward the •cash value' of ideas, as the criterion 
for their validity. 
The pragmatic view of language Le<l to the formulation of 
what has been called the •verifiability criterion of meaning,• 
among the positivists of the Vienna Circle and its associates. 
Carnap• tor example• held that meaningful discourse is either 
(1) tautologous (analytical), such as in mathematics or logic, 
(2) contradictory (and hE>.nce, false), or (3) empirical. Since 
metaphysics is none of these, it must be meaningless. "Metaphyai-
cians 1" carnap jibed, uare musicians without talent.n42 
'Lhe strict atomistic empiricism of the earlier positivism 
faded out 1n the twentieth century, so that the so-ca11ed Logical 
Empiricists of the Twenties no longer felt that meaningful langtll@e 
is limited to 'observational tcrms 1 1 like red, warm, and spots 
touching. One might, 1t was allowed, uae abstractions. so long as 
the statements derivable from the abstractions could be checked by 
experiment. There are concepts, as ?'re.,."lk poi:lte<l out, which "can-
not be deductld from sensory raw me.teriat.n43 Again, "According to 
the conception of Logical empiricism the relations between symbols 
which fcrm the: 5top 1 of any scientific theory can.1.1ot be produced 
by a11y Losical mE:tho<-~. 'I.heir origin can only be exple.ined psycl:lo-
logical.ly. 0 
42cf. Frank's "The Pragmatic Flement in Carnap's Elimination 
Of Metaphysics, tt in ~I ~il¥Ueb% Qf {\Us\ol{ Ca(Q,Jh e<l. P. A. 
Schilpp• Chicago, 19 , 9- • 
43nF.instein, Mach anc.~ Logical Positivism., 1oc. ci;. • ?80. 
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It is th.e latter view, rather tha.n the strict 1 op~rational­
ism1 of Bridgman, which Frank developed in his later works. Not 
that Frank ct:itici.zed Bridgman unfavorably; b.e a,sret'<l with the 
Latter in respect to the application of Language of science gua 
science. But F~ank saw th.at meaning goes beyond the operational 
ciefinitio.n - the Oi>eratio.r1s one performs to test t.11.e idea. Frank 
saw the non-scientific aspects of scie11c:EJ• for wb.ich operational-
ism fails to hold. 
Discussing the c:our ses he taught in philosophy of scie·nee, 
Frank illustrated this more moderate view. 0 t take great pains," 
he said, 0 t:o present an adequate conception of 'straight meta-
physics' and, at the other extreme, 'straight positivism' 'Which 
bluntly says th.at there is W! principle exce.!pt those which can be 
confirmed by the agreEltnent of their consequences with @xper-
ience. 044 In this latter group, F'ra.nk would include Hume• Comte, 
Sta11o, Peirce, Mao.;., Poiticare, James, Dewey• Bridgman• Wittgen-
stein ancl Carnap. 
G'HAPTER Vll 
SCIENCE AND CULTURE 
As has been demonstrated in numerous examples above, Frank 
h.ad a great interest in science, not only as a theoretical disci• 
pline and. a source of truth about nature, but also as it fits into 
the Whole human endeavor. Whatever confidence he may have felt in 
the processes of science as the best way to thi.a.k, he recognized 
the need to integrate science into the liberal education and social 
philosophy of the culture that developed it. Lacking such an in• 
tegration, he felt, science had been abused, and misunderstood. 
The efforts of this Chapter will be to co.naider more closely the 
role that science can, and in Frank's opinion, ought to play, for 
the advancement of society, not only as a tool for its material 
well-being, but more important, as a way of thinking. 
There ar~ natural tendencies for scientists to develop an 
attitude of uncritical isolationism, and for science to divorce 
itself from other fields. ln the first place, society at large 
often views scientists, especially u..~ivers1ty types, as cold and 
reasoning individuals, wbo steep themselves in abstractions which 
have little appeal for the conmon man. i-~urther, science is also 
viewed at times with suspicion as an agency for the advancement of 
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materialism• and the engines of political power. Th.is view ltas 
been supported from time to time by cases in which politically 
naive scientists have become dupes of governmental leaders, or 
social reformers, who uae the scientists• reputation and profes• 
sional aki1L to support their own schemes for power. Often scien-
tists, particularly those knowledgeable in the field of war 
machinery, have been targets for defection operations mounted 
against major world powers, like America and the SOVlet Union. 
On the other hand, scientlsta themselves add to the es-
trangement by viewing the political and philosophical worlds with 
suspicion or disgust. Th.ey are not at home in the realm of un-
predictable human actions. Instead of becoming involved ln poli-
tical and social machinations. or philosophical speculation, they 
pref er to lea<l a cloistered 11f e in the safety of their labora-
tories, where all the variable• are known, or at least knowable. 
Physicists may call the attempts to find metaphyeical interpreta-
tions of scie.nce - for example, the theories of relativity - just 
so much nonsense. 8ut 1 as Frank comments, "Unfortunately, this 
•nonsense• has a powerful effect upon human behavior, and a phyal-
cist who is not able to glve his students a precise account of the 
philosophical repercussions of relativity does not fulfill the 
auties of a physics teacher in a democratic society."1 
In an article entitled "Science Linked to Life, n2 Frank 
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suggeata one way in which aclentiats ~•n.b.elp 1 through publica• 
tions. to overcome the tendency to divorce acleoce from culture. 
Science does not normally advance. he says, through the publishing 
of booka 1 in the. way that other fields do. linate#.n'a HtfaJ,,pg of 
lfl•tlxl~ is a rare exception. There ahould 1 Frank think.s 1 be 
more ef foi:-ts along this 11.o.e. For example, one aigb.t use ~ortho• 
dox texts in his courses that place equal emphasis on the mathe• 
matical, the experimental, and the philosophical views. Tb.is would 
allow for more comparison and choice on the students• part. Also, 
more 1bandbooks 1 and other reference materials should be made 
available. Another important area is in the ao-called 'populari• 
aat1on 1 of aclentlflc findings for the consumption of 11ayaen•. 
frank calls for more 'literary' works to be written by trained 
scientists, JllefttlOAing by way of illustration the book gQ•fph 
SIQO'• B\• Llfe •ed.. Wgrk. Of more recent publications, we might 
add Tbt M1sft! IMS•Cf 1 and XU T.Grlto.£it•I. lnsatlye. It 
seema 1 as a matter of fact, that biology has been far more g~ven 
to literary interpretation than other aciences. Finally• books 
that combine humanistic and scientific philosophy are needed. As 
a good example of this, Frank cites C&•sirer's book, 'tJ\t ptob\n 
2( &!cmlf!dU• 
Today1 looking over the ac1eAtific publlcatioas since 1950, 
when Frank's critici• waa written, OAe ia surprised and encouraged 
to see that all the typea of writing that Frank mentioned, de• 
acrlbed above, have undergone an 1.o.creaae of publication. This is 
especially true in the populari.zatiOAs of scientific developments, 
:, 
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and more recently, 1n the u.p-gradl.ag of text materials, such as 
th.e Bi.ologlcal SCience Curriculum S~t and the Physical Science 
Study Commlttee aeries for high school, and beglmat.ng college 
courses. 1n view of this one wonders if Frank'• early crlt1c1am 
was somehow 1Af1uentia1. At any rate, the lncreaaes i.n publica-
tions indicate tbat Prank's opi.nt.on of the COW\tey 1 s need.a in th.la 
area has become the generally-accepted opinion. 
The first place to begin ef f orta at reuniting acience and 
the humanities is, of course, in the science classroom. A sci• 
e.ntist who i.a knowledgeable of hi.a cultural environment should be 
particularly well-suited to develop in his students a sense of 
direction - to give them what Hutchi.ns has called wisdom, namely, 
"the knowledge of principles and causes.n3 ln his fb&losoehX of 
§Sl!BS!; Iha LMJ!s il£ntA IQIQSI !Qd £bi121mmza Frank describes 
th.e potential educational value of science in terms similar to 
those of Hutchins. '!'here, he says, 
Science has to do• on the one hand, with hard 
stubborn facts 1 and on the other hand, with general ideas. 5.'hat aei.e.nce teacbes us is the correlation 
between both. 'lhe chief thing w'li.versity educators 
should give to students la interest in tb.e possibility 
of coordinating stubborn facts by means of abstract 
prillcipl.es. 1.'hia is the most faacioatlng topic of 
university education. • •• We need a full understand• 
!.Ag of the principles of physics or biology, and under• 
301ted 1.n EllilosPQb,Y gf isl:8"1t xiii. 
1
,1 
' 
' 
j,I 
' j 
ae&nding not only of logical argument but alao of P81'• 
chological and sociological lava; briefly, we need to 
complement the science Of physical nature b)' the sci-
ence of man. 4 ·· 
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l'bia is the potential value of science. However, it is a 
matter of tact that: science teachers often fail to meet Cbeir 
potential, :ln Che classroom. 'J.b.8" tend to be dull, eometlaes even 
o.n purpose, from a misguided aenee of duty to what Chey call •ob-
jectlvity1. lt is safe to say that most atudenta who atay t.n sci-
ence do ao J.B. m;1 of their teachers, rather than lflSl.Qll of th-. 
These atude.nta are so highly motivated to learn about science that 
they put up with their education, for the sake of the end. 
"there ia scarcely any doubt,,. Frank observes, "that the 
teachers of pb.lloaopb.71 hiatoq1 or EngU.ab. bave a much greater ln-
flue11ce upon the intellectual and emotional make-up of the average 
college atUdent than the teacbera of maeh.atics or cll•istry."S 
Wben faced with questions about the mean1ng of science I. proaoa of 
the •relativity of trutb.1 or the 'freedom of the td.11 1 1 Frank 
c1a1.ma1 "The ac1ent1at will, aa a matter of fact• often be more 
helpleae than an intelligent reader of popular magaa:l.nes."6 eoa-
ventional teaching i.n science baa resulted 1n uncritical tM..ald.ng .. 
Frank goes on to observe, ttthe Longing for the :l.ntegration of 
knowledge is very deeply rooted ln the human ml.Ad. If it 1• 11ot 
4£b&&ii2WIZ gf §ci1PSS!1 xiv. 
s~ •• xv. 
~ss a;&snc,~ I&! ftY.L2•sm.ut. 230. 
cuJ.tivated by the science teacher• it will look for other out-
lets. n7 
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Such other outlets may be popular presentations of scie.nce, 
or worse, even anti•acientific ideologies. Thus, the student with 
a purely technical training is, Frank continues, "extremely gull-
ible when he is faced with paeudopbi.losophic and pseudoreligious 
interpretations 'that f 111 somehow tb.e gap left by bis acie.ace 
couraea."8 'lhia writer i.a rf!llli...Nled of a piece of graffiti that 
made the rounds of the engineering school he attended. lt pictured 
a country bick.1 with bayaeed in hie hair, and a sliderule in his 
pocket, saying, "Two years ago 1 couldn't even spell 'lnjuneer•, 
and now 1 Ga one I " 
Frank recommend• th.at cou.raea in the pbiloaopb.y of science 
be made obligatory tor all students of science, be it pure science 
or technology. 1n the chapter of tlOJiltra Sc1taa and lttl rl!iLosE1Y 
entitled .. Philosophy of Science in the Physic• CUrr1culum1 ° he 
outlines sucb. a course, aa he taught it at Harvard for many years. 
"t1 starting point," he eays there, "has been the traditional dis-
tinction between •scientific truth.' and 1pbJ.Losophic truth.' 
Specifically, 1 have referred to the formulation that the great 
medieval philosopher, lhotnas Aqulna.a, gave to Ch.ls diati.nction." 
Fram t:hia point, Frank gives a hiatorical survey of prin-
ciples Cbat have been used by adentiata, as a basis for their 
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1>ropositions. His students studied the mechanistic period in its 
entirety - approximately 1600-1900 - based on Newtonian laws of 
mechanics. To show that these latter are not 'self-evident' the 
students examined tb.e earlier period of Aristotelian or 'organis• 
mic' science. Having established this historical perspective, 
Fra.ak took his students through the development of 'Logico-empir• 
ical analysis'• and showed its .epplicat1on to tb.e most relevant 
parts of physics today 1 such as geometry 1 Iiewtonian mechanics, the 
corpuscular and relativistic theories of light, and quantum theory. 
Similar examination was given to causality, determination, chance, 
energy and mass. Finally, the course examined the philosophical 
interpretations of science, and what Prank calls "the lin.k. of 
metaphysical creeds with religious and political creeda.u8 
Tb.is is the way in which Frank tried, in his ovn work, to 
reestablish the link between philosophy and science. Whatever 
merits his particu.1.ar approach to the course may be, Frank makes 
a strong case for this kind of study in the well-rounded curri-
culum. He generalizes hia convictions about the efficacy of such. 
a program, thus: 
lf science is taught in thia way, t:b.e emphasis o.n 
science ane. technology will no longer be an obstacle 
t:o a Liberal education of the student. Tb.e deplorable 
gap between science and the humanities will not arise, 
let aloae widen. On t:be other hand, the latenalve 
stuciy of science as a living being will give to the 
student of it a prof oun<l understanding of tb.e role of 
the human mind 1n human action, which. is the very goal 
81,W.., 258. 
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of instruction in the humanities.9 
Frank's suggestions about science teaching seem almost 
prophetical. ln the last few years there has been a tendency 
among science textbook writers, and curriculum study committees, 
to follow some of the suggestions that Frank has offered. Partic-
ularly effective are the Biological Science Curriculum Study, and 
the Physical Science Study Committee, supported by federal and 
private funds, wilich have combined the experience and ideas of 
thousands of teachers throughout the United States, to develop a 
unified approach to the teaching of science to high school, and 
latterly, to college students. One of their principal beliefs is 
that one cannot simply teach fa5g1; indeed, the explosion of know-
ledge in the sciences has 1Rtde 1t a practical impossibility to 
learn all the facts, even were it desirable to know them. This 
Frank would agree with entirely. 
The effort baa now become, of necessity• a search for gen• 
aralizat1ons and unifying principles. One is reminded of a story 
Frank tells about Einstein. The Latter was once confronted with a 
remark Thomas Edison had made about the uaeless.neaa of college 
education. When someone told Einstein what Edison bad said, he 
answered, "lt ia not so very important for a person to learn facts. 
For that he does not really need a college. He can Learn th• from 
9~ •• 282. 
158 
books. The value of an education in a liberal arts college is not 
the learning of many facts but the training of the mind to think 
sometlling that cannot be learned from textbooka. 1110 Tllis remark 
also characterizes Frank's attitude. 
3. ~cie,gtif!£ Specia\lzati9n 
Sometimes it is held that the depth of detail demanded of a 
scientist in order to be a leader in his field makes it impossible 
for him to gain a proper perspective on his study. He has to run, 
just in order to keep from falling behind, it b.as been said. 
Therefore, in order to gain any depth. of understanding, scientists 
must limit their area of study drastically. Gone are the days of 
the so-called 'natural philosopher' who knew something of all the 
sciences, and tried to integrate them with an overview. Now there 
are experts in solid-state electronics, laser optics, crystal• 
ograph.y, and the like - topics that are totally foreign to the 
uninitiated. As Frank points out,11 it seems almost like another 
Tower of Babel, where there bas been a •confusion of tongues•, and 
the progeas baa stopped. 
How does Frank answer this criticism? He holds that there 
is actually a unifying trend within science th.at tends to overcome 
the disintegrating effect of specialization. Aa more and more is 
discovered about particular sciences, 'Which at first seemed to be 
lOcited in f.io@;fHl.i. His &ife and Tkla, 185. 
llcf. "Contemporary Science and the Contemporary World 
View, 11 Loe. cit., 60. 
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disparate 1 principle• are dlacovered wh1ch can be applied to more 
than one branch of study• thua reunltlng them. For example, the 
apparent boundariea between traditional 'chemistry• and traditional 
'phyalca• have been broken down, so that one can now study physi-
cal chemistry, or atomic pbyaica 1 aa intermediate areas. Much. the 
same elimination of boundaries seems to be tald.ng place as well in 
the area of bio-phyalce. 
Some educators look for integrating principles to come from 
so-called perennial philoaophlea1 which will not need revision. 
For Catholics 1 this might be provided by Thomism; for Communists, 
by Dialectical Materialism. But Frank warns that there would be a 
high price to pay for such perm&nel'lt unifying principles. The 
only way to keep euch ph11oaopb.1es from becoming outmoded would be 
to eliminate their direct connection to present reality • in other 
words, to make them tautologous and irrefutable. Frank does not 
see this as a satisfactory solution. 1Datead 1 he offer• the 
1acient1fic method' as the only realistic way of integration. 
Scientists and philosophers need not agree on uL;1!!te general 
princlples 1 in order to agree on the practical aims of their 
education and researcb.12 
4. S5\enst anq Mft~r1•&ltm 
lt vas seen above that science has often been called upon 
to support varying philosophical and moral codes; in.deed, one anc 
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the same ac1entif ic theory baa at times bean used to prove two 
contradictory ideas. Because the making of generalizations is a 
creative. human endeavor, wblch. can go far beyond the collecting 
of facts, it can often be abused in the sense mentioned. The link· 
ing of science and philosophy ia of ten as much a matter of personal 
taste as it is a matter of logic. As R. Oppenheimer once said, 
commenting on a paper of Frank.1a, "Everything cannot be connected 
with everythlftg; everythlng can be co.nnect:ed with anything.•13 
Does science encourage ma teriallatic thinking 'l Al though 
one cannot say that a particular scientific theory supports this or 
that metaphysical qst•, or naoraL code• ia there not some ev:l.dence 
Chat scientific tblnking in general supports material1811l't After 
all, scientists look for causal lows wholly within the material 
realm, and do not consider any other realm. 
lt appears that Frank'• vie'tl of this 411ueatioa cbanged some-
what toward the end of his life. ln 1938, in the lpsY'cL!?.R!d'=! of 
ynifltd Sciense, Frank suggested that metaphysical terms do not 
belong i.n science. 'J.'b.ere he satd, "A •soulless• pqcbology and a 
•matterless' phyaica have been eatabl.iahed as parts of 'Unified 
Science.• Word• 11.lte •matter• and •mind' are left to the language 
of everyday life where they have their legitimate place and are 
W'lder•t:OOd by the famous 'man i.n the street• unamblguoua1y.n14 
13ct. "1.be Growth of Science and the Structure of CUlture: 
Comments on Dr. Frank's Paper, .. DtedtLY! 87, 1958, 67-76. 
1422,. si.t•t 502. 
I ' ~ 
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Similarly, one critic of Frank's book, Modtm sc&.11999 and 1§1. 
filiL012alll:t suggested th.at its main thesis waa: "There are no sig-
nificant questions th.at are ao profound that they cannot be solved 
by tb.e exact aciencea.nl5 
Toward the end of his 11f e, Frank exhibited an increasing 
tendency to view science proper &Ad its metaphysical interpret&· 
tio.na to be somehow integrated 1n the person of the scientist. 
The connection is not a logical one; 1t ia paycholog1ca1 1 and it 
certainly is real. ln respect to tb.e queation. asked about mater• 
iali.sm anc1 science, tb.en1 one can claim thia: Science does not 
1.ead to, or support, a material.iatic view of life, nor does it 
discourage or refute it. Such a view of life R£•£tdll the know-
ledge that acience off era, since it is pare of the makeup of the 
scientist. 
In oi:der to avoid the materialistic interpretation, if it 
is to be avoided, educators mwst do two things. First, aa Frank 
suggests, they must show the historical development of science and 
its several revolutt.ona, and the metaphysical interpretations that 
have been attached to it from time to time. 'l'his vlll break down 
the idea. 1 on the one ba.n.d. 1 that there is a 'right' interpretation, 
and on the ot:her ha.od 1 it will ebow how closely I.inked science and 
its interpretations are, as a matter of fact. Secondly, educators 
must establish. the aoats for which they vish science to be em-
ployed, not only as a technical tool, but especia11y1 as a way of 
thought. 
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These ideas do not tell what Frank. may have felt personally 
with. respect to materialism as a philosophy. l'hi• writer is unable 
to interpret hia views in this regard, v1th any degree of certainty. 
One might aasUl'l.\e, from the 1.nterest Frank b.ad 1n such groups •• 
the Co.nf ertmce on science, Ph.l.Loaophy and Religion, that he vaa 
not a materialist, although h1• background was positiviatic. 
Frank was born a Jew, wblc:h ceul.d support the same conclusion. 
Yet one of his Lifett.me friends has auggeated thla conclusion is 
on shaky ground. She aaya, 8 Ph111pp might have 'been an aeh.elat." 16 
1n terms of hi.a vlews on truth• Frank •• an empl.rict.at. 
However, he seems to view empt.rt.cal. knowledge in a very broad way 
• broad enough, one might even say, to admit of atl experience. 
la 1950, for instance, be stated, 
Beyond experience, reason and imagination there are 
no faculties by which the human mind can find knowledge. 
the cooperation of these three faculties follow• one and 
the same general pattern in all fields. Not only science 
proper, but also politics and religion, are ultimately 
based on principles that are the result of creative 
1mag1nat.1on, and that are teated by experience.17 
A scientist who claims to baae his ideas on facts must take 
into account historical and psychological facts too. Frank noted 
this frequently. Thus the truest view of the world must include 
the ec1.ant1st 1n it as a human, alongside the Chin.gs he studies. 
16t..etter from Mme. R. von Mises to Justin Synnestvedt, 
April 10, 1969. 
17se1a5iv&u1 .. A N&1l!r I(g~h, ss. 
i 
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ln the words of Heisenberg, mi.ch Frank cited in one of his last 
writings, "Method and object can no Longer be aeparated. 0 18 Else-
where, i.n the same year, Frank suggested that it is false to 
separate pure science from QUJ.tural values. Such a vlew1 he main• 
tai.ned, "ignores the close ties vh.l.cb. have always a.ad everywhere 
existed between maA1 a picture of the pl\ya1ca1 universe and his 
picture of an ideal human society."19 
Finally, collating theae idea.a, one is safe to assume t..iutt 
Frank felt science does not strengthen any one view of the nature 
of reality over any other. Rather it is a way of aymboliaing 
reality, just aa poetry is another way. Neither way gives the 
•true picture•. As Frank aaid 1 "Reality can o.nly be experieACed 1 
never repreaented. 1120 
s. S;,1tace anq R.!m2craa 
After World War 11 there were many pb.11osophical confer· 
ences and many works written to reexamine democratic ideals, and 
to determine what forces in society might e.xplain the growth of 
autocracies in various parts of the world. Frank belonged to one 
such effort - the Conference on Science, Ph.ilosoplly and Religion• 
from its start in 1940. His book, R!!Latj,v&tx: A JY:chtE Iruhl!, 
published in 19501 is an integration of llis ideas as they were 
18"?.ifan Confronts Himself," 1.2£. £&.t. 
19 "Tb.$ Present Role of Science, " 12£. sit.• , 14 • 
20"Contanporary Sc1e11ce and the Contemporary World View," 
1.f.C._sll., 65. 
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presented an<l developed during the decade of his concern vi.th that 
Conference. _It was Frank's belief that science - or, more exactly, 
t.he •splri.t of modern science' - 1.s in no way deleterious to the 
ideal of a democra~ie society. On the contrary, it provides the 
possibility for establishing that ideal in th• t.~inking of its 
students with something more permanent and valid than prejudice or 
propaganda. 
How a good science education can accomplish this is, i.n 
Frank's opinion• quite aimple, 14\at one might call the scientific 
attitude la one that la basically critical of .new ideas until it 
bas exand.ned them in the light of experience. Because it tries to 
stay close to the 'facts•, it is antimetaphysical. And because it 
is co.naciou1 of the need for exact •operational detinltio.n•, it is 
wary of oversimplifications, attd the application of generalities 
to realms that are untested. In Frank's words, "If the student of 
physics gets Ms instruction with a view to the integration of 
knowledge, hs wi11 Learn that sciMce cannot •prove• any fact. 
Instead, it confirm• principles by the deacriptio.n of facts that 
are 'observed' by scientists generally." 
In his years at Prague, during the long build•up toward the 
second World war, Fra.nk had many opportunities to see the evils 
th.at can be supported by an unscientific attitude. OJ:le example 
will suffice for illustration - the Nazi concept of racial super-
iority. Because it was useful as a propaganda tool, the Nazis 
took over wholeheartedly the idea of Aryan supremacy which was 
initiated in the ninetee.nth century, and strengthened by Nietzsche. 
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The term non-Aryan soon came to refer, under NnS. thinking, to 
Jews. who were used as a scapegoat for all Gersaan problems. How-
ever, when Finns, and Japanese came to be allied with the Nazis, it 
was suggested, in all aeri.ouaneaa, that they were neither Aryans, 
nor non-Aryans. 'Ihia obvious contradiction is typical of the ab.l8e 
to whleb. language can be put, i.f t.t: ia viewed unscientifically. 
'l1l.e scientifically trained peraon w.l.ll not be apt to follow 
banners or slogans blindly. Th.ea• can be meaningful, if the con• 
tent they symbolize is mac1e known. But t:b.ey can al so become a too1 
for covering over specific meanings that leaders do not want to 
disclose. ~hat meaning 1 for example, dat'ts one man give to the 
national flag, when he salutes it freely fr.om Love? And how does 
that meaning compare to the .meaning understood by another man whose 
faith forbids him to salute, and who is proaecuted as a result? 
'l'he thoughtful person will try always to see within the 
symbol the specifics of the symbolism, and act accordingly. Such 
a "pragmatic spirit, n as Frank called it, "has notbJ.ng to do with" 
philosophic:aL skepticism. 21 l~ther, the meaning of principles 
consists, for the scientist, 1n the facts mich follow from them, 
and, as Frank concluded, "not in their sound or in the pleasurable 
emotions th.is soWlc1 arouses. n 
i'I" 
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CHAPTER V 111 
CONQ.USION 
lndicated 1.n the Pref ace above, the purpose of this study 
has been to exhibit the ideas of Philipp Frank as representing 
some of the major developments 1n the philosophy of science, to 
mid-century. It vi.11 be the effort of this Qi.apter to recapitulate 
briefly some of the points developed already, in order to confirm 
this thesis. 
The first historic trend that Frank's th.ought mirrors is 
the replaci~> of metaphysical idealism by positivistic empiricism. 
The Renaissance, as Whitehead and Frank suggest, brought an auton-
omy to science which encouraged, first, an anti-religious reaction, 
and after that, an anti-metaphysical reaction too.1 This scien-
tistic or positivistic trend, inspired by the successes in mathe-
matics a.nc: phy!iicaL scie.nce during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, and supported by the ideas of British empiricists, ha<l 
all but moL<led the intellectual milieu of European scientists -
including Frank and his young colleagues in Vienna. One aspect of 
this positivism waa a strong distaste for metaphysics, which sci-
entists considered to be vain and pompous. 
lcf. Ch.apter 111, section 5. 
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Of course the ninteenth century also witnessed the culmina-
tion of romantic idealism • primarily Kantian thought in much of 
Germany ... and an anti-scientific view as well. However, this was 
not the primary in.f luence on the young Frank, by hi.a own admission. 
What it provided vas an area of non-scientific thought to which 
Frank and his friends could turn, when they began to notice the 
problem• which the eAd of mechanistic science brought about. 
the second trend Frank'• writi.Ag bri.Aga out is the resur-
gence of metaphysic• once more, as a reaction to certain revolu-
tionary developments in mathematics 1 logic, and physics during the 
nineteenth eentw:y. Frank points out Chat Newtonian mechanics be-
gan to collapse in the face of non•Euclidean mathematics and 
eleetro-magnetlca.2 Thie invited the feeling that science, with a 
capital '•'• had ec:qeb,ov failed. Into the vacuum left by mechanism 
poured all sorts of religious and metaphysical iJlterpretations of 
the new science1 all trying to say, in effect, "1 told you so. 0 
For Frank and his associates, steeped in positiviatic tradition, 
there was a period of intense thought and study of the old and .new 
scientific ideas. together with their interpretatiOA•t to discover 
whether or not science had really failed and must be abandoned. 
Frank abed light on some of the metaphysical miai.ntet:pretations of 
acleace1 which Wive been discussed in tbi• work.3 
2Cf. Qiapter 11, section 2. 
3ct. especially Chapters lY and v. 
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'lhe developments being dlscuaaed bere are not clear and 
dlatt.nct. however, in terma of hi.atorl.c: periods. They overlap, 
and at tlmes run side-by-aide in time, ao that their edges are 
fuzay. nie distinction between these periOda is further smeared 
because aome persona tend generally toward the metaphysical view-
point, while others tend always toward the empirical. so, too, if 
Frank is to be representative, we must aee hi.JD as developing, not 
1n distinct, isolated stages, but continuously. For this reason, 
we cannot safely say bia early ldeaa were Mhphya1ca1 1 or that 
bJ.a middle period was given to Logical Poaitlviam, or that in the 
wisdom ot age he reached the aougbt-for ayntbesia although there 
i• aot1e truth 1n tbJ.a aimplificatio.n" OUr study baa tried to eh.ow 
that the b.umanlm, breadth, and moderation of Frank's ideas devel• 
oped along the 11.Jle, throughout his life. For this reaaon1 too, 
it ia not often easy to discover juet what Frank thought. At any 
one point, his thoughts were a combination of pros and eons -
further complicated by b.ia objectivity 1n reporting• even with 
respect to his own developmant.4 
~at saved science for Frank a.nd his acquaintances, as we 
nave pointed out, was the ayntheais of several important ideas, 
from me.a Like Macll1 Poincare, Dub.am and Einstein.5 Of course, the 
syntbeslzi.ns itself was done ma1.n11 by Frank and his colleagues. 
4we have shown several instances of misunderstanding on the 
part of Frank'• cr1t:1ca, which may, 1n part at leaat 1 be excused for thia reason. 
Set. Chapter 11, section 3. 
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The message they took from tbeae four men, and others of leaser 
importance, had two main parts. First, it was shown in various 
ways t:hat the tenet• of Newtonian mechanics, which had come to be 
viewed as self-evident truths about observable nature were in fact 
only useful constructions of the mlAd.1 sat up to give sensible 
causal form to the expl.a.aation of obaaned pb..-aena1 and to pro-
vide a means for predicting future events. Maas, velocity and 
energy are examples of such S'Mlltal. constructs, 11b.lc:h by themselves 
have no more claim to reality than Che moat unreachable ldeaa of 
metaphysics. It waa ab.own concomitantly that traditional mechan• 
i.cs, which employed such terms, was neither sacrosanct, nor was it 
synonymous with science in general. It was one of many possible 
system• for viewing the world. Co.naequent1y 1 for Frank's group, 
science became free to develop along modern llnea, without carry-
S.ng along the burden of metaphysical. trappi.nga that bad been hWlg 
on Newtonian mech.a.aica. 
2. TtAMW!&~ Al!.!.U:•i•; .A Qmltr11Nti,AA gf M!91;n P2sit&vie 
the second part of 'the synthesis we are discussing was 
cLoaely related to the first. having to do with the language of 
science, In th.la area, several things are .noteworthy. Fl.rat, 
ninet:eenth•century advances ln matb.ematlca and logic led to the 
realization that there may be many different language systems to 
describe tb.i.n.gs 1 and that no Ol'l8 system carries any guarantee of 
being the true interpretation of facts. The reason for choosing 
one system aver another • say Euclidean over Riema.nnian geometry -
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1.a just a matter of it• convenience a.rad approprt.ateneaa for the 
job to be done. Frank pouted this out.6 Similarly in logic 1 one 
may chooae two-valued, or .W.ti•vaLued aystema, depeadln.g on what 
he wiahea to describe. 
Juat ~t constitutes the con.nection between a language 
system and what 1t purports to describe is another sector of the 
language development that concerned Frank. ln acientif ic work, 
which proved to be most amenable to analysis, Bridgman presented 
the phase cal.Led •operatio.aaliam1 , which can be summarized aa 
follows: Tbe meaning of a scientific term, aay maaa for example, 
does not inhere b tb.e name. Ratner, a term 11 properly defined 
simply by elucidating what operations one may perform to illus-
trate vb.at the term aigoifiea. Thia signification will always be 
relative to other tems. The c0t0plex. of terma are mutually 
def 1.ned by tile i.Dterrelation of the operations to which they 
refer. Maas, in our example, could mean the measured value one 
gets for mi or 1112 wen they are related to other measured values 
by the equation: 
F • G m1 ·m2 • 
r2 
However, Bridgman added, there is a danger of circularity, if one 
defines all the members of such a relation only ill terms of the 
other members. One must teat such operational definitions by 
independent means • as, for example, by other operatiorus. ln the 
6cf. eapec1a1Ly Olapter Vt, section 6. 
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example of maaa, one could aolve another equation involving 'm' 
which ls independent of the first, and comparing the values by 
measurement. Newton's Second Law: F • m•a, might provide such a 
second test. 
Bridgman's developments in scientific Language were incor-
porated in the Vienna group's emphasis on 1physica1ism', which 
proposed to reduce scientific statements to their Leaat common 
denominator, in terms of sense-data, or sense-related statements 
called •protocols.• Thia pbaae of Frank's thought ia epitomized 
by his words, 0 A 'soulless' psychology and a 'matterleaa' physics 
have been established as parts of 'Unified Science.' Words like 
•matter' and 'mind' are left to the language of everyday Life 
where they have their legitimate place ••• u7 
There was a similar effort to reduce !JJ. Language to ex• 
plicit sense-oriented statements - atomic propositions, as 
Wittgenstein, for one• called them. Of course, lt was seen, too, 
that many statements can have a clearly defined meaning without 
depending on sense-experience. Such are the statements in matbe• 
matics and Logic, like, "A straight Line is the shortest distance 
between two points, 0 or "Not p and •p simultaneously." This sort 
of statement, together with empirical statements, tied down by 
suitable operational def initiona, were said to exhaust the realm of 
meaningful discourse. ALL else was cognitatively empty. 
7cf. Chapter IV, section 2, on "The Abuse of Scientific 
Language." 
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3. The Ri!! •Qd l•&L of Logical Posittvi1m 
Such ideas as these developed into the Logical Positivism 
of the Vienna Circle. Although Frank waa influenced by the ideas, 
and added his own to the rest, be remained somewhat apart from the 
main movement, for reasons of practicality, aa well as by choice. 
This bae been pointed out frequently. 
Ramiflcatlcns of linguistic and scientific analyses pro-
pounded by the Vienna Circle led to the Analytic school, and still 
later to the so-called ordlnary language philosophy within and 
without Logical Positivism - especially ln F.ngland an~ America. 
the main movement, covering. a period, aay, from 1910 to 1940, 
developed many valuable contributions, as this eaaay has tried to 
point out.8 Nonetheless, it included some inaurmountable problems. 
Doctrinally speaking, its major weakness Lay in the so-called 
'criterion of verifiability.• Put in simplest terms, this doctrilE' 
held that no statement is meaningful unless it ia (1) empirically 
verifiable, or (2) necessarily true, 1n the manner of mathematical 
and logical propositions. 'lbe argument against this dOc:trine can 
be 1\IDIDarized as follows: If every meaningful statement either 
baa logico-mathematical necessity, or else can be empirically ver-
ified, then the criterion for meaningfulness ia itself meaning-
less, because (1) it is not Logico-mathematical in form, and (2) 
Set. Chapter 11, section s. 
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it ia not eaplrically true, alnee lt cannot be teated, and many 
people doubt it. 
More important 'than thl• teehnlcal problem with Logical 
Poaltlvism, however, ls the attitudinal problem it symbolizes, and 
it is here that Frank dlff ers most strongly from th.at movement. 
Frank, aa well as Carnap and others, came to crltlclze the Vienna 
group'• efforts at linguistic reduction, for going too far.9 
Clearty there were concepts, even in the sciences, whichcould not 
be reduced to the level that lridgrun, for f.tll:Ample, had suggested. 
But what the crltlciama that Frank and others put forward really 
mean, for our purposea, 1• that they began to eee in Logical Poal-
tiviam a degree of eelf•certalnty and oversinlplifieation that was 
objectlonable. It was ln&ppropriata to face a world full of con• 
fusion and complexity With this attitude. More apeclfically, 
Logical Positivism did not allow enough room for a broad human• 
istic :Lnterpreta.tion, to inclUde areas of discourse that were 
emotional, psychological, religious, aea~hetlc and the like. 
According to our thesis, tnia is just the reason tlh.y Frank never 
fully embraced Logical Poa1t1Tism, and why he left it more and 
more with time's passing.IO 
Such criticisms aimed against Logical Positivism for its 
lack of breadth and its over-emphasis of logico-matbematical 
9cf. Chapter II, sections 3 and 4. 
lOcf. Chapter 11, section 7. 
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thought, brtnga us to the culmination of thla atud:y. These criti.• 
clams point up the need for ayntheaia in philosophy a.ad science, 
just as Fra.nlc.'s own development shows an effort at auch llJ"ntheaia. 
There is a dialectic pattern in his Life, if one may borrow Regel• 
1an terms. Tb.e metaphysical domination of science up to about 
16001 and Frank's corresponding metaphysical interests, form a 
thesis; the developing autonomy of science from metaphysics • say 
from 1600 to 1900 • and Frank'• interests in pure pb.yalca and 
Logical Positivism represent an antithesis; finally, current 
developments, which. emphasize the h1atorlca1 and sociological 
aspects of science, represent a synthesis of the former extremes. 
But as we bave suggested above, our dialectic has fussy edges, 
because lt is a theoretical model forced upon the facts. lt does 
not fit 1n all respects. 
4. Ph1ti2e.fra1!5: P&~al1tt 1 Bument:st1 Rtla~ivisk 
The complexity of Frank's ideas makes of him a good para-
digm for contemporary philosophy of science.. Just as his avowed 
aim was to sy.ntb.eaize philosophy and science, his •ny-faceted 
ideas demand from us, too, a ayntheals of some sort. A brief 
Listing of his traits may accompllah this. 
Frank was an intellectual, capable of great abstraction and 
erudition, as illustrated by hls mastery of Languages, and his 
knowledge of Einstein's work in relativity. But he was also an 
activist, originating and supporting numerous agencies for sci-
ence and philosophy - especially those which might help to improve 
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the quality of education and inspire a.n appreciation for democ-
racy. Frank. was a theoretical phyaiciat, yet his concern for 
experimentation ve have aLao noted. Frank waa a traditionalist, 
insofar as be aimed at historical perspective and demonstrated his 
debt to people like Mach, Kant, Hume, and even Aquinas. He was 
also mocteaa,prai.aing the developments of contemporary aclence and 
methodology, and criticiziag the untested metapb.yalca and outmoded 
mechanics, even of twentiety•century aclentiata. Frank was prag-
matic, often me11tion1ng the thoughts of James aftd Peirce 1n sup-
port of tbe social meaning of theories - their 1cash value'. Yet 
he also dealt 1n metaphyalca - pexhapa a aimpl1f1ed1 common-sense 
type• but metaphyaica n011et:heleaa. Frank showed concern with 
moral questions, especially those surrounding the abuse of poli-
tical power. Nevertheless b.e felt that most efforts to find a 
perennial moral system to sexve as a guide to education • such as 
R. K. Hutchins had advocated .11 would probably fail. In this 
regard, Frank aaid, 
The trouble with such a program (aa Hutchins 
proposed) l.a 1 of course, the problem of ft.ndl.Ag these 
principles of permanent validity. As a matter of 
fact, the permanence of the philosophical prl.ncl.plea 
can be kept up and guaranteed only by apt.ritual or 
secular authorities or both. No univeralty education 
can be based on metaphysics unless the choice of it 
:La decided by an authority that ls permanently 1..n 
control of the teaching.12 
llcf. fh:iJ:.01opQz of sc~tace, xiii. 
12llJr.9.. 
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Note, f'rank di.d not aay it is wrong to look for metaphysi-
cal prl.nciples, to use, for example, in guiding a university cur-
riculum; it la •imply t.mpractlcaL to find such principles that are 
truly permanent. That Frank did, l.n fact, believe in the efficacy 
of guiding principles ia definite. Thay are part - a non-scien-
tific part, granted, but .nonetheless a real part - of our given 
culture. To de.ny them would be aa foolish aa it would be near-
sighted. Frank commented to thla effect in one of his last papers, 
delivered to the Twelfth lnter.national Congress of Philosophy, at 
Venice, in 1958. He stated tbat the man who posits a •strict 
dichotomy• between 'facts• (e.g. of science) and •values' (e.g. of 
politics) 0 ignorea the close ties which bave always and every-
where existed between man 1 a pict:ure of the physical universe and 
his picture of an ideal human aociety. 0 13 
ln sum, Frank was a pluralist, a humanist and al.ways a 
moderate person. Faced with ao many vi.able options, he was alao 
a relativist. But that term muat be applied cautiously in this 
caae1 and only now, after we h.ave studied Frank, can we apply it 
in the same way th.at Frank would apply it. ln hi• book, &!L•tiv• 
iSYI A Richer: T;YiQ, Frank proposes that relativism is a neces-
sary and useful part of our culture. He does not favor the skep-
tical relativism which. Likes to cite J:'elativity theory to prove 
that nothing is certain. Rather, what Frank means ia the attitu<le 
13cf. "The Present Role of Sci.ence, 0 in Acts of the I!t!Lf~q 
lniernatl:,qnaJ. 90Dgr9a1 ot f4'L21mmz:, Florence, !Ho. 
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of suspending judgment until the faeta are in • the wllllngnesa to 
take the time to examine• scientifically and objectively as pos-
sible, all aides of the question. Finally, he means also that 
wbe.a one doea make a judgment, he makes it ln modest terms - not 
with self-confident aplomb - because ha realizes that wben our 
tools are more refined, or when the socio-psychological situation 
demands it, there will be a re-examination, and a re-evaluation, 
and most Likely the judgment will have to be changed. In t:hia 
sense of relativism, as Frank defines it, we see one of the best 
off spring of modern scientific thought. It is the attitude wb.ich 
characterizes Frank himself. 
Frank was not a highly original thinker. Hts abilities lay 
more in the way of rethinking and synthesizing what had already 
been said. He did not have a pet theory for which he might become 
famous. His ideas were many, and his approach was modest. He 
fits well the description of Werner Heisen.berg 1 in IQe fQ:rs!sist'£ 
ConcoQti,on qf .tf..a1;u;1, that 'modern science' (after Galileo) is 
characterized by 'modesty•. This modesty disappeared in the nine-
teenth century, but nas reappeared in the twentieth.14 Perhaps 
such modesty will prevent Frank from being widely read; 1t should 
not, howavei", preven.t a thoughtful student who reads him from dis-
covering an impressive depth of knowledge, well expressed. 
Frank discussed most of the aspects of philosophy of sci-
ence. He shed ligb.t on all of them, primarily by refusing to lose 
14cf. ''Ma.a Confronts HimseLf 1" Frank's review of Heisen-
berg's book, in §!~dar Rev\~ 2f Lite~a£~! 41, Oct. 25, 1958. 
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sight of the whole. ln this way• his contribution appears to be 
an eloquent reaffirmation of the Greek norm: moderation. No 
method or insight may claim to off er the whole truth. Frank 
showed that metaphysics alone 1s vague and 1.neffective; he also 
showed that empiricism alone is pointless. A philosopher of 
science - if he follows Fra.nk's leading • will make uae of both. 
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